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Matthew Tugby (tugby)

Cited in the following articles

The Primitivist Response to the Inference Problem, Dispositions and Token Identity

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Bibliography

    Alvarado Marambio, José Tomás and Tugby, Matthew. 2021. “A Problem for Natural-Kind Essentialism and Formal Causes.” in Neo-Aristotelian Perspectives on Formal Causation, edited by Ludger Jansen and Petter Sandstad, pp. 201–222. London: Routledge, doi:10.4324/9780429329821.
    Mumford, Stephen and Tugby, Matthew, eds. 2013a. Metaphysics and Science. Mind Association Occasional Series. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199674527.001.0001.
    Mumford, Stephen and Tugby, Matthew. 2013b. “What is the Metaphysics of Science?” in Metaphysics and Science, edited by Stephen Mumford and Matthew Tugby, pp. 3–27. Mind Association Occasional Series. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199674527.001.0001.
    Tugby, Matthew. 2008. “Review of Shoemaker (2007).” in Der praktische Syllogismus, edited by Christof Rapp, pp. 237–240. Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy n. 11. Paderborn: Mentis Verlag.
    Tugby, Matthew. 2012a. “The Metaphysics of Pan-Dispositionalism.” in Properties, Powers and Structures. Issues in the Metaphysics of Realism, edited by Alexander Bird, Brian Ellis, and Howard Sankey, pp. 165–180. Routledge Studies in Metaphysics n. 5. New York: Routledge, doi:10.4324/9780203124482.
    Tugby, Matthew. 2012b. “Rescuing Dispositionalism from the Ultimate Problem: Reply to Barker and Smart (2012).” Analysis 72(4): 723–731, doi:10.1093/analys/ans112.
    Tugby, Matthew. 2013a. “Causal Nominalism and the One over Many Problem.” Analysis 73(3): 455–462.
    Tugby, Matthew. 2013b. “Platonic Dispositionalism.” Mind 122(486): 451–480.
    Tugby, Matthew. 2013c. “Nomic Necessity for Platonists.” Thought 2(4): 324–331.
    Tugby, Matthew. 2014. “Categoricalism, Dispositionalism, and the Epistemology of Properties.” Synthese 191(6): 1075–1084.
    Tugby, Matthew. 2015. “The Alien Paradox.” Analysis 75(1): 28–37.
    Tugby, Matthew. 2016a. “Mirage Realism Revisited.” in Metaphysics and Scientific Realism. Essays in Honor of David Malet Armstrong, edited by Francesco Federico Calemi, pp. 13–30. EIDE – Foundations of Ontology n. 9. Berlin: de Gruyter, doi:10.1515/9783110455915.
    Tugby, Matthew. 2016b. “Universals, Laws, and Governance.” Philosophical Studies 173(5): 1147–1163, doi:10.1007/s11098-015-0521-2.
    Tugby, Matthew. 2016c. “On the Reality of Intrinsically Finkable Dispositions.” Philosophia 44(2): 623–631.
    Tugby, Matthew. 2016d. “What are Dispositional Properties?” in Reality Making, edited by Mark Jago, pp. 75–98. Mind Association Occasional Series. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198709008.001.0001.
    Tugby, Matthew. 2017. “The Problem of Retention.” Synthese 194(6): 2053–2075.
    Tugby, Matthew. 2020. “Abduction and the Scientific Realist Case for Properties.” Grazer Philosophische Studien 98(1): 123–145, doi:10.1163/18756735-000112.
    Tugby, Matthew. 2021. “Grounding Theories of Powers.” Synthese 198(12): 11187–11216, doi:10.1007/s11229-020-02781-2.
    Tugby, Matthew. 2022. Putting Properties First. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198855101.001.0001.

Further References