Ned Block (block-n)

Contributions to Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Block, Ned. 1976. “Fictionalism, Functionalism and Factor Analysis.” in PSA 1974: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, edited by Robert S. Cohen, Clifford A. Hooker, Alex C. Michalos, and James W. van Evra, pp. 127–141. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science n. 32. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co.
Block, Ned. 1978. “Troubles with Functionalism.” in Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Volume IX: Perception and Cognition: Issues in the Foundations of Psychology, edited by C. Wade Savage, pp. 261–325. Minneapolis, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press. Reprinted in Block (2007a, 63–101).
Block, Ned, ed. 1980a. Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology. Volume I. Language and Thought. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Block, Ned. 1980b. “What Intuitions about Homunculi Do Not Show.” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3: 425–426. Reprinted in Block (2007a, 103–108).
Block, Ned. 1980c. “Are Absent Qualia Impossible?” The Philosophical Review 89(2): 257–274. Reprinted in Block (2007a, 379–395).
Block, Ned. 1980d. “Introduction. What Is Philosophy of Psychology?” in Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology. Volume I, edited by Ned Block, pp. 1–10. Language and Thought. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Block, Ned. 1980e. “Introduction: What Is Functionalism?” in Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology. Volume I, edited by Ned Block, pp. 171–184. Language and Thought. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press. Reprinted in Block (2007a, 15–44).
Block, Ned, ed. 1981a. Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology. Volume II. Language and Thought. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Block, Ned, ed. 1981b. Imagery. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Block, Ned. 1981c. “Psychologism and Behaviorism.” The Philosophical Review 90: 5–43.
Block, Ned. 1982. “Functionalism.” in Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science VI: Proceedings of the Sixth International Congress of Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science, Hannover, 1979, edited by Laurence Jonathan Cohen, Jerzy Łoś, Helmut Pfeiffer, and Klaus-Peter Podewski, pp. 519–539. Studies in Logic and the Foundations of Mathematics n. 104. Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Co.
Block, Ned. 1983a. “Mental Pictures and Cognitive Science.” The Philosophical Review 92: 499–542.
Block, Ned. 1983b. “The Photographic Fallacy in the Debate about Mental Imagery.” Noûs 17: 651–662.
Block, Ned. 1987a. “Functional Role and Truth Conditions.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 61: 157–181.
Block, Ned. 1987b. “Advertisement for a Semantics for Psychology.” in Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10: Studies in the Philosophy of Mind, edited by Peter A. French, Theodore E. Uehling Jr., and Howard K. Wettstein, pp. 615–678. Minneapolis, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press.
Block, Ned. 1990a. “Can the Mind Change the World?” in Meaning and Method – Essays in Honour of Hilary Putnam, edited by George Boolos, pp. 137–170. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Reprinted in Macdonald and Macdonald (1995a, 29–59).
Block, Ned. 1990b. “Inverted Earth.” in Philosophical Perspectives 4: Action Theory and Philosophy of Mind, edited by James E. Tomberlin, pp. 53–79. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. Reprinted in Block (2007a, 511–532).
Block, Ned. 1990c. “The Computer Model of the Mind.” in An Invitation to Cognitive Science. Volume 3: Thinking, volume 3, edited by Daniel N. Osherson and Edward E. Smith. vol. 3. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Block, Ned. 1991. “What Narrow Content is Not.” in Meaning in Mind: Fodor and His Critics, edited by Barry C. Loewer and Georges Rey, pp. 33–64. Philosophers and Their Critics. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Block, Ned. 1992a. “Le fonctionnalisme face au problème des qualia.” Les Études Philosophiques 46(3): 337–369.
Block, Ned. 1992b. “Begging the Question Against Phenomenal Consciousness.” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15: 205–206. Reprinted in Block, Flanagan and Güzeldere (1997, 175–180).
Block, Ned. 1993a. “Review of Dennett (1991).” The Journal of Philosophy 90(4): 181–193. Reprinted in Block (2007a, 129–140).
