Michael D. Resnik (resnik-md)

Contributions to Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Cheng, Chung-Ying and Resnik, Michael D. 1965. “Ontic Commitment and the Empty Universe.” The Journal of Philosophy 62(14): 359–364.
Hale, Susan C. and Resnik, Michael D. 1987. “Science Nominalized [on Horgan (1984)].” Philosophy of Science 54: 277–280.
Luce, Lila and Resnik, Michael D. 1991. “Mathematical Structures.” in Handbook of Metaphysics and Ontology, edited by Hans Burkhardt and Barry Smith. Analytica: Investigations in Logic, Ontology, and the Philosophy of Language n. 2. München: Philosophia Verlag.
Resnik, Michael D. 1964. “Some Observations Related to Frege’s Way Out.” Logique et Analyse 7(27): 138–144.
Resnik, Michael D. 1966. “On Skolem’s paradox.” The Journal of Philosophy 63: 425–438.
Resnik, Michael D. 1974. “The Frege-Hilbert Controversy.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 34(3): 386–403. Translated as “Die Frege-Hilbert Kontroverse” in Schirn (1976, 193–214).
Resnik, Michael D. 1975. “Mathematical knowledge and pattern cognition.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 5: 25–39.
Resnik, Michael D. 1976. “Frege’s Context Principle Revisited.” in Studien zu Frege III: Logik und Semantik, edited by Matthias Schirn, pp. 35–50. Problemata n. 44. Stuttgart - Bad Cannstatt: Friedrich Frommann Verlag - Günther Holzboog.
Resnik, Michael D. 1980a. Frege and the Philosophy of Mathematics. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press.
Resnik, Michael D. 1980b. “Review of Field (1980).” Noûs 14: 514–519.
Resnik, Michael D. 1981a. “Frege and Analytic Philosophy: Facts and Speculations.” in Midwest Studies in Philosophy 6: Foundations of Analytic Philosophy, edited by Peter A. French, Theodore E. Uehling Jr., and Howard K. Wettstein, pp. 83–104. Minneapolis, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press.
Resnik, Michael D. 1981b. “Mathematics as a Science of Patterns: Ontology and Reference.” Noûs 15: 529–550.
Resnik, Michael D. 1982. “Mathematics as a Science of Patterns: Epistemology.” Noûs 16: 95–105.
Resnik, Michael D. 1984. “Review of Wright (1983).” The Journal of Philosophy 81(12): 778–783.
Resnik, Michael D. 1985a. “How Nominalist is Hartry Field’s Nominalism?” Philosophical Studies 47: 163–181.
Resnik, Michael D. 1985b. “Ontology and Logic: Remarks on Hartry Field’s Anti-Platonist Philosophy of Mathematics.” History and Philosophy of Logic 6: 191–209.
Resnik, Michael D. 1987a. Choices. An Introduction to Decision Theory. Minneapolis, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press.
Resnik, Michael D. 1987b. “You Can’t Trust an Ideal Theory to Tell the Truth.” Philosophical Studies 52: 151–160.
Resnik, Michael D. 1988a. “Second Order Logic Still Wild.” The Journal of Philosophy 85(2): 75–87. Reprinted in Shapiro (1996).
Resnik, Michael D. 1988b. “Mathematics from the Structural Point of View.” Revue Internationale de Philosophie 42: 400–424.
Resnik, Michael D. 1989. “Computation and Mathematical Empiricism.” Philosophical Topics 17(2): 129–144.
Resnik, Michael D. 1990. “Beliefs About Mathematical Objects.” in Physicalism in Mathematics, edited by Andrew David Irvine, pp. 41–72. The University of Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science n. 45. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, doi:10.1007/978-94-009-1902-0.
Resnik, Michael D. 1991. “Between Mathematics and Physics.” in PSA 1990: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, Part II: Symposium Papers, edited by Arthur I. Fine, Micky Forbes, and Linda Wessels, pp. 369–378. East Lansing, Michigan: Philosophy of Science Association.
Resnik, Michael D. 1992a. “A Structuralist’s Involvement with Modality [review of Hellman (1989)].” Mind 101: 107–122.
Resnik, Michael D. 1992b. “Proofs as a Source of Truth.” in Proof and Knowledge in Mathematics, edited by Michael Detlefsen, pp. 6–32. London: Routledge.
Resnik, Michael D. 1993. “Review of Dummett (1991).” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53(4): 961–963.
Resnik, Michael D. 1994a. “Numbers as Structures and as Positions in Structures.” in Language, Mind and Art. Essays in Appreciation and Analysis, in Honor of Paul Ziff, edited by Dale Jamieson, pp. 55–68. Synthese Library n. 240. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Resnik, Michael D. 1994b. “What is Structuralism?” in Logic, and Philosophy of Science in Uppsala, edited by Dag Prawitz and Dag Westerståhl, pp. 355–364. Synthese Library n. 236. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Resnik, Michael D. 1995a. Mathematical Objects and Mathematical Knowledge. Aldershot, Hampshire: Dartmouth Publishing.
