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Jamie Tappenden (tappenden-j)

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Bibliography

    Tappenden, Jamie. 1990. Review of McGee (1988).” The Philosophical Review 99(1): 142–144.
    Tappenden, Jamie. 1993a. The Liar and Sorites Paradoxes: Towards a Unified Account.” The Journal of Philosophy 90(11): 551–577.
    Tappenden, Jamie. 1993b. Analytic Truth – It’s Worse (or Perhaps Better) than You Thought.” Philosophical Topics 21(2): 223–261.
    Tappenden, Jamie. 1995a. Extending Knowledge and ‘Fruitful Concepts’: Fregean Themes in the Philosophy of Mathematics.” Noûs 29(4): 427–467.
    Tappenden, Jamie. 1995b. Geometry and Generality in Frege’s Philosophy of Arithmetic.” Synthese 102: 319–361.
    Tappenden, Jamie. 1996. The Roundsquare Copula: A Semantic Internalist’s Rejoinder.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 96: 395–400.
    Tappenden, Jamie. 1997. Metatheory and Mathematical Practice in Frege.” Philosophical Topics 25(2): 213–264.
    Tappenden, Jamie. 1999. Negation, Denial and Language Change in Philosophical Logic.” in What is Negation?, edited by Dov M. Gabbay and Heinrich Theodor Wansing, pp. 261–298. Applied Logic Series n. 13. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
    Tappenden, Jamie. 2000. Frege on Axioms, Indirect Proofs and Independence Arguments in Geometry.” Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 41(3).
    Tappenden, Jamie. 2001. Recent Work in the Philosophy of Mathematics.” The Journal of Philosophy 98(9): 488–497. Review of Maddy (1997; Shapiro 1997; Resnik 1997).
    Tappenden, Jamie. 2002. Critical Notice of Soames (1999).” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65(2): 418–421.
    Tappenden, Jamie. 2005a. The Caesar Problem in its Historical Context: Mathematical Background.” Dialectica 59(2): 237–264.
    Tappenden, Jamie. 2005b. Critical Notice of Fine (2002).” Philosophical Studies 122(3): 349–366.
    Tappenden, Jamie. 2005c. Proof Style and Understanding in Mathematics I: Visualization, Unification and Axiom Choice.” in Visualisation, Explanation and Reasoning Styles in Mathematics, edited by Paolo Mancosu, Klaus Frovin Jørgensen, and Stig Andur Pedersen, pp. 147–214. Synthese Library n. 327. Dordrecht: Springer.
    Tappenden, Jamie. 2008a. Mathematical Concepts and Definitions.” in The Philosophy of Mathematical Practice, edited by Paolo Mancosu, pp. 256–275. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199296453.001.0001.
    Tappenden, Jamie. 2008b. Mathematical Concepts: Fruitfulness and Naturalness.” in The Philosophy of Mathematical Practice, edited by Paolo Mancosu, pp. 276–301. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199296453.001.0001.
    Tappenden, Jamie. 2012. Fruitfulness as a Theme in the Philosophy of Mathematics.” The Journal of Philosophy 109(1): 204–219.
    Tappenden, Jamie. 2019. Infinitesimals, Magnitudes, and Definition in Frege.” in Essays on Frege’s Basic Laws of Arithmetic, edited by Philip A. Ebert and Marcus Rossberg, pp. 235–263. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198712084.001.0001.
    Tappenden, Jamie and Smadja, Ivahn. 2011. Définitions mathématiques pour philosophes.” Les Études Philosophiques 65(2): 179–191.

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