Jonathan M. Weinberg (weinberg-jm)

Citato nei seguenti articoli

Contributi a Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Alexander, Joshua and Weinberg, Jonathan M. 2014. “The ‘Unreliability’ of Epistemic Intuitions.” in Current Controversies in Experimental Philosophy, edited by Edouard Machery and Elizabeth O’Neill, pp. 128–145. Current Controversies in Philosophy. New York: Routledge.
Barnard, Robert, Ulatowski, Joseph and Weinberg, Jonathan M. 2017. “Thinking about the Liar, Fast and Slow.” in Reflections on the Liar, edited by Bradley Armour-Garb, pp. 39–70. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780199896042.001.0001.
Meskin, Aaron and Weinberg, Jonathan M. 2011. “Imagination Unblocked.” in The Aesthetic Mind. Philosophy and Psychology, edited by Elisabeth Schellekens and Peter Goldie, pp. 239–253. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199691517.001.0001.
Nichols, Shaun, Stich, Stephen P. and Weinberg, Jonathan M. 2003. “Meta-Skepticism: Meditations in Ethno-epistemology.” in The Skeptics: Contemporary Essays, edited by Steven Luper, pp. 227–248. Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate.
Stich, Stephen P. and Weinberg, Jonathan M. 2001. “Jackson’s Empirical Assumptions [on Jackson (1998)].” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62(3): 637–643.
Swain, Stacey, Alexander, Joshua and Weinberg, Jonathan M. 2008. “The Instability of Philosophical Intuitions: Running Hot and Cold on Truetemp.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76(1): 138–155.
Weinberg, Jonathan M. 2006. “What’s Epistemology for? The Case for Neopragmatism in Normative Metaepistemology.” in Epistemology Futures, edited by Stephen Cade Hetherington, pp. 26–47. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780199273317.001.0001.
Weinberg, Jonathan M. 2007a. “Analytic Epistemology and Experimental Philosophy.” Philosophy Compass 2(1): 56–80.
Weinberg, Jonathan M. 2007b. “How to Challenge Intuitions Empirically Without Risking Skepticism.” in Midwest Studies in Philosophy 31: Philosophy and the Empirical, edited by Peter A. French and Howard K. Wettstein, pp. 318–343. Boston, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers, doi:10.1111/j.1475-4975.2007.00157.x.
Weinberg, Jonathan M. 2007c. “Moderate Epistemic Relativism and Our Epistemic Goals.” Episteme 4(1): 66–92.
Weinberg, Jonathan M. 2008a. “Configuring the Cognitive Imagination.” in New Waves in Aesthetics, edited by Kathleen Stock and Katherine Thomson-Jones, pp. 203–223. New Waves in Philosophy. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.
Weinberg, Jonathan M. 2008b. “Naturalism and Intuitions: Commentary on Hales (2006).” International Journal of Philosophical Studies 16(2): 263–270.
Weinberg, Jonathan M. 2009. “On Doing Better, Experimental-Style [on Williamson (2007)].” Philosophical Studies 145(3): 455–464.
Weinberg, Jonathan M. 2011. “Experimental Epistemology.” in The Routledge Companion to Epistemology, edited by Sven Bernecker and Duncan Pritchard, pp. 823–835. Routledge Philosophy Companions. London: Routledge.
Weinberg, Jonathan M. 2013. “The Prospects for an Experimentalist Rationalism, or Why It’s Ok if the A Priori Is Only 99.44 Percent Empirically Pure.” in The A Priori in Philosophy, edited by Albert Casullo and Joshua C. Thurow, pp. 92–108. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199695331.001.0001.
Weinberg, Jonathan M. 2014a. “Cappelen Between Rock and a Hard Place [on Cappelen (2012)].” Philosophical Studies 171(3): 545–553, doi:10.1007/s11098-014-0286-z.
Weinberg, Jonathan M. 2014b. “All Your Desires in One Box.” in Aesthetics and the Sciences of Mind, edited by Gregory Currie, Matthew Kieran, Aaron Meskin, and Jon Robson, pp. 181–204. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199669639.001.0001.
Weinberg, Jonathan M. 2015a. “Regress-Stopping and Disagreement for Epistemic Neopragmatists.” in Epistemic Evaluation. Purposeful Epistemology, edited by David Henderson and John Greco, pp. 186–203. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199642632.001.0001.