Block, Ned. 1993b. “Holism, Hyper-Analyticity and Hyper-Compositionality.” in Philosophical Issues 3: Science and Knowledge, edited by Enrique Villanueva, pp. 37–72. Atascadero, California: Ridgeview Publishing Co.
Block, Ned. 1994a. “What is Dennett’s Theory a Theory of?” Philosophical Topics 22(1–2): 23–40. Reprinted in Block (2007a, 141–158).
Block, Ned. 1994b. “Qualia.” in A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind, edited by Samuel D. Guttenplan, pp. 514–520. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. Reprinted in Block (2007a, 501–510), doi:10.1002/9781405164597.
Block, Ned. 1995a. “On a Confusion about a Function of Consciousness.” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18(2): 227–247. Reprinted in Block, Flanagan and Güzeldere (1997, 375–416).
Block, Ned. 1995b. “Reply [to Macdonald and Macdonald (1995b)]: Causation and two kinds of laws.” in Philosophy of Psychology – Debates on Psychological Explanation, edited by Cynthia Macdonald and Graham F. Macdonald, pp. 78–84. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Block, Ned. 1995c. “Ruritania Revisited.” in Philosophical Issues 6: Content, edited by Enrique Villanueva, pp. 171–187. Atascadero, California: Ridgeview Publishing Co.
Block, Ned. 1995d. “How Many Concepts of Consciousness? [Reply to Commentators on Block (1995a)].” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18(2). Reprinted in Block (2007a, 214–247).
Block, Ned. 1995e. “An Argument for Holism.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 95: 151–169.
Block, Ned. 1996a. “How Heritability Misleads about Race.” The Boston Review 20(6): 30–35.
Block, Ned. 1996b. “Mental Paint and Mental Latex.” in Philosophical Issues 7: Perception, edited by Enrique Villanueva, pp. 19–49. Atascadero, California: Ridgeview Publishing Co., doi:10.2307/1522889.
Block, Ned. 1996c. “Functionalism.” in Supplement to the Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Donald M. Borchert. London: MacMillan Publishing Co. Reprinted in the second edition (borchert:2005?) and, in revised form, in Block (2007a, 15–26).
Block, Ned. 1997a. “Anti-Reductionism Slaps Back.” in Philosophical Perspectives 11: Mind, Causation, and World, edited by James E. Tomberlin, pp. 107–132. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Block, Ned. 1997b. “Biology versus Computation in the Study of Consciousness [Reply to Commentators on Block (1995a)].” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20(1): 159–165. Reprinted in Block (2007a, 248–268).
Block, Ned. 1998a. “How to Find the Neural Correlate of Consciousness.” in Current Issues in Philosophy of Mind, edited by Anthony O’Hear, pp. 23–34. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement n. 43. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Block, Ned. 1998b. “Is Experiencing Just Representing?” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58(3): 663–670. Reprinted in Block (2007a, 603–610).
Block, Ned. 1998c. “How Not to Find the Neural Correlate of Consciousness.” in Toward a Science of Consciousness II: The Second Tucson Discussions and Debates, edited by Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak, and Alwyn C. Scott, pp. 329–338. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Block, Ned. 1999a. “Sexism, Racism, Ageism, and the Nature of Consciousness.” Philosophical Topics 26(1–2): 39–70. Reprinted in Block (2007a, 571–601).
Block, Ned. 1999b. “Ridiculing Social Constructivism about Phenomenal Consciousness.” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22(1). Reprinted in Block (2007a, 269–273).
Block, Ned. 2001a. “Paradox and Cross-Purposes in Recent Work on Consciousness.” Cognition 79(1–2): 197–219. Reprinted in Block (2007a, 311–338).
Block, Ned. 2001b. “How Not to Find the Neural Correlate of Consciousness.” in Foundations of Cognitive Science, edited by João Branquinho, pp. 1–10. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Reprinted in Block (2007a, 299–309).
