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John MacFarlane (macfarlane-j)

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Bibliography

    Kolodny, Niko and MacFarlane, John. 2010. “Ifs and Oughts.” The Journal of Philosophy 107(3): 115–143, doi:10.5840/jphil2010107310.
    MacFarlane, John. 2000a. “What does it Mean to Say that Logic is Formal?” PhD dissertation, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania: University of Pittsburgh, https://web.archive.org/web/20030510033523id_/http://socrates.berkeley.edu:80/~jmacf/Diss.pdf.
    MacFarlane, John. 2000b. “What is Modeled by Truth in All Models?” Unpublished manuscript March 23, 2000, of a talk delivered at the Pacific APA, Albuquerque NM April 8, 2000.
    MacFarlane, John. 2002a. “Valuations without Supervaluation.” Unpublished manuscript.
    MacFarlane, John. 2002b. “Frege, Kant, and the Logic in Logicism.” The Philosophical Review 111(1): 25–65.
    MacFarlane, John. 2002c. “Review of Neale (2001).” Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 8(15).
    MacFarlane, John. 2003a. “Future Contingents and Relative Truth.” The Philosophical Quarterly 53(212): 321–336, doi:10.1111/1467-9213.00315.
    MacFarlane, John. 2003b. “Review of Burnyeat (2001).” The Philosophical Review 112(1): 97–99.
    MacFarlane, John. 2004. “McDowell’s Kantianism.” Theoria 70(2–3): 250–265.
    MacFarlane, John. 2005a. “Logical Constants.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2005/entries/logical-constants/.
    MacFarlane, John. 2005b. “Making Sense of Relative Truth.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 105: 305–323, doi:10.1111/j.0066-7373.2004.00116.x.
    MacFarlane, John. 2005c. “The Assessment Sensitivity of Knowledge Attributions.” in Oxford Studies in Epistemology, volume I, edited by Tamar Szabó Gendler and John Hawthorne, pp. 197–234. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780199285891.001.0001.
    MacFarlane, John. 2006. “The Things We (Sorta Kinda) Believe [on Schiffer (2003)].” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73(1): 218–224.
    MacFarlane, John. 2007a. “Relativism and Disagreement.” Philosophical Studies 132(1): 17–31.
    MacFarlane, John. 2007b. “Semantic Minimalism and Nonindexical Contextualism.” in Context-Sensitivity and Semantic Minimalism. New Essays on Semantics and Pragmatics, pp. 240–250. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    MacFarlane, John. 2007c. “The Logic of Confusion [on Camp (2002)].” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74(3): 700–708.
    MacFarlane, John. 2008a. “Truth in the Garden of Forking Paths.” in Relative Truth, edited by Manuel Garcı́a-Carpintero and Max Kölbel, pp. 81–102. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199234950.003.0004.
    MacFarlane, John. 2008b. “Brandom’s Demarcation of Logic [on Brandom (2008)].” Philosophical Topics 36(2): 55–62.
    MacFarlane, John. 2008c. “Boghossian, Bellarmine, and Bayes [on Boghossian (2006)].” Philosophical Studies 141(3): 391–398, doi:10.1007/s11098-008-9281-6.
    MacFarlane, John. 2009a. “Nonindexical Contextualism.” Synthese 166(2): 231–250.
    MacFarlane, John. 2009b. “Logical Constants.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2009/entries/logical-constants/.
    MacFarlane, John. 2010a. “Fuzzy Epistemicism.” in Cuts and Clouds. Vagueness, Its Nature, and Its Logic, edited by Richard Dietz and Sebastiano Moruzzi, pp. 438–463. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199570386.001.0001.
    MacFarlane, John. 2010b. “Pragmatism and Inferentalism.” in Reading Brandom. On Making It Explicit, edited by Bernhard Weiss and Jeremy Wanderer, pp. 81–95. London: Routledge.
    MacFarlane, John. 2011a. “Epistemic Modals are Assessment-Sensitive.” in Epistemic Modality, edited by Andy Egan and Brian Weatherson, pp. 144–178. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199591596.001.0001.
    MacFarlane, John. 2011b. “Simplicity Made Difficult [on Cappelen and Hawthorne (2009)].” Philosophical Studies 156(3): 441–448.
    MacFarlane, John. 2011c. “Relativism and Knowledge Attributions.” in The Routledge Companion to Epistemology, edited by Sven Bernecker and Duncan Pritchard, pp. 536–544. Routledge Philosophy Companions. London: Routledge.
    MacFarlane, John. 2011d. “What is Assertion?” in Assertion: New Philosophical Essays, edited by Jessica A. Brown and Herman Cappelen, pp. 79–96. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199573004.001.0001.
    MacFarlane, John. 2012a. “Assessment Sensitivity: Relative Truth and Its Applications.” Unpublished manuscript. Version of November 1, 2012.
    MacFarlane, John. 2012b. “Richard on Truth and Commitment Richard (2008).” Philosophical Studies 160(3): 445–453.
    MacFarlane, John. 2012c. “Relativism.” in The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Language, edited by Gillian K. Russell and Delia Graff Fara, pp. 132–142. Routledge Philosophy Companions. London: Routledge.
    MacFarlane, John. 2014. Assessment Sensitivity: Relative Truth and Its Applications. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199682751.001.0001.
    MacFarlane, John. 2015. “Logical Constants.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2015/entries/logical-constants/.
    MacFarlane, John. 2016a. “Vagueness as Indecision.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 90: 255–283.
    MacFarlane, John. 2016b. “Abelard’s Argument for Formality.” in Formal Approaches and Natural Language in Medieval Logic. Proceedings of the XIXth European Symposium of Medieval Logic and Semantics, Geneva, 12-16 June 2012, edited by Laurent Cesalli, Frédéric Goubier, and Alain de Libera, pp. 41–58. Textes et Études du Moyen Âge n. 82. Turnhout: Brepols Publishers.
    MacFarlane, John. forthcoming. “Why Future Contingents Are Not All False.” Analytic Philosophy, doi:10.1111/phib.12334.

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