Conor McHugh (mchugh-c)

Mentionné.e sur les pages du portail suivantes

Contributions à Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Di Nucci, Ezio and McHugh, Conor, eds. 2006a. Content, Consciousness, and Perception. Essays in Contemporary Philosophy of Mind. Newcastle upon Tye: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.
Di Nucci, Ezio and McHugh, Conor. 2006b. “The State of Mind.” in Content, Consciousness, and Perception. Essays in Contemporary Philosophy of Mind, edited by Ezio Di Nucci and Conor McHugh, pp. 1–34. Newcastle upon Tye: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.
McHugh, Conor. 2011a. “What do we Aim At When we Believe?” Dialectica 65(3): 369–392.
McHugh, Conor. 2011b. “Judging as a Non-Voluntary Action.” Philosophical Studies 152(2): 245–269.
McHugh, Conor. 2012a. “Epistemic Deontology and Voluntariness.” Erkenntnis 77(1): 65–94.
McHugh, Conor. 2012b. “Reasons and Self-Knowledge.” in The Self and Self-Knowledge, edited by Annalisa Coliva, pp. 139–163. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199590650.001.0001.
McHugh, Conor. 2012c. “Belief and Aims.” Philosophical Studies 160(3): 425–439.
McHugh, Conor. 2012d. “What Assertion Doesn’t Show.” European Journal of Philosophy 20(3): 407–429.
McHugh, Conor. 2012e. “Control of Belief and Intention.” Thought 1(4): 337–346.
McHugh, Conor. 2012f. “The Truth Norm of Belief.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93: 8–30.
McHugh, Conor. 2013a. “Normativism and Doxastic Deliberation.” Analytic Philosophy 54(4): 447–465.
McHugh, Conor. 2013b. “Epistemic Responsibility and Doxastic Agency.” in Philosophical Issues 23: Epistemic Agency, edited by Ernest Sosa, Enrique Villanueva, and Baron Reed, pp. 132–157. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell.
McHugh, Conor. 2014. “Fitting Belief.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 114(2): 167–187.
McHugh, Conor. 2015. “The Illusion of Exclusivity.” European Journal of Philosophy 23(4): 1117–1136.
McHugh, Conor. 2017a. “Engel on Doxastic Correctness.” Synthese 194(5): 1451–1462.
McHugh, Conor. 2017b. “Attitudinal Control.” Synthese 194(8): 2745–2762.
McHugh, Conor and Way, Jonathan. 2016. “Against the Taking Condition.” in Philosophical Issues 26: Knowledge and Mind, edited by Christoph Kelp and Jack C. Lyons, pp. 314–331. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell.
McHugh, Conor and Way, Jonathan. 2017. “Objectivism and Perspectivism about the Epistemic Ought.” Ergo 4(5): 121–145.
McHugh, Conor and Way, Jonathan. 2018. “What is Reasoning?” Mind 127(505): 167–196.
McHugh, Conor and Way, Jonathan. 2022. Getting Things Right. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198810322.001.0001.
McHugh, Conor, Way, Jonathan and Whiting, Daniel, eds. 2018a. Normativity: Epistemic and Practical. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198758709.001.0001.
McHugh, Conor, Way, Jonathan and Whiting, Daniel, eds. 2018b. Metaepistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198805366.001.0001.
McHugh, Conor, Way, Jonathan and Whiting, Daniel. 2018c. “Introduction.” in Normativity: Epistemic and Practical, edited by Conor McHugh, Jonathan Way, and Daniel Whiting, pp. 1–11. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198758709.001.0001.
McHugh, Conor, Way, Jonathan and Whiting, Daniel. 2018d. “Introduction.” in Metaepistemology, edited by Conor McHugh, Jonathan Way, and Daniel Whiting, pp. 1–8. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198805366.001.0001.