Block, Ned. 2002a. “The Harder Problem of Consciousness.” The Journal of Philosophy 99(8): 391–425. Longer version published as Block (2003e); reprinted in Block (2007a, 397–433).
Block, Ned. 2002b. “Concepts of Consciousness.” in Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings, edited by David J. Chalmers, pp. 206–218. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Reprinted in Block (2007a, 274–296).
Block, Ned. 2003a. “Mental Paint.” in Reflections and Replies. Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge, edited by Martin Hahn and Bjørn T. Ramberg, pp. 165–200. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press. Reprinted in Block (2007a, 533–570).
Block, Ned. 2003b. “Philosophical Issues about Consciousness.” in The Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science, edited by Lynn Nadel. London: Nature Publishing Group. Reprinted in Block (2007a, 111–127).
Block, Ned. 2003c. “Spatial Perception via Tactile Sensation.” Trends in Cognitive Science 7(7): 285–286. Reprinted in Block (2007a, 339–341).
Block, Ned. 2003d. “Do Causal Powers Drain Away? [on Kim (1998)].” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67(1): 133–150.
Block, Ned. 2003e. “The Harder Problem of Consciousness.” Disputatio s/n(15): 5–49. Longer version of Block (2002a).
Block, Ned. 2005a. “Review of Noë (2005).” The Journal of Philosophy 102(5): 259–272. Reprinted in Block (2007a, 363–375).
Block, Ned. 2005b. “Two Neural Correlates of Consciousness.” Trends in Cognitive Science 9(2): 46–52. Reprinted in Block (2007a, 342–361), doi:10.1016/j.tics.2004.12.006.
Block, Ned. 2005c. “Bodily Sensations as an Obstacle for Representationism [on Tye (2005)].” in Pain. New Essays on Its Nature and the Methodology of Its Study, edited by Murat Aydede, pp. 137–142. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press. Reprinted in Block (2007a, 611–616).
Block, Ned. 2006. “Max Black’s Objection to Mind-Body Identity.” in Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, volume II, edited by Dean W. Zimmerman, pp. 3–78. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Reprinted in Block (2007a, 435–498), and in Alter and Walter (2007, 249–306), doi:10.1093/oso/9780199290581.001.0001.
Block, Ned. 2007a. Consciousness, Function, and Representation. Collected Papers, Volume 1. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, doi:10.7551/mitpress/2111.001.0001.
Block, Ned. 2007b. “Wittgenstein and Qualia.” in Philosophical Perspectives 21: Philosophy of Mind, edited by John Hawthorne, pp. 73–115. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. Reprinted in Baghramian (2013, 275–310).
Block, Ned. 2007c. “Consciousness, Accessibility, and the Mesh Between Psychology and Neuroscience.” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30: 481–548, doi:10.1017/s0140525x07002786.
Block, Ned. 2007d. “Introduction: Remarks on Chauvinism and the Mind-Body Problem.” in Consciousness, Function, and Representation. Collected Papers, Volume 1, pp. 1–12. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, doi:10.7551/mitpress/2111.001.0001.
Block, Ned. 2008. “Consciousness and Cognitive Access.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108: 289–317.
Block, Ned. 2009. “Comparing the Major Theories of Consciousness.” in The Cognitive Neurosciences, 4th ed., pp. 111–122. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press. First edition: Gazzaniga (1995).
Block, Ned. 2010. “Attention and Mental Paint.” in Philosophical Issues 20: Philosophy of Mind, edited by Ernest Sosa and Enrique Villanueva, pp. 23–63. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell.
Block, Ned. 2011a. “The Higher Order Approach to Consciousness is Defunct.” Analysis 71(3): 419–431.
Block, Ned. 2011b. “Response to Rosenthal (2011) and Weisberg (2011).” Analysis 71(3): 443–448.
Block, Ned. 2011c. “Perceptual Consciousness Overflows Cognitive Access.” Trends in Cognitive Science 15(12): 567–575, doi:10.1016/j.tics.2011.11.001.
