Peter Menzies (menzies)

My contributions to Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Beebee, Helen, Hitchcock, Christopher R. and Menzies, Peter, eds. 2009a. The Oxford Handbook of Causation. Oxford Handbooks. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199279739.001.0001.
Beebee, Helen, Hitchcock, Christopher R. and Menzies, Peter. 2009b. “Introduction.” in The Oxford Handbook of Causation, edited by Helen Beebee, Christopher R. Hitchcock, and Peter Menzies, pp. 1–19. Oxford Handbooks. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199279739.001.0001.
Garrett, Brian John and Menzies, Peter, eds. 1993. 1992 ANU Metaphysics Conference. Working Papers in Philosophy n. 2. Canberra: RSSS Australasian National University.
Jackson, Frank, Menzies, Peter and Oppy, Graham. 1994. “The Two Envelope ‘Paradox’ .” Analysis 54(1): 43–45.
List, Christian and Menzies, Peter. 2009. “Nonreductive Physicalism and the Limits of the Exclusion Principle.” The Journal of Philosophy 106(9): 475–502, doi:10.5840/jphil2009106936.
List, Christian and Menzies, Peter. 2017. “My Brain Made Me Do It: The Exclusion Argument Against Free Will, and What’s Wrong with It.” in Making a Difference. Essays on the Philosophy of Causation, edited by Helen Beebee, Christopher R. Hitchcock, and Huw Price, pp. 269–285. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198746911.001.0001.
Menzies, Peter. 1989. “A Unified Account of Causal Relata.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 67: 59–83.
Menzies, Peter, ed. 1991. Response-Dependent Concepts. Working Papers in Philosophy n. 1. Canberra: RSSS Australasian National University.
Menzies, Peter. 1992. “Critical Notice of Armstrong (1989).” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52: 731–734.
Menzies, Peter. 1993a. “Review of van Fraassen (1989).” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 71: 94–97.
Menzies, Peter. 1993b. “Laws of Nature, Modality and Humean Supervenience.” in Ontology, Causality and Mind – Essays in Honour of D.M. Armstrong, edited by John Bacon, Keith Campbell, and Loyd R. Reinhardt, pp. 195–224. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Menzies, Peter. 1996. “Probabilistic Causation and the Pre-Emption Problem.” Mind 105.
Menzies, Peter. 1998. “Possibility and Conceivability: A Response-Dependent Account of Their Connections.” in Response-Dependence, edited by Roberto Casati and Christine Tappolet, pp. 261–277. European Review of Philosophy n. 3. Stanford, California: CSLI Publications.
Menzies, Peter. 1999. “Intrinsic versus Extrinsic Conceptions of Causation.” in Causation and the Laws of Nature, edited by Howard Sankey, pp. 313–330. Australasian Studies in History and Philosophy of Science n. 14. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, doi:10.1007/978-94-015-9229-1.
Menzies, Peter. 2001. “Counterfactual Theories of Causation.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2001/entries/causation-counterfactual/.
Menzies, Peter. 2002. “Capacities, Natures and Pluralism: A New Metaphysics for Science? [on Cartwright (1999)].” Philosophical Books 43(4): 261–270.
Menzies, Peter. 2003a. “Is Causation a Genuine Relation?” in Real Metaphysics – Essays in honour of D.H. Mellor, edited by Hallvard Lillehammer and Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra, pp. 120–136. Routledge Studies in Twentieth-Century Philosophy n. 15. London: Routledge.
Menzies, Peter. 2003b. “The Causal Efficacy of Mental States.” in Physicalism and Mental Causation. The Metaphysics of Mind and Action, edited by Sven Walter and Heinz-Dieter Heckmann, pp. 195–224. Exeter: Imprint Academic.
Menzies, Peter. 2004a. “L’efficacité causale des états mentaux.” in La structure du monde: objets, propriétés, états de choses. Renouveau de la métaphysique dans l’école australienne de philosophie, edited by Jean-Maurice Monnoyer, pp. 547–575. Recherches sur la philosophie et le langage. Paris: Librairie philosophique Jean Vrin.
Menzies, Peter. 2004b. “Difference-Making in Context.” in Causation and Counterfactuals, edited by John David Collins, Ned Hall, and Laurie A. Paul, pp. 139–180. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, doi:10.7551/mitpress/1752.001.0001.
Menzies, Peter. 2004c. “Causal Models, Token Causation, and Processes.” Philosophy of Science 71(5): 820–832.
