Ryan Wasserman (wasserman-ry)

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Bibliography

Chalmers, David J., Manley, David and Wasserman, Ryan, eds. 2009. Metametaphysics. New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780199546046.001.0001.
Hudson, Hud and Wasserman, Ryan. 2010. “Van Inwagen on Time-Travel and Changing the Past.” in Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, volume V, edited by Dean W. Zimmerman, pp. 41–52. New York: Oxford University Press.
Manley, David and Wasserman, Ryan. 2007. “A Gradable Approach to Dispositions.” The Philosophical Quarterly 57(226): 68–75.
Manley, David and Wasserman, Ryan. 2008. “On Linking Dispositions and Conditionals.” Mind 117(465): 59–84.
Manley, David and Wasserman, Ryan. 2011. “Dispositions, Conditionals, and Counterexamples.” Mind 120(480): 1191–1227.
Manley, David and Wasserman, Ryan. 2017. “Dispositions without Teleology.” in Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, volume X, edited by Karen Bennett and Dean W. Zimmerman, pp. 47–61. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198791973.001.0001.
Wasserman, Ryan. 2002. “The Standard Objection to the Standard Account.” Philosophical Studies 111(3): 197–216.
Wasserman, Ryan. 2003. “The Argument from Temporary Intrinsics.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81(3): 413–419.
Wasserman, Ryan. 2004a. “Framing the Debate over Persistence.” Metaphysica 5(1): 67–80.
Wasserman, Ryan. 2004b. “The Constitution Question.” Noûs 38(4): 693–710.
Wasserman, Ryan. 2004c. “Indeterminacy, Ignorance and the Possibility of Parity.” in Philosophical Perspectives 18: Ethics, edited by Dean W. Zimmerman and John Hawthorne, pp. 391–403. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Wasserman, Ryan. 2005. “Humean Supervenience and Personal Identity.” The Philosophical Quarterly 55(221).
Wasserman, Ryan. 2006a. “The Future Similarity Objection Revisited.” Synthese 150(1): 57–67.
Wasserman, Ryan. 2006b. “The Problem of Change.” Philosophy Compass 1(1): 48–57, doi:10.1111/j.1747-9991.2006.00012.x.
Wasserman, Ryan. 2009. “Material Constitution.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2009/entries/material-constitution/.
Wasserman, Ryan. 2010. “Teaching & Learning Guide for: The Problem of Change.” Philosophy Compass 5(3): 283–286.
Wasserman, Ryan. 2011a. “Dispositions and Generics.” in Philosophical Perspectives 25: Metaphysics, edited by John Hawthorne, pp. 425–453. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley; Sons, Inc.
Wasserman, Ryan. 2011b. “Intentional Action and the Unintentional Fallacy.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92: 524–534.
Wasserman, Ryan. 2012. “Personal Identity, Indeterminacy and Obligation.” in Personal Identity: Complex or Simple?, edited by Georg Gasser and Matthias Stefan, pp. 63–81. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, doi:10.1017/cbo9781139028486.
Wasserman, Ryan. 2013. “Material Constitution.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2013/entries/material-constitution/.
Wasserman, Ryan. 2015. “Lewis on Backward Causation.” Thought 4(3): 141–150.
Wasserman, Ryan. 2016. “Theories of Persistence.” Philosophical Studies 173(1): 243–250.
Wasserman, Ryan. 2017a. Paradoxes of Time Travel. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198793335.001.0001.
Wasserman, Ryan. 2017b. “Time Travel, Ability, and Arguments by Analogy.” Thought 6(1): 17–23.
Wasserman, Ryan. 2017c. “Material Constitution.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2017/entries/material-constitution/.
Wasserman, Ryan. 2018. “Review of Barnes (2016).” The Philosophical Review 127(2): 251–256.
Wasserman, Ryan. 2021. “Material Constitution.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2021/entries/material-constitution/.
Wasserman, Ryan, Hawthorne, John and Scala, Mark. 2004. “Recombination, Causal Constraints and Humean Supervenience: An Argument for Temporal Parts?” in Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, volume I, edited by Dean W. Zimmerman, pp. 301–318. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Reprinted in Hawthorne (2006, 71–84), doi:10.1093/oso/9780199267729.001.0001.
Wasserman, Ryan and Whitcomb, Dennis. 2011. “The Paradox of the Question.” Philosophical Studies 154(1): 149–159.

Further References

Barnes, Elizabeth. 2016. The Minority Body. A Theory of Disability. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198732587.001.0001.
Hawthorne, John. 2006. Metaphysical Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199291236.001.0001.