Block, Ned. 2012. “The Grain of Vision and the Grain of Attention.” Thought 1(3): 170–184.
Block, Ned. 2013. “Seeing and Windows of Integration [response to Richards (2013) and Taylor (2013)].” Thought 2(1): 29–39.
Block, Ned. 2014. “The Defective Armchair: A Reply to Tye (2014).” Thought 3(2): 159–165.
Block, Ned. 2015a. “The Canberra Plan Neglects Ground.” in Qualia and Mental Causation in a Physical World. Themes from the Philosophy of Jaegwon Kim, edited by Terence E. Horgan, Marcelo Sabatés, and David Sosa, pp. 105–133. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, doi:10.1017/cbo9781139939539.
Block, Ned. 2015b. “The Puzzle of Perceptual Precision.” in Open MIND, edited by Thomas Metzinger and Jennifer M. Windt. Frankfurt a.M.: MIND Group, Philosophisches Seminar der Johannes Gutenberg Universität Mainz.
Block, Ned. 2019a. “The Direct Realist Approach to Illusion: Reply to Brewer (2019).” in Blockheads! Essays on Ned Block’s Philosophy of Mind and Consciousness, edited by Adam Pautz and Daniel Stoljar, pp. 35–40. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, doi:10.7551/mitpress/9196.001.0001.
Block, Ned. 2019b. “Tyler Burge on Perceptual Adaptation [on Burge (2019)].” in Blockheads! Essays on Ned Block’s Philosophy of Mind and Consciousness, edited by Adam Pautz and Daniel Stoljar, pp. 71–78. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, doi:10.7551/mitpress/9196.001.0001.
Block, Ned. 2019c. “Attention Affects Appearance: Response to Carrasco (2019).” in Blockheads! Essays on Ned Block’s Philosophy of Mind and Consciousness, edited by Adam Pautz and Daniel Stoljar, pp. 107–108. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, doi:10.7551/mitpress/9196.001.0001.
Block, Ned. 2019d. “David Chalmers on Shape and Color [on Chalmers (2019)].” in Blockheads! Essays on Ned Block’s Philosophy of Mind and Consciousness, edited by Adam Pautz and Daniel Stoljar, pp. 139–144. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, doi:10.7551/mitpress/9196.001.0001.
Block, Ned. 2019e. “Reply to Frank Jackson on A Priori Necessitation [on Jackson (2019)].” in Blockheads! Essays on Ned Block’s Philosophy of Mind and Consciousness, edited by Adam Pautz and Daniel Stoljar, pp. 167–170. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, doi:10.7551/mitpress/9196.001.0001.
Block, Ned. 2019f. “Empirical Science Meets Higher-Order Views of Consciousness: Reply to Lau and Brown (2019).” in Blockheads! Essays on Ned Block’s Philosophy of Mind and Consciousness, edited by Adam Pautz and Daniel Stoljar, pp. 199–214. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, doi:10.7551/mitpress/9196.001.0001.
Block, Ned. 2019g. “Geoff Lee’s Hegemony of the Third Person [on Lee (2019)].” in Blockheads! Essays on Ned Block’s Philosophy of Mind and Consciousness, edited by Adam Pautz and Daniel Stoljar, pp. 243–246. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, doi:10.7551/mitpress/9196.001.0001.
Block, Ned. 2019h. “Strong Representationism and Unconscious Perception: Reply to Levin (2019).” in Blockheads! Essays on Ned Block’s Philosophy of Mind and Consciousness, edited by Adam Pautz and Daniel Stoljar, pp. 273–278. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, doi:10.7551/mitpress/9196.001.0001.
Block, Ned. 2019i. “Intuitions and the Metaphysics of Mind: Reply to Levine (2019).” in Blockheads! Essays on Ned Block’s Philosophy of Mind and Consciousness, edited by Adam Pautz and Daniel Stoljar, pp. 301–306. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, doi:10.7551/mitpress/9196.001.0001.
