Georges Rey (rey-g)
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Bibliography
Allott, Nicholas, Lohndal, Terje and Rey, Georges, eds. 2021a. A Companion to Chomsky. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Hoboken, New Jersey: Wiley-Blackwell, doi:10.1002/9781119598732.
Allott, Nicholas, Lohndal, Terje and Rey, Georges. 2021b. “Synoptic Introduction.” in A Companion to Chomsky, edited by Nicholas Allott, Terje Lohndal, and Georges Rey, pp. 1–17. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Hoboken, New Jersey: Wiley-Blackwell, doi:10.1002/9781119598732.
Allott, Nicholas, Lohndal, Terje and Rey, Georges. 2021c. “Biographical Sketch.” in A Companion to Chomsky, edited by Nicholas Allott, Terje Lohndal, and Georges Rey, pp. 18–22. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Hoboken, New Jersey: Wiley-Blackwell, doi:10.1002/9781119598732.
Allott, Nicholas, Lohndal, Terje and Rey, Georges. 2021d. “Chomsky’s ‘Galilean’ Explanatory Style.” in A Companion to Chomsky, edited by Nicholas Allott, Terje Lohndal, and Georges Rey, pp. 517–528. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Hoboken, New Jersey: Wiley-Blackwell, doi:10.1002/9781119598732.
Antony, Louise M. and Rey, Georges. 2016. “Philosophy and Psychology.” in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Methodology, edited by Herman Cappelen, Tamar Szabó Gendler, and John Hawthorne, pp. 554–586. Oxford Handbooks. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199668779.001.0001.
Collins, John and Rey, Georges. 2021. “Chomsky and Intentionality.” in A Companion to Chomsky, edited by Nicholas Allott, Terje Lohndal, and Georges Rey, pp. 488–502. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Hoboken, New Jersey: Wiley-Blackwell, doi:10.1002/9781119598732.
Devitt, Michael and Rey, Georges. 1991. “Transcending Transcendentalism.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 72: 87–100.
Loewer, Barry C. and Rey, Georges, eds. 1991a. Meaning in Mind: Fodor and His Critics. Philosophers and Their Critics. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Loewer, Barry C. and Rey, Georges. 1991b. “Editors’ Introduction.” in Meaning in Mind: Fodor and His Critics, edited by Barry C. Loewer and Georges Rey, pp. xi–. Philosophers and Their Critics. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Pietroski, Paul M. and Rey, Georges. 1995. “When Other Things Aren’t Equal: Saving Ceteris Paribus Laws from Vacuity.” The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 46(1): 81–110.
Rey, Georges. 1976. “Survival.” in The Identities of Persons, edited by Amélie Oksenberg Rorty, pp. 17–40. Berkeley, California: University of California Press, doi:10.1525/9780520353060.
Rey, Georges. 1980. “Functionalism and the Emotions.” in Explaining Emotions, edited by Amélie Oksenberg Rorty, pp. 163–196. Berkeley, California: University of California Press.
Rey, Georges. 1981. “What are Mental Images?” in Imagery, edited by Ned Block. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Rey, Georges. 1983a. “Concepts and Stereotypes.” Cognition 15: 237–262.
Rey, Georges. 1983b. “A Reason for Doubting the Existence of Consciousness.” in Consciousness and Self-regulation. Advances in Research and Theory, volume 3, edited by Richard J. Davidson, Gary E. R. Schwartz, and Daniel Shapiro, pp. 1–40. New York: Springer.
Rey, Georges. 1986. “What’s Really Going on in Searle’s ‘Chinese Room’ .” Philosophical Studies 50: 169–185.
Rey, Georges. 1988a. “A Question about Consciousness.” in Perspectives on Mind, edited by Herbert R. Otto and James Alan Tuedio, pp. 5–24. Synthese Library n. 194. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co. Reprinted in Block, Flanagan and Güzeldere (1997, 461–482).
Rey, Georges. 1988b. “Towards a Computational Account of Akrasia and Self-Deception.” in Perspectives on Self-Deception, edited by Brian P. McLaughlin and Amélie Oksenberg Rorty, pp. 264–296. Berkeley, California: University of California Press.
Rey, Georges. 1991a. “An Explanatory Budget for Connectionism and Eliminativism.” in Connectionism and the Philosophy of Mind, edited by Terence E. Horgan and John L. Tienson, pp. 219–239. Studies in Cognitive Systems n. 9. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Rey, Georges. 1991b. “Sensations in a Language of Thought.” in Philosophical Issues 1: Consciousness, edited by Enrique Villanueva, pp. 73–112. Atascadero, California: Ridgeview Publishing Co.
Rey, Georges. 1992a. “Semantic Externalism and Conceptual Competence.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 92: 315–333.
