Vann McGee (mcgee-v)
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Bibliography
Boolos, George and McGee, Vann. 1987. “The Degree of the Set of Sentences of Predicate Provability Logic that are True under every Interpretation.” The Journal of Symbolic Logic 52: 165–171.
Lehrer, Keith and McGee, Vann. 1991. “An Epistemic Principle which Solves Newcomb’s Paradox.” Grazer Philosophische Studien 40: 197–217. “Metamind, Knowledge, and Coherence,” ed. by Johannes Brandl, Wolfgang Combocz and Christian Piller.
Lehrer, Keith and McGee, Vann. 1992. “Particulars, Individual Qualities, and Universals.” in Language, Truth and Ontology, edited by Kevin Mulligan, pp. 37–47. Philosophical Studies Series n. 51. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co.
McGee, Vann. 1981. “Finite Matrices and the Logic of Conditionals.” The Journal of Philosophical Logic 10(2): 349–351.
McGee, Vann. 1985a. “A Counterexample to Modus Ponens.” The Journal of Philosophy 82(9): 462–471, doi:10.2307/2026276.
McGee, Vann. 1985b. “How Truthlike Can a Predicate Be? A Negative Result.” The Journal of Philosophical Logic 14(4): 399–410.
McGee, Vann. 1988. Truth, Vagueness, and Paradox: An Essay on the Logic of Truth. Indianapolis, Indiana: Hackett Publishing Co.
McGee, Vann. 1989. “Conditional Probabilities and Compounds of Conditionals.” The Philosophical Review 98(4): 485–541.
McGee, Vann. 1991. “Reply to Piller (1991).” Grazer Philosophische Studien 40: 229–232. “Metamind, Knowledge, and Coherence,” ed. by Johannes Brandl, Wolfgang Combocz and Christian Piller.
McGee, Vann. 1992a. “Two Problems with Tarski’s Theory of Consequence.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 92: 273–292.
McGee, Vann. 1992b. “Review of Etchemendy (1990).” The Journal of Symbolic Logic 57(1): 254–255.
McGee, Vann. 1992c. “Maximal Consistent Sets of Instances of Tarski’s Schema (T).” The Journal of Philosophical Logic 21(3): 235–241, doi:10.1007/bf00260929.
McGee, Vann. 1993. “A Semantic Conception of Truth?” Philosophical Topics 21(2): 83–111. Reprinted in Armour-Garb and Beall (2005, 111–142).
McGee, Vann. 1994. “Learning the Impossible.” in Probability and Conditionals: Belief Revision and Rational Decision, edited by Ellery Eells and Brian Skyrms, pp. 179–199. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
McGee, Vann. 1996. “Logical Operations.” The Journal of Philosophical Logic 25(6): 567–580, doi:10.1007/bf00265253.
McGee, Vann. 1997a. “The Complexity of the Modal Predicate Logic of ‘True in Every Transitive Model of ZF’ .” The Journal of Symbolic Logic 62: 1371–1378.
McGee, Vann. 1997b. “How We Learn Mathematical Language.” The Philosophical Review 106(1): 35–68.
McGee, Vann. 1997c. “Revision.” in Philosophical Issues 8: Truth, edited by Enrique Villanueva, pp. 387–406. Atascadero, California: Ridgeview Publishing Co.
McGee, Vann. 2000a. “The Analysis of ‘\(x\) is true’ as ‘For every \(p\), if \(x = ``p''\), then \(p\)’ .” in Circularity, Definition, and Truth, edited by André Chapuis and Anil Gupta, pp. 255–272. New Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research.
McGee, Vann. 2000b. “Review of Boolos (1998).” The Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 7(1): 58–62.
McGee, Vann. 2000c. “Everything.” in Between Logic and Intuition: Essays in Honor of Charles Parsons, edited by Gila Y. Sher and Richard Tieszen, pp. 54–78. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
McGee, Vann. 2001a. “Truth by Default.” Philosophia Mathematica 9(1): 5–20.
McGee, Vann. 2001b. “Review of Etchemendy (1990).” The Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 7(3): 379–380.
McGee, Vann. 2002. “Ramsey and the Correspondence Theory.” in Principles of Truth, edited by Volker Halbach and Leon Horsten, pp. 153–168. Egelsbach: Hänsel-Hohenhausen. Second edition, with small corrections: Halbach and Horsten (2004).
McGee, Vann. 2003. “Universal Universal Quantification.” in Liars and Heaps: New Essays on Paradox, edited by J. C. Beall, pp. 357–364. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
McGee, Vann. 2004a. “Ramsey’s Dialetheism.” in The Law of Non-Contradiction: New Philosophical Essays, edited by Graham Priest, J. C. Beall, and Bradley Armour-Garb, pp. 276–293. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199265176.001.0001.
McGee, Vann. 2004b. “Tarski’s Staggering Existential Assumptions.” Synthese 142(3): 371–387.
