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Jeffrey C. King (king-jc)

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Bibliography

    Glanzberg, Michael and King, Jeffrey C. 2020. Binding, Compositionality, and Semantic Values.” Philosophers’ Imprint 20(2).
    King, Jeffrey C. 1987. Pronouns, Descriptions and the Semantics of Discourse.” Philosophical Studies 51(3): 61–93.
    King, Jeffrey C. 1991. Instantial Terms, Anaphora and Arbitrary Objects.” Philosophical Studies 61(3): 239–265.
    King, Jeffrey C. 1993. Intentional Identity Generalized.” The Journal of Philosophical Logic 22(1): 61–93.
    King, Jeffrey C. 1994a. Anaphora and Operators.” in Philosophical Perspectives 8: Logic and Language, edited by James E. Tomberlin, pp. 221–250. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
    King, Jeffrey C. 1994b. Can Propositions Be Naturalistically Acceptible? in Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19: Philosophical Naturalism, edited by Peter A. French, Theodore E. Uehling Jr., and Howard K. Wettstein, pp. 53–75. Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press.
    King, Jeffrey C. 1995. Structured Propositions and Complex Predicates.” Noûs 29(4): 516–535.
    King, Jeffrey C. 1996. Structured Propositions and Sentence Structure.” The Journal of Philosophical Logic 25(5): 495–521.
    King, Jeffrey C. 1997. Structured Propositions.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win1997/entries/propositions-structured/.
    King, Jeffrey C. 1998. What is a Philosophical Analysis? Philosophical Studies 90(2): 155–179.
    King, Jeffrey C. 1999. Are Complex ‘That’ Phrases Devices of Direct Reference? Noûs 33(2): 155–182.
    King, Jeffrey C. 2000. On the Possibility of Correct Apparently Circular Dispositionall Analyses.” Philosophical Studies 98: 257–278.
    King, Jeffrey C. 2001a. Complex Demonstratives: A Quantificational Account. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, doi:10.7551/mitpress/1990.001.0001.
    King, Jeffrey C. 2001b. Remarks on the Syntax and Semantics of Day Designators.” in Philosophical Perspectives 15: Metaphysics, edited by James E. Tomberlin, pp. 291–333. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
    King, Jeffrey C. 2001c. Structured Propositions.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2001/entries/propositions-structured/.
    King, Jeffrey C. 2002a. Designating Propositions.” The Philosophical Review 111(3): 241–241.
    King, Jeffrey C. 2002b. Two Sorts of Claim about ‘Logical Form’.” in Logical Form and Language, pp. 118–131. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    King, Jeffrey C. 2003. Tense, Modality, and Semantic Values.” in Philosophical Perspectives 17: Language and Philosophical Linguistics, edited by Dean W. Zimmerman and John Hawthorne, pp. 195–245. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
    King, Jeffrey C. 2004. Anaphora.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2004/entries/anaphora/.
    King, Jeffrey C. 2006a. Singular Terms, Reference and Methodology in Semantics.” in Philosophical Issues 16: Philosophy of Language, edited by Ernest Sosa, pp. 141–161. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
    King, Jeffrey C. 2006b. Semantics for Monists.” Mind 115(460): 1023–1058.
    King, Jeffrey C. 2006c. Formal Semantics.” in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language, edited by Ernest LePore and Barry C. Smith, pp. 557–573. Oxford Handbooks. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199552238.001.0001.
    King, Jeffrey C. 2007a. The Nature and Structure of Content. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199226061.001.0001.
    King, Jeffrey C. 2007b. What in the world are the ways things might have been? [on Stalnaker (2003)].” Philosophical Studies 133(3): 443–453.
    King, Jeffrey C. 2008a. Complex Demonstratives, QI Uses, and Direct Reference.” The Philosophical Review 117(1): 99–117.
    King, Jeffrey C. 2008b. Complex Demonstratives as Quantifiers: Objections and Replies.” Philosophical Studies 141(2): 209–242.
    King, Jeffrey C. 2009. Questions of Unity.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 109(3): 257–277.