Resnik, Michael D. 1995b. “Scientific vs. Mathematical Realism: The Indispensability Argument.” Philosophia Mathematica 3(2): 166–174.
Resnik, Michael D. 1995c. “Learning About Life.” in Artificial Life: An Overview, edited by Christopher G. Langton, pp. 229–242. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Resnik, Michael D. 1996a. “Quine, the Argument from Proxy Functions, and Structuralism.” Philosophical Topics 24(1): 129–148.
Resnik, Michael D. 1996b. “Ought There to be One Logic?” in Logic and Reality: Essays on the Legacy of Arthur Prior, edited by B. Jack Copeland, pp. 489–517. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Resnik, Michael D. 1996c. “Structural Relativity.” Philosophia Mathematica 4(2): 83–99.
Resnik, Michael D. 1996d. “On Positing Mathematical Objects.” in Frege: Importance and Legacy, edited by Matthias Schirn, pp. 45–69. Perspektiven der analytischen Philosophie / Perspectives in Analytic Philosophy n. 13. Berlin: de Gruyter.
Resnik, Michael D. 1997a. Mathematics as a Science of Patterns. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0198250142.001.0001.
Resnik, Michael D. 1997b. “The Same Size Theorem and Quine’s Argument from Proxy Functions.” in Logica ’96: Proceedings of the 10th International Symposium, edited by Timothy Childers, Petr Kolář, and Vladimı́r Svoboda, pp. 7–20. Praha: Filosofia. Nakladetelstvı́ Filosofického ústavu AV ČR.
Resnik, Michael D. 1998. “Holistic Mathematics.” in The Philosophy of Mathematics Today, edited by Matthias Schirn, pp. 227–246. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198236542.001.0001.
Resnik, Michael D. 2000a. “Parsons on Mathematical Intuition and Obviousness.” in Between Logic and Intuition: Essays in Honor of Charles Parsons, edited by Gila Y. Sher and Richard Tieszen, pp. 219–231. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Resnik, Michael D. 2000b. “Some Remarks on Mathematical Progress from a Structuralist’s Perspective.” in Third Wave Feminism. A Critical Exploration, edited by Stacy Gillis, Gillian Howie, and Rebecca Munford, pp. 353–362. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.
Resnik, Michael D. 2004. “Revising Logic.” in The Law of Non-Contradiction: New Philosophical Essays, edited by Graham Priest, J. C. Beall, and Bradley Armour-Garb, pp. 178–195. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199265176.001.0001.
Resnik, Michael D. 2005. “Quine and the Web of Belief.” in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mathematics and Logic, edited by Stewart Shapiro, pp. 412–436. Oxford Handbooks. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0195148770.001.0001.
Resnik, Michael D. and Kushner, David. 1987. “Explanation, Independence, and Realism in Mathematics.” The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 38(2): 141–158.

Further References

Dummett, Michael A. E. 1991. The Logical Basis of Metaphysics. London: Gerald Duckworth & Co.
Field, Hartry. 1980. Science without Numbers: A Defense of Nominalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Second edition: Field (2016), doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198777915.001.0001.
Field, Hartry. 2016. Science without Numbers: A Defense of Nominalism. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press. First edition: Field (1980), doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198777915.001.0001.
Hellman, Geoffrey. 1989. Mathematics without Numbers: Towards a Modal-Structural Interpretation. 11th ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0198240341.001.0001.
Horgan, Terence E. 1984. “Science Nominalized.” Philosophy of Science 51: 529–549.
Schirn, Matthias, ed. 1976. Studien zu Frege I: Logik und Philosophie der Mathematik. Problemata n. 42. Stuttgart - Bad Cannstatt: Friedrich Frommann Verlag - Günther Holzboog.
Shapiro, Stewart. 1996. The Limits of Logic: Second-Order Logic and the Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem. Brookfield, Vermont: Aldershot.
Wright, Crispin. 1983. Frege’s Conception of Numbers as Objects. Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press.