Laurie A. Paul (paul-la)

Cited in the following articles

Contributions to Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Collins, John David, Hall, Ned and Paul, Laurie A., eds. 2004a. Causation and Counterfactuals. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, doi:10.7551/mitpress/1752.001.0001.
Collins, John David, Hall, Ned and Paul, Laurie A. 2004b. “Counterfactuals and Causation: History, Problem, and Prospects.” in Causation and Counterfactuals, edited by John David Collins, Ned Hall, and Laurie A. Paul, pp. 1–57. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, doi:10.7551/mitpress/1752.003.0002.
Hall, Ned and Paul, Laurie A. 2003. “Causation and Pre-emption.” in Philosophy of Science Today, edited by Peter Clark and Katherine Hawley, pp. 100–130. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hall, Ned and Paul, Laurie A. 2013. “Metaphysically Reductive Causation.” Erkenntnis 78(suppl., 1): 9–41.
Paul, Laurie A. 1998. “Problems with Late Preemption.” Analysis 58(1): 48–53, doi:10.1093/analys/58.1.48.
Paul, Laurie A. 2000. “Aspect Causation.” The Journal of Philosophy 97(4): 235–256. Reprinted in Collins, Hall and Paul (2004a, 205–224).
Paul, Laurie A. 2001. “Comments on Mellor (1998).” in The Importance of Time – Proceedings of the Philosophy of Time Society 1995–2000, edited by L. Nathan Oaklander, pp. 69–80. Philosophical Studies Series n. 87. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Paul, Laurie A. 2002a. “Logical Parts.” Noûs 36(4): 578–595.
Paul, Laurie A. 2002b. “Limited Realism: Cartwright on Natures and Laws [on Cartwright (1999)].” Philosophical Books 43(4): 244–253.
Paul, Laurie A. 2004. “The Context of Essence.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82(1): 170–184. Reprinted in Jackson and Priest (2004, 181–195).
Paul, Laurie A. 2006a. “Coincidence as Overlap.” Noûs 40(4): 623–659.
Paul, Laurie A. 2006b. “In Defense of Essentialism.” in Philosophical Perspectives 20: Metaphysics, edited by John Hawthorne, pp. 333–372. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Paul, Laurie A. 2007. “Constitutive Overdetermination.” in Causation and Explanation, edited by Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O’Rourke, and Harry S. Silverstein, pp. 265–290. Topics in Contemporary Philosophy n. 3. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, doi:10.7551/mitpress/1753.001.0001.
Paul, Laurie A. 2009. “Counterfactual Theories.” in The Oxford Handbook of Causation, edited by Helen Beebee, Christopher R. Hitchcock, and Peter Menzies, pp. 158–184. Oxford Handbooks. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199279739.001.0001.
Paul, Laurie A. 2010a. “The Puzzles of Material Constitution.” Philosophy Compass 5(7): 579–590.
Paul, Laurie A. 2010b. “A New Role for Experimental Work in Metaphysics.” The Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1(3): 461–476.
Paul, Laurie A. 2010c. “Temporal Experience.” The Journal of Philosophy 107(7): 333–359. Reprinted in Bardon (2012, 99–122).
Paul, Laurie A. 2012a. “Building the World From its Fundamental Constituents.” Philosophical Studies 158(2): 221–256, doi:10.1007/s11098-012-9885-8.
Paul, Laurie A. 2012b. “Metaphysics as Modeling: The Handmaiden’s Tale.” Philosophical Studies 160(1): 1–29.
Paul, Laurie A. 2013a. “Categorical Priority and Categorical Collapse.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 87: 89–113.
Paul, Laurie A. 2013b. “Realism about Structure and Kinds.” in Metaphysics and Science, edited by Stephen Mumford and Matthew Tugby, pp. 183–199. Mind Association Occasional Series. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199674527.001.0001.
Paul, Laurie A. 2014. “Experience and the Arrow.” in Chance and Temporal Asymmetry, edited by Alastair Wilson, pp. 175–193. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199673421.001.0001.
Paul, Laurie A. 2015a. Transformative Experience. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198717959.001.0001.
Paul, Laurie A. 2015b. “What You Can’t Expect When You’re Expecting.” Res Philosophica 92(2): 149–170.
Paul, Laurie A. 2015c. “Transformative Choice: Discussion and Replies [on Paul (2015a)].” Res Philosophica 92(2): 473–545.
Paul, Laurie A. 2017a. “Phenomenal Feel as Process.” in Philosophical Issues 27: Metaphysics, edited by Jonathan Schaffer, pp. 204–222. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell.
Paul, Laurie A. 2017b. “A One Category Ontology.” in Being, Freedom, and Method: Themes from the Philosophy of Peter van Inwagen, edited by John Adorno Keller, pp. 32–61. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198715702.003.0003.
Paul, Laurie A. 2017c. “The Subjectively Enduring Self.” in The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Temporal Experience, edited by Ian Phillips, pp. 262–272. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge.
Paul, Laurie A. 2017d. “De Se Preferences and Empathy for Future Selves.” in Philosophical Perspectives 31: Philosophy of Mind, edited by John Hawthorne and Jason Turner, pp. 7–39. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley; Sons, Inc., doi:10.1111/phpe.12090.
Paul, Laurie A. and Hall, Ned. 2013. Causation. A User’s Guide. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199673445.001.0001.
Paul, Laurie A. and Quiggin, John. 2018. “Real World Problems.” Episteme 15(3): 363–382.
Sebo, Jeff and Paul, Laurie A. 2019. “Effective Altruism and Transformative Experience.” in Effective Altruism. Philosophical Issues, edited by Hilary Greaves and Theron Pummer, pp. 53–68. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198841364.001.0001.

Further References

Bardon, Adrian, ed. 2012. The Future of the Philosophy of Time. Routledge Studies in Metaphysics n. 4. London: Routledge, doi:10.4324/9780203338315.
Cartwright, Nancy. 1999. The Dappled World: A Study in the Boundaries of Science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Jackson, Frank and Priest, Graham, eds. 2004. Lewisian Themes: The Philosophy of David Lewis. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780199274550.001.0001.
Mellor, David Hugh. 1998. Real Time II. London: Routledge.