Block, Ned. 2019j. “Puzzled about Sensory Qualities: Reply to Lycan (2019).” in Blockheads! Essays on Ned Block’s Philosophy of Mind and Consciousness, edited by Adam Pautz and Daniel Stoljar, pp. 327–334. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, doi:10.7551/mitpress/9196.001.0001.
Block, Ned. 2019k. “Functional Role, Superficialism, and Commander Data: Reply to McLaughlin (2019).” in Blockheads! Essays on Ned Block’s Philosophy of Mind and Consciousness, edited by Adam Pautz and Daniel Stoljar, pp. 375–378. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, doi:10.7551/mitpress/9196.001.0001.
Block, Ned. 2019l. “Arguments Pro and Con on Adam Pautz’s External Directedness Principle [on Pautz (2019)].” in Blockheads! Essays on Ned Block’s Philosophy of Mind and Consciousness, edited by Adam Pautz and Daniel Stoljar, pp. 421–426. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, doi:10.7551/mitpress/9196.001.0001.
Block, Ned. 2019m. “Concepts and Percepts: Reply to Putnam (2019).” in Blockheads! Essays on Ned Block’s Philosophy of Mind and Consciousness, edited by Adam Pautz and Daniel Stoljar, pp. 451–458. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, doi:10.7551/mitpress/9196.001.0001.
Block, Ned. 2019n. “Sydney Shoemaker on Transparency and the Inverted Spectrum [on Shoemaker (2019)].” in Blockheads! Essays on Ned Block’s Philosophy of Mind and Consciousness, edited by Adam Pautz and Daniel Stoljar, pp. 481–486. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, doi:10.7551/mitpress/9196.001.0001.
Block, Ned. 2019o. “Attention as a Conduit: Reply to Silins and Siegel (2019).” in Blockheads! Essays on Ned Block’s Philosophy of Mind and Consciousness, edited by Adam Pautz and Daniel Stoljar, pp. 505–510. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, doi:10.7551/mitpress/9196.001.0001.
Block, Ned. 2019p. “Poise, Dispositions, and Access Consciousness: Reply to Stoljar (2019).” in Blockheads! Essays on Ned Block’s Philosophy of Mind and Consciousness, edited by Adam Pautz and Daniel Stoljar, pp. 537–544. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, doi:10.7551/mitpress/9196.001.0001.
Block, Ned. 2019q. “Fading Qualia: A Response to Tye (2019).” in Blockheads! Essays on Ned Block’s Philosophy of Mind and Consciousness, edited by Adam Pautz and Daniel Stoljar, pp. 571–580. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, doi:10.7551/mitpress/9196.001.0001.
Block, Ned. 2019r. “Optimal Attention: Reply to Watzl (2019).” in Blockheads! Essays on Ned Block’s Philosophy of Mind and Consciousness, edited by Adam Pautz and Daniel Stoljar, pp. 609–615. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, doi:10.7551/mitpress/9196.001.0001.
Block, Ned. 2023. The Border Between Seeing and Thinking. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780197622223.001.0001.
Block, Ned, Flanagan, Owen, Jr. and Güzeldere, Güven, eds. 1997. The Nature of Consciousness. Philosophical Debates. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Block, Ned and Fodor, Jerry A. 1972. “What Psychological States are Not.” The Philosophical Review 81: 159–181. Reprinted in Block (1980a, 237–250), in Fodor (1981, 79–99) and in Block (2007a, 45–61).
Block, Ned and Segal, Gabriel M. A. 1998. “The Philosophy of Psychology.” in Philosophy 2: Further through the Subject, edited by Anthony C. Grayling, pp. 1–71. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Block, Ned and Stalnaker, Robert C. 1999. “Conceptual Analysis, Dualism, and the Explanatory Gap.” The Philosophical Review 108(1): 1–46.
Hayes, Patrick J., Perlis, S. and Block, Ned. 1992. “Virtual Symposium on Virtual Mind.” Minds and Machines 2.