Rey, Georges. 1992b. “Sensational Sentences Reversed.” Philosophical Studies 68: 289–319.
Rey, Georges. 1993a. “The Unavailability of What We Mean: A Reply to Quine, Fodor and Lepore.” Grazer Philosophische Studien 46: 61–101. “Holism: A Consumer Update,” ed. by Jerry Fodor and Ernest Lepore.
Rey, Georges. 1993b. “Idealized Conceptual Roles.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53: 647–652.
Rey, Georges. 1993c. “Sensational Sentences.” in Consciousness: Psychological and Philosophical Essays, edited by Martin Kinsey Davies and Glyn W. Humphreys, pp. 240–257. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Rey, Georges. 1994a. “Dennett’s Unrealistic Psychology.” Philosophical Topics 22(1–2): 259–289.
Rey, Georges. 1994b. “Wittgenstein, Computationalism, and Qualia.” in Proceedings of the 16th International Wittgenstein Symposium: Philosophy and the Cognitive Sciences, edited by Roberto Casati, Barry Smith, and Graham White, pp. 75–88. Schriftenreihe der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft n. 21. Wien: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky.
Rey, Georges. 1995a. “A Not ‘Merely Empirical’ Argument for a Language of Thought.” in Philosophical Perspectives 9: AI, Connectionism, and Philosophical Psychology, edited by James E. Tomberlin, pp. 201–222. Atascadero, California: Ridgeview Publishing Co.
Rey, Georges. 1995b. “Toward a Projectivist Account of Conscious Experience.” in Conscious Experience, edited by Thomas Metzinger, pp. 123–144. Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh.
Rey, Georges. 1996. “Resisting Primitive Compulsions.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56(2): 419–424.
Rey, Georges. 1997. Contemporary Philosophy of Mind: A Contentiously Classical Approach. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Rey, Georges. 1998a. “What Implicit Conceptions Are Unlikely to Do [on Peacocke (1998)].” in Philosophical Issues 9: Concepts, edited by Enrique Villanueva, pp. 93–104. Atascadero, California: Ridgeview Publishing Co.
Rey, Georges. 1998b. “A Narrow Representationalist Account of Qualitative Experience.” in Philosophical Perspectives 12: Language, Mind, and Ontology, edited by James E. Tomberlin, pp. 435–457. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Rey, Georges. 2000. “Role, Not Content: Comments on Rosenthal (2000).” Consciousness and Cognition 9: 224–230.
Rey, Georges. 2001a. “Physicalism and Psychology: A Plea for a Substantive Philosophy of Mind.” in Physicalism and its Discontents, edited by Carl Gillett and Barry C. Loewer, pp. 99–128. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Rey, Georges. 2001b. “Jerry Fodor (1935– ).” in A Companion to Analytic Philosophy, edited by Aloysius P. [Al] Martinich and David Sosa, pp. 451–465. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, doi:10.1002/9780470998656.
Rey, Georges. 2001c. “Digging Deeper for the A Priori [on BonJour (1998)].” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63(3): 649–656.
Rey, Georges. 2003a. “Why Wittgenstein Ought to Have been a Computationalist.” Croatian Journal of Philosophy 3(3): 231–264.
Rey, Georges. 2003b. “Intentional Content and a Chomskian Linguistics.” in Epistemology of Language, edited by Alex Barber, pp. 140–186. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Rey, Georges. 2003c. “Chomsky, Intentionality, and a CRTT.” in Chomsky and His Critics, edited by Louise M. Antony and Norbert H. Hornstein, pp. 105–139. Philosophers and Their Critics. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, doi:10.1002/9780470690024.
Rey, Georges. 2003d. “The Analytic/Synthetic Distinction.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2003/entries/analytic-synthetic/.
Rey, Georges. 2004a. “Millikan’s (Un?)Compromised Externalism.” in The Externalist Challenge, edited by Richard Schantz, pp. 347–360. Current Issues in Theoretical Philosophy n. 2. Berlin: de Gruyter, doi:10.1515/9783110915273.
Rey, Georges. 2004b. “A Deflated Intentionalist Alternative to Clark’s Unexplanatory Metaphysics [on Clark (2000)].” Philosophical Psychology 17(4): 519–540.
Rey, Georges. 2005a. “Mind, Intentionality and Inexistence: An Overview of My Work.” Croatian Journal of Philosophy 5(3): 389–415.
Rey, Georges. 2005b. “Replies to Critics [Berčić (2005), Jutronić-Tihomirović (2005), Pećnjak (2005), Puŝkarić (2005) and Miščević (2005)].” Croatian Journal of Philosophy 5(3): 465–480.
Rey, Georges. 2005c. “Explanation, Not Experience: Commentary [on Campbell (2002).” Philosophical Studies 126(1): 131–143.
