Jonathan Vogel (vogel-j)

Cited in the following articles

Contributions to Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Vogel, Jonathan. 1987. “Tracking, Closure, and Inductive Knowledge.” in The Possibility of Knowledge. Nozick and His Critics, edited by Steven Luper, pp. 197–217. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield. Published under the name “Luper-Foy” .
Vogel, Jonathan. 1990a. “Are there Counterexamples to the Closure Principle?” in Doubting: Contemporary Perspectives on Skepticism, edited by Michael D. Roth and Glenn Ross, pp. 13–28. Philosophical Studies Series n. 48. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co.
Vogel, Jonathan. 1990b. “Cartesian Skepticism and Inference to the Best Explanation.” The Journal of Philosophy 87: 658–666. Reprinted in Alcoff (1998, 352–359).
Vogel, Jonathan. 1993. “Review of Lipton (1991).” The Philosophical Review 102(3): 419–421.
Vogel, Jonathan. 1999. “The New Relevant Alternatives Theory.” in Philosophical Perspectives 13: Epistemology, edited by James E. Tomberlin, pp. 155–180. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, doi:10.1111/0029-4624.33.s13.8.
Vogel, Jonathan. 2000a. “Causation and Subjectivity.” in Transcendental Arguments. Problems and Prospects, edited by Robert Stern, pp. 211–228. Mind Association Occasional Series. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Vogel, Jonathan. 2000b. “Reliabilism Leveled .” The Journal of Philosophy 97(11): 602–623, doi:10.2307/2678454.
Vogel, Jonathan. 2004a. “Speaking of Knowledge [on Hawthorne (2004)].” in Philosophical Issues 14: Epistemology, edited by Ernest Sosa and Enrique Villanueva, pp. 501–509. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Vogel, Jonathan. 2004b. “Skeptical Arguments.” in Philosophical Issues 14: Epistemology, edited by Ernest Sosa and Enrique Villanueva, pp. 426–454. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Vogel, Jonathan. 2005. “The Refutation of Skepticism.” in Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, edited by Ernest Sosa and Matthias Steup, 1st ed., pp. 140–164. Contemporary Debates in Philosophy n. 3. Boston, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers. Second edition: Steup, Turri and Sosa (2014, 108–119).
Vogel, Jonathan. 2006. “Externalism Resisted [on BonJour and Sosa (2003)].” Philosophical Studies 131(3): 729–742.
Vogel, Jonathan. 2007. “Subjunctivitis.” Philosophical Studies 134(1): 73–88.
Vogel, Jonathan. 2008. “Internalist Reponses to Skepticism.” in The Oxford Handbook of Skepticism, edited by John Greco, pp. 533–556. Oxford Handbooks. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195183214.001.0001.
Vogel, Jonathan. 2010a. “Luminosity and Indiscriminability.” in Philosophical Perspectives 24: Epistemology, edited by John Hawthorne, pp. 547–572. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley; Sons, Inc.
Vogel, Jonathan. 2010b. “BonJour on Explanation and Skepticism.” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 41(4): 413–421.
Vogel, Jonathan. 2012. “The Enduring Trouble with Tracking.” in The Sensitivity Principle in Epistemology, edited by Kelly Becker and Tim Black, pp. 122–151. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, doi:10.1017/cbo9780511783630.
Vogel, Jonathan. 2014a. “\(E \& \neg H\).” in Scepticism and Perceptual Justification, edited by Dylan Dodd and Elia Zardini, pp. 87–107. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199658343.001.0001.
Vogel, Jonathan. 2014b. “Counting Minds and Mental States.” in Sensory Integration and the Unity of Consciousness, edited by David J. Bennett and Christopher S. Hill, pp. 393–400. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, doi:10.7551/mitpress/9780262027786.001.0001.
Vogel, Jonathan. 2015. “Skepticism and Inference to the Best Explanation.” in The Norton Introduction to Philosophy, edited by Gideon Rosen, Alex Byrne, Joshua Cohen, and Seana Valentine Shiffrin, pp. 328–334. New York: W.W. Norton & Co. Reprinted in Rosen et al. (2018, 284–290).
Vogel, Jonathan. 2017. “Accident, Evidence, and Knowledge.” in Explaining Knowledge. New Essays on the Gettier Problem, edited by Rodrigo Martins Borges, Claudio de Almeida, and Peter Klein, pp. 117–134. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198724551.001.0001.
Vogel, Jonathan. 2019. “Space, Structuralism, and Skepticism.” in Oxford Studies in Epistemology, volume VI, edited by Tamar Szabó Gendler and John Hawthorne, pp. 190–205. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198833314.001.0001.

Further References

Alcoff, Linda Martı́n. 1998. Epistemology: the Big Questions. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
BonJour, Laurence and Sosa, Ernest. 2003. Epistemic Justification. Great Debates in Philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Hawthorne, John. 2004. Knowledge and Lotteries. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0199269556.001.0001.
Lipton, Peter. 1991. Inference to the Best Explanation. London: Routledge. Second edition: Lipton (2004).
Lipton, Peter. 2004. Inference to the Best Explanation. 2nd ed. London: Routledge. First edition: Lipton (1991).
Rosen, Gideon, Byrne, Alex, Cohen, Joshua and Shiffrin, Seana Valentine, eds. 2018. The Norton Introduction to Philosophy. 2nd ed. New York: W.W. Norton & Co.
Sosa, Ernest and Steup, Matthias, eds. 2005. Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. 1st ed. Contemporary Debates in Philosophy n. 3. Boston, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers. Second edition: Steup, Turri and Sosa (2014).
Steup, Matthias, Turri, John and Sosa, Ernest, eds. 2014. Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. 2nd ed. Contemporary Debates in Philosophy n. 3. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell. First edition: Sosa and Steup (2005), doi:10.1002/9781394260744.