O’Regan, J. Kevin and Block, Ned. 2012. “Discussion of O’Regan’s Why Red Doesn’t Sound like aBell.” The Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3(1): 89–108.
Phillips, Ian and Block, Ned. 2017. “Debate on Unconscious Perception.” in Current Controversies in Philosophy of Perception, edited by Bence Nanay, pp. 165–192. Current Controversies in Philosophy. New York: Routledge.
Young, Allan W. and Block, Ned. 1997. “Consciousness.” in Unsolved Mysteries of the Mind: Tutorial Essays in Cognition, edited by Vicki Bruce. London: Taylor & Francis.

Further References

Alter, Torin and Walter, Sven, eds. 2007. Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195171655.001.0001.
Baghramian, Maria, ed. 2013. Reading Putnam. London: Routledge.
Brewer, Bill. 2019. “Basic Objects As Grounds: A Metaphysical Manifesto.” in The Nature of Ordinary Objects, edited by Javier Cumpa and Bill Brewer, pp. 48–62. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, doi:10.1017/9781316612897.
Burge, Tyler. 2019. “Psychological Content and Egocentric Indexes.” in Blockheads! Essays on Ned Block’s Philosophy of Mind and Consciousness, edited by Adam Pautz and Daniel Stoljar, pp. 41–70. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, doi:10.7551/mitpress/9196.001.0001.
Carrasco, Maria A. 2019. “Attention Alters Appearance.” in Blockheads! Essays on Ned Block’s Philosophy of Mind and Consciousness, edited by Adam Pautz and Daniel Stoljar, pp. 79–106. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, doi:10.7551/mitpress/9196.001.0001.
Chalmers, David J. 2019. “Three Puzzles about Spatial Experience.” in Blockheads! Essays on Ned Block’s Philosophy of Mind and Consciousness, edited by Adam Pautz and Daniel Stoljar, pp. 109–138. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, doi:10.7551/mitpress/9196.003.0008.
Dennett, Daniel C. 1991. Consciousness Explained. Boston, Massachusetts: Little, Brown; Co.
Fodor, Jerry A. 1981. Representations: Philosophical Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive Science. Harvester Studies in Cognitive Science n. 13. Brighton: Harvester Press.
Jackson, Frank. 2019. “Physicalism and the A Priori.” in Blockheads! Essays on Ned Block’s Philosophy of Mind and Consciousness, edited by Adam Pautz and Daniel Stoljar, pp. 145–166. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, doi:10.7551/mitpress/9196.001.0001.
Kim, Jaegwon. 1998. Mind in a Physical World: An Essay on the Mind-Body Problem and Mental Causation. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Lau, Hakwan C. and Brown, Richard H. 2019. “The Emperor’s New Phenomenology? The Empirical Case for Conscious Experiences without First-Order Representations.” in Blockheads! Essays on Ned Block’s Philosophy of Mind and Consciousness, edited by Adam Pautz and Daniel Stoljar, pp. 171–198. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, doi:10.7551/mitpress/9196.001.0001.
Lee, Geoffrey. 2019. “Alien Subjectivity and the Importance of Consciousness.” in Blockheads! Essays on Ned Block’s Philosophy of Mind and Consciousness, edited by Adam Pautz and Daniel Stoljar, pp. 215–242. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, doi:10.7551/mitpress/9196.001.0001.
Levin, Janet. 2019. “Representational Exhaustion.” in Blockheads! Essays on Ned Block’s Philosophy of Mind and Consciousness, edited by Adam Pautz and Daniel Stoljar, pp. 247–272. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, doi:10.7551/mitpress/9196.001.0001.
Levine, Joseph. 2019. “On Phenomenal Access.” in Blockheads! Essays on Ned Block’s Philosophy of Mind and Consciousness, edited by Adam Pautz and Daniel Stoljar, pp. 279–300. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, doi:10.7551/mitpress/9196.001.0001.
Lycan, William G. 2019. On Evidence in Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198829720.001.0001.
