Lara Buchak (buchak)

My contributions to Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Buchak, Lara. 2010. “Instrumental Rationality, Epistemic Rationality, and Evidence-Gathering.” in Philosophical Perspectives 24: Epistemology, edited by John Hawthorne, pp. 85–120. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley; Sons, Inc.
Buchak, Lara. 2013. “Free Acts and Chance: Why the Rollback Argument Fails.” The Philosophical Quarterly 63(250): 20–28.
Buchak, Lara. 2014a. Risk and Rationality. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199672165.001.0001.
Buchak, Lara. 2014b. “Risk and Tradeoffs.” Erkenntnis 79(suppl., 6): 1091–1117.
Buchak, Lara. 2014c. “Belief, Credence, and Norms.” Philosophical Studies 169(2): 285–311.
Buchak, Lara. 2014d. “Learning Not to be Naı̈ve: A Comment on the Exchange between Perrine/Wykstra and Draper [Draper (2014a), Perrine and Wykstra (2014) and Draper (2014b)].” in Skeptical Theism. New Essays, edited by Trent Dougherty and Justin P. McBrayer, pp. 178–189. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Buchak, Lara. 2014e. “Rational Faith and Justified Belief.” in Religious Faith and Intellectual Virtue, edited by Laura Frances Callahan and Timothy O’Connor, pp. 49–73. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199672158.001.0001.
Buchak, Lara. 2015. “Revisiting Risk and Rationality: A Reply to Pettigrew (2015) and Briggs (2015).” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45(5–6): 841–862.
Buchak, Lara. 2016. “Decision Theory.” in The Oxford Handbook of Probability and Philosophy, edited by Alan Hájek and Christopher R. Hitchcock, pp. 789–814. Oxford Handbooks. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199607617.001.0001.
Buchak, Lara. 2017. “Faith and Steadfastness in the Face of Counter-Evidence.” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 81(1-2): 113–133.
Buchak, Lara. 2018. “When is Faith Rational?” in The Norton Introduction to Philosophy, edited by Gideon Rosen, Alex Byrne, Joshua Cohen, and Seana Valentine Shiffrin, 2nd ed., pp. 115–127. New York: W.W. Norton & Co.
Buchak, Lara. 2022. “Normative Theories of Rational Choice: Rivals to Expected Utility.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2022/entries/rationality-normative-nonutility/.
Buchak, Lara and Pettit, Philip. 2015. “Reasons and Rationality: The Case of Group Agents.” in Weighing and Reasoning. Themes from the Philosophy of John Broome, edited by Iwao Hirose and Andrew Reisner, pp. 207–231. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199684908.001.0001.
Buchak, Lara and Zimmerman, Dean W., eds. 2022. Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion. vol. X. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780192862976.001.0001.
Buchak, Lara, Zimmerman, Dean W. and Swenson, Philip, eds. 2019. Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion. vol. IX. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198845492.001.0001.
Murray, Dylan and Buchak, Lara. 2019. “Risk and Motivation: When the Will is Required to Determine What to Do.” Philosophers’ Imprint 19(16).
Russell, Jeffrey Sanford, Hawthorne, John and Buchak, Lara. 2015. “Groupthink.” Philosophical Studies 172(5): 1287–1309.

Further References

Briggs, Rachael A. 2015. “Costs of Abandoning the Sure-Thing Principle.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45(5–6): 827–840.
Draper, Paul. 2014a. “Confirmation Theory and the Core of CORNEA.” in Skeptical Theism. New Essays, edited by Trent Dougherty and Justin P. McBrayer, pp. 132–141. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Draper, Paul. 2014b. “Meet the New Skeptical Theism, Same as the Old Skeptical Theism.” in Skeptical Theism. New Essays, edited by Trent Dougherty and Justin P. McBrayer, pp. 164–177. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Perrine, Timothy and Wykstra, Stephen John. 2014. “Skeptical Theism, Abductive Atheology, and Theory Versioning.” in Skeptical Theism. New Essays, edited by Trent Dougherty and Justin P. McBrayer, pp. 142–163. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Pettigrew, Richard. 2015. “Risk, Rationality and Expected Utility Theory.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45(5–6): 798–826.