McGee, Vann. 2004c. “The Many Lives of Ebenezer Wilkes Smith.” in One Hundred Years of Russell’s Paradox. Mathematics, Logic, Philosophy, edited by Godehard Link, pp. 611–624. de Gruyter Series in Logic and Its Applications n. 6. Berlin: de Gruyter.
McGee, Vann. 2005b. “Two Conceptions of Truth? – Comment [review of Field (2001) ].” Philosophical Studies 124(1): 71–104.
McGee, Vann. 2005c. “In Praise of the Free Lunch: Why Disquotationalists should Embrace Compositional Semantics.” Unpublished manuscript.
McGee, Vann. 2005d. “Afterword [to the reprint of McGee (1993)]: Trying (with Limited Success) to Demarcate the Disquotational-Correspondence Distinction.” in Deflationary Truth, edited by Bradley Armour-Garb and J. C. Beall, pp. 143–152. LaSalle, Illinois: Open Court Publishing Co.
McGee, Vann. 2006a. “There’s a Rule for Everything.” in Absolute Generality, edited by Agustı́n Rayo and Gabriel Uzquiano, pp. 179–202. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
McGee, Vann. 2006b. “There are Many Things.” in Content and Modality. Themes from the Philosophy of Robert Stalnaker, edited by Judith Jarvis Thomson and Alex Byrne, pp. 93–122. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
McGee, Vann. 2006c. “Truth.” in The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Language, edited by Michael Devitt and Richard Hanley, pp. 392–410. Blackwell Philosophy Guides. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, doi:10.1002/9780470757031.
McGee, Vann. 2010. “Field’s Logic of Truth.” Philosophical Studies 147(3): 421–432.
McGee, Vann. 2011a. “Review of Berto (2009).” Philosophia Mathematica 19(3): 367–369.
McGee, Vann. 2011b. “Logical Consequence.” in The Continuum Companion to Philosophical Logic, edited by Richard Pettigrew and Leon Horsten, pp. 29–53. London: Continuum International Publishing Group.
McGee, Vann. 2015a. “The Categoricity of Logic.” in Foundations of Logical Consequence, edited by Colin R. Caret and Ole Thomassen Hjortland, pp. 161–185. Mind Association Occasional Series. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198715696.001.0001.
McGee, Vann. 2015b. “Whittle’s Assault on Cantor’s Paradise [on Whittle (2015)].” in Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, volume IX, edited by Karen Bennett and Dean W. Zimmerman, pp. 20–32. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198729242.003.0002.
McGee, Vann. 2016. “Thought, Thoughts, and Deflationism.” Philosophical Studies 173(12): 3153–3168.
McGee, Vann. 2017. “Gödel, Lucas, and the Soul-Searching Selfie.” in Raymond Smullyan on Self Reference, edited by Melvin Chris Fitting and Brian Rayman, pp. 147–164. Outstanding Contributions to Logic n. 14. Cham: Springer.
McGee, Vann and McLaughlin, Brian P. 1995. “Distinctions without a Difference.” The Southern Journal of Philosophy 33(suppl.): 203–251. Spindel Conference 1994: Vagueness, ed. Terry Horgan.
McGee, Vann and McLaughlin, Brian P. 1998. “Review of Williamson (1994).” Linguistics and Philosophy 21(2): 221–235.
McGee, Vann and McLaughlin, Brian P. 2000. “The Lessons of the Many.” Philosophical Topics 28(1): 129–151.
McGee, Vann and McLaughlin, Brian P. 2004. “Logical Commitment and Semantic Indeterminacy: A Reply to Williamson (2004).” Linguistics and Philosophy 27(1): 123–136.
Further References
Armour-Garb, Bradley and Beall, J. C., eds. 2005. Deflationary Truth. LaSalle, Illinois: Open Court Publishing Co.
Berto, Francesco. 2008. Tutti Pazzi Per Gödel! La guida completa al Teorema di Incompletezza. Bari: Editori Laterza.
Berto, Francesco. 2009. There’s Something About Gödel. The Complete Guide to the Incompleteness Theorems. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell. Translation of Berto (2008).
Boolos, George. 1998. Logic, Logic, and Logic. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. Introductions and afterword by John P. Burgess; edited by Richard Jeffrey, doi:10.1080/01445340051095856.
Etchemendy, John. 1990. The Concept of Logical Consequence. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
Field, Hartry. 2001. Truth and the Absence of Facts. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0199242895.001.0001.
Piller, Christian. 1991. “Comment on Lehrer and McGee (1991).” Grazer Philosophische Studien 40: 221–228. “Metamind, Knowledge, and Coherence,” ed. by Johannes Brandl, Wolfgang Combocz and Christian Piller.
Whittle, Bruno. 2015. “On Infinite Size.” in Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, volume IX, edited by Karen Bennett and Dean W. Zimmerman, pp. 3–19. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198729242.003.0001.
Williamson, Timothy. 2004. “Logical Commitment and Semantic Indeterminacy. A Reply to McGee and McLaughlin (1998).” Linguistics and Philosophy 27(1): 113–122.