    King, Jeffrey C. 2011. Structured Propositions.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2011/entries/propositions-structured/.
    King, Jeffrey C. 2012. Anaphora.” in The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Language, edited by Gillian K. Russell and Delia Graff Fara, pp. 367–379. Routledge Philosophy Companions. London: Routledge.
    King, Jeffrey C. 2013a. On Fineness of Grain.” Philosophical Studies 163(3): 763–781.
    King, Jeffrey C. 2013b. Supplementives, the Coordination Account, and Conflicting Intentions.” in Philosophical Perspectives 27: Philosophy of Language, edited by John Hawthorne, pp. 288–311. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley; Sons, Inc.
    King, Jeffrey C. 2013c. Propositional Unity: What’s the Problem, Who Has It and Who Solves It? Philosophical Studies 165(1): 71–93.
    King, Jeffrey C. 2014a. Speaker Intentions in Context.” Noûs 48(2): 219–237.
    King, Jeffrey C. 2014b. The Metasemantics of Contextual Sensitivity.” in Metasemantics. New Essays on the Foundations of Meaning, edited by Alexis Burgess and Brett Sherman, pp. 97–118. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199669592.001.0001.
    King, Jeffrey C. 2015. Acquaintance, Singular Thought and Propositional Constituency.” Philosophical Studies 172(2): 543–560.
    King, Jeffrey C. 2016a. Timothy Williamson on the Contingently Concrete and Non-Concrete [on Williamson (2013)].” Analysis 76(2): 190–201.
    King, Jeffrey C. 2016b. Philosophical and Conceptual Analysis.” in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Methodology, edited by Herman Cappelen, Tamar Szabó Gendler, and John Hawthorne, pp. 249–261. Oxford Handbooks. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199668779.001.0001.
    King, Jeffrey C. 2017. The Metaphysics of Propositions.” Oxford Philosophy Handbooks Online, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199935314.013.26.
    King, Jeffrey C. 2018. Propositions and Truth-Bearers.” in The Oxford Handbook of Truth, edited by Michael Glanzberg, pp. 307–332. Oxford Handbooks. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199557929.001.0001.
    King, Jeffrey C. 2019. Structured Propositions.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2019/entries/propositions-structured/.
    King, Jeffrey C. 2021. Felicitous Underspecification. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780192857057.001.0001.
    King, Jeffrey C. and Lewis, Karen S. 2016. Anaphora.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2016/entries/anaphora/.
    King, Jeffrey C. and Lewis, Karen S. 2021. Anaphora.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2021/entries/anaphora/.
    King, Jeffrey C. and Liston, Michael. 1983. Explaining Donnellan’s Distinction.” Analysis 43: 13–14.
    King, Jeffrey C., Soames, Scott and Speaks, Jeff. 2014. New Thinking about Propositions. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199693764.001.0001.
    King, Jeffrey C. and Stanley, Jason. 2005. Semantics, Pragmatics, and the Role of Semantic Content.” in Semantics versus Pragmatics, edited by Zoltán Gendler Szabó, pp. 111–164. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Reprinted in Stanley (1997, 133–181), doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199251520.001.0001.

Further References

    Hale, Bob and Wright, Crispin, eds. 1997. A Companion to the Philosophy of Language. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. Second edition: Hale, Wright and Miller (2017).
    Hale, Bob, Wright, Crispin and Miller, Alexander, eds. 2017. A Companion to the Philosophy of Language. 2nd ed. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell. First edition: Hale and Wright (1997), doi:10.1002/9781118972090.
    Stalnaker, Robert C. 2003. Ways a World Might Be: Metaphysical and Anti-Metaphysical Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0199251487.001.0001.
    Stanley, Jason. 1997. Names and Rigid Designation.” in A Companion to the Philosophy of Language, edited by Bob Hale and Crispin Wright, pp. 555–583. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. Reprinted in Hale, Wright and Miller (2017, 920–947).
    Williamson, Timothy. 2013. Modal Logic as Metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199552078.001.0001.