Rey, Georges. 2006a. “Better to Study Human Than World Psychology.” Journal of Consciousness Studies 13(10–11): 110–116.
Rey, Georges. 2006b. “Conventions, Intuitions and Linguistic Inexistents: A Reply to Devitt.” Croatian Journal of Philosophy 6(3): 549–569.
Rey, Georges. 2006c. “The Intentional Inexistence of Language – But Not Cars.” in Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science, edited by Robert J. Stainton, pp. 237–256. Contemporary Debates in Philosophy n. 7. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Rey, Georges. 2007. “Resisting Normativism in Psychology.” in Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind, edited by Brian P. McLaughlin and Jonathan Cohen, pp. 69–84. Contemporary Debates in Philosophy n. 8. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. second edition: McLaughlin and Cohen (2023).
Rey, Georges. 2008a. “(Even Higher-Order) Intentionality Without Consciousness.” Revue Internationale de Philosophie 63(243): 51–78.
Rey, Georges. 2008b. “In Defense of Folieism: Replies to Critics.” Croatian Journal of Philosophy 8(2): 177–202.
Rey, Georges. 2008c. “The Analytic/Synthetic Distinction.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/analytic-synthetic/.
Rey, Georges. 2011. “Representation.” in The Continuum Companion to the Philosophy of Mind, edited by James Garvey, pp. 171–189. London: Continuum International Publishing Group.
Rey, Georges. 2012. “Externalism and Inexistence in Early Content.” in Prospects for Meaning, edited by Richard Schantz, pp. 503–530. Current Issues in Theoretical Philosophy n. 3. Berlin: de Gruyter.
Rey, Georges. 2013. “The Analytic/Synthetic Distinction.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2013/entries/analytic-synthetic/.
Rey, Georges. 2014a. “The Possibility of a Naturalistic Cartesianism regarding Intuitions and Introspection.” in Philosophical Methodology: The Armchair or the Laboratory?, edited by Matthew C. Haug, pp. 243–267. London: Routledge.
Rey, Georges. 2014b. “Analytic, A Priori, False-and Maybe Non-Conceptual.” European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 10(2): 85–110.
Rey, Georges. 2017. “The Analytic/Synthetic Distinction.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2017/entries/analytic-synthetic/.
Rey, Georges. 2020a. Representation of Language. Philosophical Issues in a Chomskyan Linguistics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198855637.001.0001.
Rey, Georges. 2020b. “Explanation First! The Priority of Scientific Over ‘Commonsense’ Metaphysics.” in Language and Reality from a Naturalistic Perspective. Themes from Michael Devitt, edited by Andrea Bianchi, pp. 299–328. Cham: Springer.
Rey, Georges. 2021. “Nativism.” in A Companion to Chomsky, edited by Nicholas Allott, Terje Lohndal, and Georges Rey, pp. 451–461. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Hoboken, New Jersey: Wiley-Blackwell, doi:10.1002/9781119598732.
Rey, Georges. 2022. “The Analytic/Synthetic Distinction.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2022/entries/analytic-synthetic/.
Further References
Berčić, Boran. 2005. “Rey’s Meta-Atheism.” Croatian Journal of Philosophy 5(3): 417–422.
Block, Ned, Flanagan, Owen, Jr. and Güzeldere, Güven, eds. 1997. The Nature of Consciousness. Philosophical Debates. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
BonJour, Laurence. 1998. In Defense of Pure Reason. A Rationalist Account of A Priori Justification. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Campbell, John A. 2002. Reference and Consciousness. Oxford Cognitive Science Series. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0199243816.001.0001.
Clark, Austen. 2000. A Theory of Sentience. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198238515.001.0001.
Jutronić-Tihomirović, Dunja. 2005. “Chomsky Amongst the Philosophers.” Croatian Journal of Philosophy 5(3): 423–431.
Miščević, Nenad. 2005. “Rescuing Conceptual Analysis.” Croatian Journal of Philosophy 5(3): 447–463.
Peacocke, Christopher. 1998. “Implicit Conceptions, Understanding and Rationality.” in Philosophical Issues 9: Concepts, edited by Enrique Villanueva, pp. 43–88. Atascadero, California: Ridgeview Publishing Co., doi:10.2307/1522959.
Pećnjak, Davor. 2005. “How to Eliminate Computational Eliminativism.” Croatian Journal of Philosophy 5(3): 433–439.
Puŝkarić, Ksenija. 2005. “Rey and the Projectivist Account.” Croatian Journal of Philosophy 5(3): 441–445.
Rosenthal, David M. 2000. “Consciousness, Content, and Metacognitive Judgments.” Consciousness and Cognition 9: 203–214.