Macdonald, Cynthia and Macdonald, Graham F., eds. 1995a. Philosophy of Psychology – Debates on Psychological Explanation. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Macdonald, Cynthia and Macdonald, Graham F. 1995b. “How to Be Psychologically Relevant [on Block (1990a)].” in Philosophy of Psychology – Debates on Psychological Explanation, edited by Cynthia Macdonald and Graham F. Macdonald, pp. 60–77. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
McLaughlin, Brian P. 2019. “Could an Android Be Sentient?” in Blockheads! Essays on Ned Block’s Philosophy of Mind and Consciousness, edited by Adam Pautz and Daniel Stoljar, pp. 335–374. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, doi:10.7551/mitpress/9196.001.0001.
Noë, Alva. 2005. “Real Presence.” Philosophical Topics 33(1): 235–264.
Pautz, Adam. 2019. “How can Brains in Vats Experience a Spatial World? A Puzzle for Internalists.” in Blockheads! Essays on Ned Block’s Philosophy of Mind and Consciousness, edited by Adam Pautz and Daniel Stoljar, pp. 379–420. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, doi:10.7551/mitpress/9196.001.0001.
Putnam, Hilary. 2019. “ ‘Naı̈ve Realism’ and Qualia.” in Blockheads! Essays on Ned Block’s Philosophy of Mind and Consciousness, edited by Adam Pautz and Daniel Stoljar, pp. 427–450. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, doi:10.7551/mitpress/9196.001.0001.
Richards, Bradley. 2013. “Identity-Crowding and Object-Seeing: A Reply to Block (2012).” Thought 2(1): 9–19.
Rosenthal, David M. 2011. “Exaggerated Reports: Reply to Block (2011a).” Analysis 71(3): 431–437.
Shoemaker, Sydney S. 2019. “Phenomenal Character and Physicalism.” in Blockheads! Essays on Ned Block’s Philosophy of Mind and Consciousness, edited by Adam Pautz and Daniel Stoljar, pp. 459–480. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, doi:10.7551/mitpress/9196.001.0001.
Silins, Nicholas and Siegel, Susanna. 2019. “Attention and Perceptual Justification.” in Blockheads! Essays on Ned Block’s Philosophy of Mind and Consciousness, edited by Adam Pautz and Daniel Stoljar, pp. 487–504. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, doi:10.7551/mitpress/9196.001.0001.
Stoljar, Daniel. 2019. “In Praise of Poise.” in Blockheads! Essays on Ned Block’s Philosophy of Mind and Consciousness, edited by Adam Pautz and Daniel Stoljar, pp. 511–536. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, doi:10.7551/mitpress/9196.001.0001.
Taylor, John H. 2013. “Is the Grain of Vision Finer than the Grain of Attention? Response to Block (2012).” Thought 2(1): 20–28.
Tye, Michael. 2005. “Another Look at Representationalism about Pain.” in Pain. New Essays on Its Nature and the Methodology of Its Study, edited by Murat Aydede, pp. 99–119. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Tye, Michael. 2014. “Does Conscious Seeing Have A Finer Grain Than Attention? [on Block (2012)].” Thought 3(2): 154–158.
Tye, Michael. 2019. “Homunculi Heads and Silicon Chips: The Importance of History to Phenomenology.” in Blockheads! Essays on Ned Block’s Philosophy of Mind and Consciousness, edited by Adam Pautz and Daniel Stoljar, pp. 545–570. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, doi:10.7551/mitpress/9196.001.0001.
Watzl, Sebastian. 2019. “Can Representationism Explain How Attention Affects Appearances?” in Blockheads! Essays on Ned Block’s Philosophy of Mind and Consciousness, edited by Adam Pautz and Daniel Stoljar, pp. 581–608. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, doi:10.7551/mitpress/9196.001.0001.
Weisberg, Josh. 2011. “Abusing the Notion of What-It’s-Like-Ness: A Response to Block (2011a).” Analysis 71(3): 438–443.