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Marc Slors (slors)

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Bibliography

    Bransen, Jan and Slors, Marc, eds. 1996. The Problematic Reality of Values. Assen: Koninklijke Van Gorcum & Comp.
    Francken, Jolien C. and Slors, Marc. 2014. From Commonsense to Science and Back: The Use of Cognitive Concepts in Neuroscience.” Consciousness and Cognition 29: 248–258, doi:10.1016/j.concog.2014.08.019.
    Janssen, Annelli, Klein, Colin and Slors, Marc. 2017. What is a Cognitive Ontology, Anyway? Philosophical Explorations: An International Journal for the Philosophy of Mind and Action 20(2): 123–128, doi:10.1080/13869795.2017.1312496.
    Slors, Marc. 1996. Why Dennett Cannot Explain What It is to Adopt the Intentional Stance.” The Philosophical Quarterly 46(182): 93–98.
    Slors, Marc. 1998. Two Claims that Can Save a Nonreductive Account of Mental Causation.” in Human Action, Deliberation and Causation, edited by Jan Bransen and Stefaan E. Cuypers, pp. 225–248. Philosophical Studies Series n. 77. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
    Slors, Marc. 2001a. The Diachronic Mind. An Essay on Personal Identity, Psychological Continuity and the Mind-Body Problem. Philosophical Studies Series n. 86. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
    Slors, Marc. 2001b. Personal Identity, Memory, and Circularity: An Alternative for Q-Memory.” The Journal of Philosophy 98: 186–214.
    Slors, Marc. 2002. Epiphenomenalism and Cross-Realization Induction.” Grazer Philosophische Studien 65: 15–36. “Mental Causation, Multiple Realization, and Emergence,” ed. by Marc Slors and Sven Walter.
    Slors, Marc. 2004a. Care for One’s Own Future Experiences.” Philosophical Explorations: An International Journal for the Philosophy of Mind and Action 7(2): 183–195.
    Slors, Marc. 2004b. The Closest Continuer View Revisited.” Croatian Journal of Philosophy 4(3): 387–402.
    Slors, Marc. 2008. The Importance and Limits of the Phenomenological Mind [on Gallagher and Zahavi (2008b)].” Abstracta – Linguagem, Mente e Ação special issue(2): 34–44.
    Slors, Marc. 2012a. The Model-Model of the Theory-Theory.” Inquiry 55(5): 521–542.
    Slors, Marc. 2012b. Looking for the Real Enemy.” in Action in Context, edited by Anton Leist, pp. 254–260. Berlin: de Gruyter.
    Slors, Marc. 2015. Two Improvements to the Intentional Stance Theory [on Hutto and Satne (2015)].” Philosophia 43(3): 579–591.
    Slors, Marc. 2017. Reasons of One’s Own. London: Routledge.
    Slors, Marc and Macdonald, Cynthia. 2008. Rethinking Folk-Psychology: Alternatives to Theories of Mind.” Philosophical Explorations: An International Journal for the Philosophy of Mind and Action 11(3): 153–161.

Further References

    Gallagher, Shaun and Zahavi, Dan. 2008a. The Phenomenological Mind. London: Routledge.
    Gallagher, Shaun and Zahavi, Dan. 2008b. Précis of Gallagher and Zahavi (2008a).” Abstracta – Linguagem, Mente e Ação special issue(2): 4–9.
    Hutto, Daniel D. and Satne, Glenda. 2015. The Natural Origins of Content.” Philosophia 43(3): 521–536.