Sherrilyn Roush (roush)

My contributions to Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Roush, Sherrilyn. 2005. Tracking Truth. Knowledge, Evidence, and Science. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0199274738.001.0001.
Roush, Sherrilyn. 2009a. “Randomized Controlled Trials and the Flow of Information: Comment on Cartwright (2009).” Philosophical Studies 143(1): 137–145.
Roush, Sherrilyn. 2009b. “Précis of Roush (2005).” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79(1): 213–222.
Roush, Sherrilyn. 2009c. “Replies [to Goldman (2009) and Godfrey-Smith (2009)].” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79(1): 240–247.
Roush, Sherrilyn. 2009d. “Second Guessing: A Self-Help Manual.” Episteme 6(3): 251–268.
Roush, Sherrilyn. 2010a. “The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Survival.” Metaphilosophy 41(3): 255–278. Reprinted in Allo (2010, 9–32).
Roush, Sherrilyn. 2010b. “Optimism about the Pessimistic Induction.” in New Waves in Philosophy of Science, edited by P. D. Magnus and Jacob Busch, pp. 29–58. New Waves in Philosophy. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.
Roush, Sherrilyn. 2012. “Sensitivity and Closure.” in The Sensitivity Principle in Epistemology, edited by Kelly Becker and Tim Black, pp. 242–268. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, doi:10.1017/cbo9780511783630.
Roush, Sherrilyn. 2013. “Justification and the Growth of Error.” Philosophical Studies 165(2): 527–551.
Roush, Sherrilyn. 2015. “The Rationality of Science in Relation to its History.” in Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions – 50 Years On, edited by William J. Devlin and Alisa Bukolich, pp. 71–90. Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science n. 311. Dordrecht: Springer.
Roush, Sherrilyn. 2016. “Simulation and Understanding Other Minds.” in Philosophical Issues 26: Knowledge and Mind, edited by Christoph Kelp and Jack C. Lyons, pp. 351–373. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell.
Roush, Sherrilyn. 2017a. “The Difference between Knowledge and Understanding.” in Explaining Knowledge. New Essays on the Gettier Problem, edited by Rodrigo Martins Borges, Claudio de Almeida, and Peter Klein, pp. 384–408. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198724551.001.0001.
Roush, Sherrilyn. 2017b. “Closure Failure and Scientific Inquiry.” Res Philosophica 94(2): 275–299.
Roush, Sherrilyn. 2017c. “Epistemic Self-Doubt.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2017/entries/epistemic-self-doubt/.
Roush, Sherrilyn, Allen, Kelty and Herbert, Ian. 2012. “Skepticism about Reasoning.” in New Waves in Philosophical Logic, edited by Greg Restall and Gillian K. Russell, pp. 112–141. New Waves in Philosophy. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.

Further References

Allo, Patrick, ed. 2010. Putting Information First. Luciano Floridi and the Philosophy of Information. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, doi:10.1002/9781444396836.
Cartwright, Nancy. 2009. “Evidence-based Policy: What’s to Be Done about Relevance?” Philosophical Studies 143(1): 127–136.
Godfrey-Smith, Peter. 2009. “Knowledge, Trade-Offs, and Tracking Truth [on Roush (2005)].” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79(1): 231–239.
Goldman, Alvin I. 2009. “Recursive Tracking versus Process Reliabilism [on Roush (2005)].” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79(1): 223–230.