Neil Levy (levy-n)

Mentioned on the following portal pages

Contributions to Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Giubilini, Alberto and Levy, Neil. 2018. “What in the World is Collective Responsibility?” Dialectica 72(2): 191–218.
Levy, Neil. 2002. “Excusing Responsibility for the Inevitable.” Philosophical Studies 111(1): 43–52.
Levy, Neil. 2004a. “Self-Deception and Moral Responsibility.” Ratio 17(3).
Levy, Neil. 2004b. “Epistemic Akrasia and the Subsumption of Evidence: A Reconsideration.” Croatian Journal of Philosophy 4(1): 149–156.
Levy, Neil. 2005a. “Contrastive Explanations: A Dilemma for Libertarians.” Dialectica 59(1): 51–61.
Levy, Neil. 2005b. “Imaginative Resistance and the Moral/Conventional Distinction.” Philosophical Psychology 18(2): 231–241.
Levy, Neil. 2006a. “Determinist Deliberations.” Dialectica 60(4): 453–459.
Levy, Neil. 2006b. “Autonomy and Addiction.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36(3): 427–448.
Levy, Neil. 2006c. “The Wisdom of the Pack.” Philosophical Explorations: An International Journal for the Philosophy of Mind and Action 9(1): 99–103.
Levy, Neil. 2007a. “Agents and Mechanisms: Fischer’s Way.” The Philosophical Quarterly 57(226): 123–130.
Levy, Neil. 2007b. “Radically Socialized Knowledge and Conspiracy Theories.” Episteme 4(2): 181–192.
Levy, Neil. 2008a. “Counterfactual Intervention and Agents’ Capacities.” The Journal of Philosophy 105: 223–239.
Levy, Neil. 2008b. “Bad Luck Once Again.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77(3): 749–754.
Levy, Neil. 2009a. “Neuroethics: Ethics and the Sciences of the Mind.” Philosophy Compass 4(1): 69–81.
Levy, Neil. 2009b. “Luck and History-Sensitive Compatibilism.” The Philosophical Quarterly 59(235): 237–251.
Levy, Neil. 2009c. “What, and Where, Luck is: A Response to Jennifer Lackey (2008).” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87(3): 489–497.
Levy, Neil. 2009d. “Self-Deception without Thought Experiments.” in Delusion and Self-Deception. Affective and Motivational Influences on Belief Formation, edited by Tim[othy John] Bayne and Jordi Fernández, pp. 227–242. London: Routledge.
Levy, Neil. 2010. “Addiction and Compulsion.” in A Companion to the Philosophy of Action, edited by Timothy O’Connor and Constantine Sandis, pp. 267–273. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, doi:10.1002/9781444323528.
Levy, Neil. 2011a. Hard Luck. How Luck Undermines Free Will & Moral Responsibility. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199601387.001.0001.
Levy, Neil. 2011b. “Moore on Twin Earth.” Erkenntnis 75(1): 137–146.
Levy, Neil. 2011c. “Luck and Free Will.” in New Waves in Philosophy of Action, edited by Jesús H. Aguilar, Andrei A. Buckareff, and Keith Frankish, pp. 173–188. New Waves in Philosophy. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.
Levy, Neil. 2011d. “Expressing Who We Are: Moral Responsibility and Awareness of Our Reasons for Action.” Analytic Philosophy 52(4): 243–261.
Levy, Neil. 2011e. “Culture by Nature.” Philosophical Explorations: An International Journal for the Philosophy of Mind and Action 14(3): 237–248.
Levy, Neil. 2012. “Capacities and Counterfactuals: A Reply to Haji and McKenna.” Dialectica 66(4): 607–620.
Levy, Neil, ed. 2013a. Addiction and Self-Control. Perspectives from Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199862580.001.0001.
Levy, Neil. 2013b. “The Importance of Awareness.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91(2): 211–229.
Levy, Neil. 2013c. “Are we Agents at All? Helen Steward’s Agency Incompatibilism.” Inquiry 56(4): 386–399.
Levy, Neil. 2013d. “Review of: Hodgson, David., Rationality + Consciousness = Free Will.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91(1): 183–192.
Levy, Neil. 2014a. Consciousness and Moral Responsibility. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198704638.001.0001.
Levy, Neil. 2014b. “Consciousness, Implicit Attitudes and Moral Responsibility.” Noûs 48(1): 21–40.
Levy, Neil. 2014c. “Addiction as a Disorder of Belief.” Biology and Philosophy 29(3): 337–355.
Levy, Neil. 2014d. “Frankfurt in Fake Barn Country.” Metaphilosophy 45(4–5): 529–542. Reprinted in Pritchard and Whittington (2015, 79–92).
Levy, Neil. 2014e. “Intuitions and Experimental Philosophy: Comfortable Bedfellows.” in Philosophical Methodology: The Armchair or the Laboratory?, edited by Matthew C. Haug, pp. 381–397. London: Routledge.
Levy, Neil. 2014f. “Neuroethics: Moral Cognition.” Oxford Philosophy Handbooks Online, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199935314.013.003.
