Robert D. Rupert (rupert)

Mentioned on the following portal pages

Contributions to Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Rupert, Robert D. 1999. “Mental Representations and Millikan’s Theory of Intentional Content: Does Biology Chase Causality?” The Southern Journal of Philosophy 37: 113–140.
Rupert, Robert D. 2000. “Dispositions Indisposed: Semantic Atomism and Fodor’s Theory of Content.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 81: 325–349.
Rupert, Robert D. 2001. “Coining Terms in the Language of Thought: Innateness, Emergence, and the Lot of Cummins’s Argument against the Causal Theory.” The Journal of Philosophy 98(10): 499–530.
Rupert, Robert D. 2005. “Minding One’s Cognitive Systems: When Does a Group of Minds Constitute a Single Cognitive Unit?” Episteme 1(3): 177–188.
Rupert, Robert D. 2006. “Functionalism, Mental Causation, and the Problem of Metaphysically Necessary Effects.” Noûs 40(2): 256–283.
Rupert, Robert D. 2008a. “Causal Theories of Mental Content.” Philosophy Compass 3(2): 353–380.
Rupert, Robert D. 2008b. “The Causal Theory of Properties and the Causal Theory of Reference, or How to Name Properties and Why it Matters.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77(3): 579–612.
Rupert, Robert D. 2009. Cognitive Systems and the Extended Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195379457.001.0001.
Rupert, Robert D. 2011a. “Cognitive Systems and the Supersized Mind [on Clark (2008)].” Philosophical Studies 152(3): 427–436.
Rupert, Robert D. 2011b. “Empirical Arguments for Group Minds: A Critical Appraisal.” Philosophy Compass 6(9): 630–639.
Rupert, Robert D. 2011c. “Embodiment, Consciousness, and the Massively Representational Mind.” Philosophical Topics 39(1): 99–120.
Rupert, Robert D. 2014a. “The Sufficiency of Objective Representation.” in Current Controversies in the Philosophy of Mind, edited by Uriah Kriegel, pp. 180–195. Current Controversies in Philosophy. New York: Routledge.
Rupert, Robert D. 2014b. “Against Group Cognitive States.” in From Individual to Collective Intentionality. New Essays, edited by Sara Rachel Chant, Frank Hindriks, and Gerhard Preyer, pp. 97–111. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199936502.001.0001.
Rupert, Robert D. 2014c. “Necessity Is Unnecessary: A Response to Bradley (2014).” Noûs 48(3): 558–564.
Rupert, Robert D. 2016. “Embodied Knowledge, Conceptual Change, and the A Priori; Or, Justification, Revision, and the Ways Life Could Go.” American Philosophical Quarterly 53(2): 169–192.
Rupert, Robert D. 2018. “The Self in the Age of Cognitive Science: Decoupling the Self from the Personal Level.” Philosophic Exchange 47(2).

Further References

Bradley, Darren J. 2014. “Functionalism and the Independence Problems.” Noûs 48(3): 545–557.
Clark, Andy. 2008. Supersizing the Mind: Embodiment, Action, and Cognitive Extension. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195333213.001.0001.