Amos Tversky (tversky-a)

Beiträge zu Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Kahneman, Daniel, Slovic, Paul and Tversky, Amos, eds. 1982. Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, doi:10.1017/cbo9780511809477.
Kahneman, Daniel and Tversky, Amos. 1979a. “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk.” Econometrica 47: 263–291. Reprinted in Gärdenfors and Sahlin (1988, 183–214).
Kahneman, Daniel and Tversky, Amos. 1979b. “On the Interpretation of Intuitive Probability: A Reply to Jonathan Cohen.” Cognition 7: 409–411.
Krantz, David H., Luce, R. Duncan, Suppes, Patrick and Tversky, Amos. 1971. Foundations of Measurement, Vol. 1: Additive and Polynomial Representations. New York: Academic Press.
Luce, R. Duncan, Krantz, David H., Suppes, Patrick and Tversky, Amos. 1990. Foundations of Measurement, Vol. 3: Representation, Axiomatization, and Invariance. New York: Academic Press.
Quattrone, George A. and Tversky, Amos. 1986. “Self-Deception and the Voter’s Illusion.” in The Multiple Self, edited by Jon Elster, pp. 35–58. Studies in Rationality and Social Change. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Shafir, Eldar B., Simonson, I. and Tversky, Amos. 1993. “Reason-Based Choice.” Cognition 49: 11–36.
Suppes, Patrick, Krantz, David H., Luce, R. Duncan and Tversky, Amos. 1989. Foundations of Measurement, Vol. 2: Geometrical, Threshold, and Probabilistic Representations. New York: Academic Press.
Tversky, Amos. 1972. “Elimination by Aspects: A Theory of Choice.” Psychological Review 79: 281–299.
Tversky, Amos. 1975. “A Critique of Expected Utility Theory: Descriptive and Normative Considerations.” Erkenntnis 9(2): 163–173.
Tversky, Amos. 1977. “On the Elicitation of Preferences: Descriptive and Prescriptive Considerations.” in Conflicting Objectives in Decisions, edited by David E. Bell, Ralph L. Keeney, and Howard Raiffa, pp. 207–222. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley; Sons, Inc.
Tversky, Amos. 1986. “Cognitive Illusions in Judgment and Choice.” in The Kaleidoscope of Science. The Israel Colloquium: Studies in History, Philosophy, and Sociology of Science. Volume 1, edited by Edna Ullmann-Margalit, pp. 75–88. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science n. 94. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co.
Tversky, Amos. 2004. Preference, Belief, and Similarity. Selected Writings. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press. Edited by Eldar Shafir.
Tversky, Amos and Kahneman, Daniel. 1977. “Causal Thinking in Judgment under Uncertainty.” in Logic, Foundations of Mathematics, and Computability Theory. Part One of the Proceedings of the Fifth International Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, London, Ontario, Canada, 1975, edited by Robert E. Butts and Jaakko Hintikka, pp. 167–191. The University of Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science n. 9. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co.
Tversky, Amos and Kahneman, Daniel. 1986. “The Framing of Decisions and the Evaluation of Prospects.” in Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science VII: Proceedings of the Seventh International Congress of Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science, Salzburg, 1983, edited by Ruth Barcan Marcus, Georg J. W. Dorn, and Paul Weingartner, pp. 503–520. Studies in Logic and the Foundations of Mathematics n. 114. Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Co.
Tversky, Amos and Kahneman, Daniel. 1990. “Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions.” in The Limits of Rationality, edited by Karen Schweers Cook and Margaret Levi, pp. 60–89. Chicago, Illinois: The University of Chicago Press.

Further References

Gärdenfors, Peter and Sahlin, Nils-Eric, eds. 1988. Decision, Probability, Utility: Selected Readings. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.