Menzies, Peter. 2007a. “Mental Causation on the Program Model.” in Common Minds. Themes from the Philosophy of Philip Pettit, edited by Geoffrey Brennan, Robert E. Goodin, Frank Jackson, and Michael A. Smith, pp. 28–54. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Menzies, Peter. 2007b. “Causation in Context.” in Causation, Physics and the Constitution of Reality: Russell’s Republic Revisited, edited by Huw Price and Richard Corry, pp. 191–223. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Menzies, Peter. 2008a. “The Exclusion Problem, the Determination Relation, and Contrastive Causation.” in Being Reduced. New Essays on Reduction, Explanation, and Causation, edited by Jakob Hohwy and Jesper Kallestrup, pp. 196–217. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199211531.001.0001.
Menzies, Peter. 2008b. “Counterfactual Theories of Causation.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2008/entries/causation-counterfactual/.
Menzies, Peter. 2009a. “Critical Notice of Bird (2007).” Analysis 69(4): 769–778.
Menzies, Peter. 2009b. “The Folk Theory of Colours and the Causes of Colour Experience.” in Minds, Ethics, and Conditionals. Themes from the Philosophy of Frank Jackson, edited by Ian Ravenscroft, pp. 141–160. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199267989.001.0001.
Menzies, Peter. 2009c. “Platitudes and Counterexamples.” in The Oxford Handbook of Causation, edited by Helen Beebee, Christopher R. Hitchcock, and Peter Menzies, pp. 341–367. Oxford Handbooks. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199279739.001.0001.
Menzies, Peter. 2010. “Reasons and Causes Revisited.” in Naturalism and Normativity, edited by Mario De Caro and David Macarthur, pp. 142–172. New York: Columbia University Press.
Menzies, Peter. 2011. “The Role of Counterfactual Dependence in Causal Judgements.” in Understanding Counterfactuals, Understanding Causation. Issues in Philosophy and Psychology, edited by Christoph Hoerl, Teresa McCormack, and Sarah R. Beck, pp. 186–207. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199590698.001.0001.
Menzies, Peter. 2013. “Mental Causation in the Physical World.” in Mental Causation and Ontology, edited by Sophie C. Gibb, Edward Jonathan Lowe, and Rögnvaldur D. Ingthorsson, pp. 58–87. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199603770.001.0001.
Menzies, Peter. 2014. “Counterfactual Theories of Causation.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/causation-counterfactual/.
Menzies, Peter. 2017a. “The Problem of Counterfactual Isomorphs.” in Making a Difference. Essays on the Philosophy of Causation, edited by Helen Beebee, Christopher R. Hitchcock, and Huw Price, pp. 153–174. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198746911.001.0001.
Menzies, Peter. 2017b. “The Consequence Argument Disarmed: An Interventionist Perspective.” in Making a Difference. Essays on the Philosophy of Causation, edited by Helen Beebee, Christopher R. Hitchcock, and Huw Price, pp. 307–330. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198746911.001.0001.
Menzies, Peter and Beebee, Helen. 2019. “Counterfactual Theories of Causation.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/causation-counterfactual/.
Menzies, Peter and Beebee, Helen. 2024. “Counterfactual Theories of Causation.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2024/entries/causation-counterfactual/.
Menzies, Peter and List, Christian. 2010. “The Causal Autonomy of the Special Sciences.” in Emergence in Mind, edited by Cynthia Macdonald and Graham F. Macdonald, pp. 108–128. Mind Association Occasional Series. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199583621.001.0001.
Menzies, Peter and Pettit, Philip. 1993. “Found: The Missing Explanation.” Analysis 53(2): 100–109.
Menzies, Peter and Pettit, Philip. 1994. “In Defence of Fictionalism about Possible Worlds.” Analysis 54: 27–36.
Menzies, Peter and Price, Huw. 1993. “Causation as a Secondary Quality.” The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 43: 187–203.
Menzies, Peter and Price, Huw. 2009. “Is Semantics in the Plan?” in Conceptual Analysis and Philosophical Naturalism, edited by David Braddon-Mitchell and Robert Nola, pp. 183–200. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, doi:10.7551/mitpress/9780262012560.001.0001.

Further References

Armstrong, David M. 1989. A Combinatorial Theory of Possibility. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, doi:10.1017/cbo9781139172226.
Bird, Alexander. 2007. Nature’s Metaphysics. Laws and Properties. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199227013.001.0001.
Cartwright, Nancy. 1999. The Dappled World: A Study in the Boundaries of Science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
van Fraassen, Bas C. 1989. Laws and Symmetry. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0198248601.001.0001.