Weinberg, Jonathan M. 2015b. “Humans as Instruments: or, the Inevitability of Experimental Philosophy.” in Experimental Philosophy, Rationalism, and Naturalism. Rethinking Philosophical Method, edited by Eugen Fischer and John Collins, pp. 171–187. London: Routledge, doi:10.4324/9781315714196.
Weinberg, Jonathan M. 2016a. “What is the A Priori, that thou Art Mindful of it? A Comment on Albert Casullo, Essays on a Priori Justification and Knowledge.” Philosophical Studies 173(6): 1695–1703.
Weinberg, Jonathan M. 2016b. “Intuitions.” in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Methodology, edited by Herman Cappelen, Tamar Szabó Gendler, and John Hawthorne, pp. 287–308. Oxford Handbooks. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199668779.001.0001.
Weinberg, Jonathan M. 2017a. “What is Negative Experimental Philosophy Good For?” in The Cambridge Companion to Philosophical Methodology, edited by Giuseppina D’Oro and Søren Overgaard, pp. 161–184. Cambridge Companions to Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, doi:10.1017/9781316344118.
Weinberg, Jonathan M. 2017b. “Knowledge, Noise, and Curve-Fitting: A Methodological Argument for Justified True Belief ?” in Explaining Knowledge. New Essays on the Gettier Problem, edited by Rodrigo Martins Borges, Claudio de Almeida, and Peter Klein, pp. 253–272. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198724551.001.0001.
Weinberg, Jonathan M. 2019. “Humans as Instruments: Or, the Inevitability of Experimental Philosophy.” in Explanation in Action Theory and Historiography. Causal and Teleological Approaches, edited by Gunnar Schumann, pp. 171–187. London: Routledge, doi:10.4324/9780429506048.
Weinberg, Jonathan M. and Alexander, Joshua. 2014. “The Challenge of Sticking with Intuitions Through Thick and Thin.” in Intuitions, edited by Anthony Robert Booth and Darrell P. Rowbottom, pp. 187–212. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199609192.001.0001.
Weinberg, Jonathan M., Alexander, Joshua, Gonnerman, Chad and Reuter, Shane. 2012. “Restrictionism and Reflection: Challenge Deflected, or Simply Redirected?” The Monist 95(2): 200–222.
Weinberg, Jonathan M. and Crowley, Stephen J. 2009. “Loose Constitutivity and Armchair Philosophy.” Studia Philosophica Estonica 2(2): 177–195.
Weinberg, Jonathan M. and Meskin, Aaron. 2006a. “Imagine That!” in Contemporary Debates in Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Art, edited by Matthew Kieran, pp. 222–235. Contemporary Debates in Philosophy n. 5. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Weinberg, Jonathan M. and Meskin, Aaron. 2006b. “Puzzling over the Imagination: Philosophical Problems, Architectural Solutions.” in The Architecture of Imagination: New Essays on Pretence, Possibility, and Fiction, pp. 175–203. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199275731.001.0001.
Weinberg, Jonathan M., Nichols, Shaun and Stich, Stephen P. 2001. “Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions.” Philosophical Topics 29(1–2): 429–460.

Further References

Cappelen, Herman. 2012. Philosophy without Intuitions. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199644865.001.0001.
Hales, Steven D. 2006. Relativism and the Foundations of Philosophy. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Jackson, Frank. 1998. From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defense of Conceptual Analysis. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0198250614.001.0001.
Williamson, Timothy. 2007. The Philosophy of Philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. Second edition: Williamson (2021), doi:10.1002/9780470696675.
Williamson, Timothy. 2021. The Philosophy of Philosophy. 2nd ed. The Blackwell / Brown Lectures in Philosophy. Hoboken, New Jersey: Wiley-Blackwell. First edition: Williamson (2007), doi:10.1002/9781119616702.