Levy, Neil. 2015a. “Moral Responsability Skepticism: Meeting McKenna’s Challenge.” in Agency, Freedom, and Moral Responsibility, edited by Andrei A. Buckareff, Carlos J. Moya, and Sergi Rosell, pp. 192–203. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Levy, Neil. 2015b. “Religion and the Meaning of Life.” in The Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy of Religion, edited by Graham Oppy, pp. 329–339. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge.
Levy, Neil. 2016a. “Have I Turned the Stove Off? Explaining Everyday Anxiety.” Philosophers' imprint 16(2).
Levy, Neil. 2016b. “Naturalism and Free Will.” in The Blackwell Companion to Naturalism, edited by Kelly James Clark, pp. 305–318. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, doi:10.1002/9781118657775.
Levy, Neil. 2016c. “Disabling Language.” in Philosophers Take On the World, edited by David Edmonds, pp. 160–163. New York: Oxford University Press.
Levy, Neil. 2016d. “Toward a More Banal Neuroethics.” in Cognitive Enhancement. Ethical and Policy Implications in International Perspectives, edited by Fabrice Jotterand and Veljko Dubljević, pp. 15–26. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199396818.001.0001.
Levy, Neil. 2017a. “Am I a Racist? Implicit Bias and the Ascription of Racism.” The Philosophical Quarterly 67(268): 534–551.
Levy, Neil. 2017b. “Embodied Savoir-Faire: Knowledge-How Requires Motor Representations.” Synthese 194(2): 511–530.
Levy, Neil. 2017c. “Methodological Conservatism and the Epistemic Condition.” in Responsibility. The Epistemic Condition, edited by Philip Robichaud and Jan Willem Wieland, pp. 252–265. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198779667.001.0001.
Levy, Neil. 2017d. “How Addicts Lose Control.” in Current Controversies in Bioethics, edited by S. Matthew Liao and Collin O’Neil, pp. 132–146. Current Controversies in Philosophy. New York: Routledge.
Levy, Neil. 2017e. “Neuroethics and Responsibility.” in A Companion to Applied Philosophy, edited by Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen, Kimberley Brownlee, and David Coady, pp. 270–283. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, doi:10.1002/9781118869109.
Levy, Neil. 2019a. “Nudge, Nudge, Wink, Wink: Nudging is Giving Reasons.” Ergo 6(10): 281–302.
Levy, Neil. 2019b. “Addiction: The Belief Oscillation Hypothesis.” in The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy and Science of Addiction, edited by Hanna Pickard and Serge H. Ahmed, pp. 54–62. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge.
Levy, Neil. 2019c. “Due Deference to Denialism: Explaining Ordinary People’s Rejection of Established Scientific Findings.” Synthese 196(1): 313–327, doi:10.1007/s11229-017-1477-x.
Levy, Neil. 2019d. “Putting the Luck Back Into Moral Luck.” in Midwest Studies in Philosophy 43: Moral Luck, edited by Peter A. French, Howard K. Wettstein, and Andrew C. Khoury, pp. 59–74. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell, doi:10.1111/misp.12104.
Levy, Neil. 2021a. Bad Beliefs. Why They Happen to Good People. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780192895325.001.0001.
Levy, Neil. 2021b. “Arrogance and Servility Online: Humility is Not the Solution.” in The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Humility, edited by Mark Alfano, Michael Patrick Lynch, and Alessandra Tanesini, pp. 472–483. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge.
Levy, Neil and Mandelbaum, Eric. 2014. “The Powers that Bind: Doxastic Voluntarism and Epistemic Obligation.” in The Ethics of Belief, edited by Jonathan D. Matheson and Rico Vitz, pp. 15–32. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199686520.001.0001.
Levy, Neil and McKenna, Michael. 2007. “Symposium on Free Will and Luck.” Philosophical Explorations: An International Journal for the Philosophy of Mind and Action 10(2): 151–152.
Levy, Neil and Ross, Robert M. 2021. “The Cognitive Science of Fake News.” in The Routledge Handbook of Political Epistemology, edited by Michael Hannon and Jeroen de Ridder, pp. 181–191. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge.
Shepherd, Joshua and Levy, Neil. 2020. “Consciousness and Morality.” in The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness, edited by Uriah Kriegel, pp. 654–672. Oxford Handbooks. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Timpe, Kevin, Griffith, Meghan and Levy, Neil, eds. 2016. The Routledge Companion to Free Will. Routledge Philosophy Companions. London: Routledge.

Further References

Lackey, Jennifer. 2008. “What Luck is Not.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86(2): 255–267.
Pritchard, Duncan and Whittington, Lee John, eds. 2015. The Philosophy of Luck. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, doi:10.1002/9781119030614.