David J. Chalmers (chalmers-dj)

My contributions to Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Bourget, David and Chalmers, David J. 2014. “What Do Philosophers Believe?” Philosophical Studies 170(3): 465–500.
Bourget, David and Chalmers, David J. 2023. “Philosophers on Philosophy: The 2020 PhilPapers Survey.” Philosophers’ Imprint 23(11), doi:10.3998/phimp.2109.
Chalmers, David J. 1990. “Syntactic Transformations on Distributed Representations.” Connection Science 2: 53–62.
Chalmers, David J. 1992. “Subsymbolic Computation and the Chinese Room.” in Symbolic and Connectionist Paradigms: Closing the Gap, edited by John D. Dinsmore. Mahwah, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.
Chalmers, David J. 1993. “Connectionism and Compositionality: Why Fodor and Pylyshyn Were Wrong.” Philosophical Psychology 6: 305–319.
Chalmers, David J. 1994. “On Implementing a Computation.” Minds and Machines 4: 391–402.
Chalmers, David J. 1995a. “Facing up to the Problem of Consciousness.” Journal of Consciousness Studies 2: 200–219. Reprinted in Shear (1997, 9–32).
Chalmers, David J. 1995b. “Absent Qualia, Fading Qualia, Dancing Qualia.” in Conscious Experience, edited by Thomas Metzinger, pp. 309–329. Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh.
Chalmers, David J. 1995c. “The Components of Content.” Unpublished manuscript.
Chalmers, David J. 1995d. “The Puzzle of Conscious Experience.” Scientific American 273(6): 80–86.
Chalmers, David J. 1996a. The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Chalmers, David J. 1996b. “Does a Rock Implement Every Finite-State Automaton?” Synthese 108: 309–333.
Chalmers, David J. 1996c. “Minds, Machines, and Mathematics.” Psyche 2: 11–20.
Chalmers, David J. 1997a. “Moving Forward on the Problem of Consciousness.” Journal of Consciousness Studies 4(1): 3–46. Reprinted in Shear (1997, 379–422).
Chalmers, David J. 1997b. “Availability: The Cognitive Basis of Experience?” in The Nature of Consciousness. Philosophical Debates, edited by Ned Block, Owen Flanagan Jr., and Güven Güzeldere, pp. 421–424. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Chalmers, David J. 1998a. “The Problems of Consciousness.” in Consciousness: At the Frontiers of Neuroscience, edited by Herbert H. Jasper, L. Descarries, V. Castellucci, and S. Rossignol. ? Lippincott-Raven.
Chalmers, David J. 1998b. “On the Search for the Neural Correlate of Consciousness.” in Toward a Science of Consciousness II: The Second Tucson Discussions and Debates, edited by Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak, and Alwyn C. Scott, pp. 219–230. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Chalmers, David J. 1999a. “Materialism and the Metaphysics of Modality.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59: 473–496.
Chalmers, David J. 1999b. La mente consciente. En busca de una teorı́a fundamental. Barcelona: Gedisa Editorial. Spanish translation of Chalmers (1996a) by José A. Álvarez.
Chalmers, David J. 2000a. “What is a Neural Correlate of Consciousness?” in Neural Correlates of Consciousness: Empirical and Conceptual Questions, edited by Thomas Metzinger, pp. 17–40. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Chalmers, David J. 2000b. “The Tyranny of the Subjunctive.” Unpublished manuscript.
Chalmers, David J. 2000c. “Is there Synonymy in Ockham’s Mental Language?” in The Cambridge Companion to Ockham, edited by Paul Vincent Spade, pp. 76–99. Cambridge Companions to Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Chalmers, David J., ed. 2002a. Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Chalmers, David J. 2002b. “The Components of Content.” in Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings, edited by David J. Chalmers, pp. 608–633. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Chalmers, David J. 2002c. “The St. Petersburg Two-Envelope Paradox.” Analysis 62(2): 155–157.
Chalmers, David J. 2002d. “Does Conceivability Entail Possibility?” in Conceivability and Possibility, edited by Tamar Szabó Gendler and John Hawthorne, pp. 145–200. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198250890.003.0004.
Chalmers, David J. 2002e. “On Sense and Intension.” in Philosophical Perspectives 16: Language and Mind, edited by James E. Tomberlin, pp. 135–182. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Chalmers, David J. 2003a. “The Content and Epistemology of Phenomenal Belief.” in Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives, edited by Aleksandar Jokić and Quentin Smith, pp. 220–272. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780199241286.003.0009.
Chalmers, David J. 2003b. “The Nature of Epistemic Space.” Unpublished manuscript.
Chalmers, David J. 2003c. “Consciousness and Its Place in Nature.” in The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Mind, edited by Stephen P. Stich and Ted A. Warfield, pp. 102–142. Blackwell Philosophy Guides. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, doi:10.1002/9780470998762.ch5.
Chalmers, David J. 2003d. “The Nature of Narrow Content.” in Philosophical Issues 13: Philosophy of Mind, edited by Ernest Sosa and Enrique Villanueva, pp. 46–66. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Chalmers, David J. 2004a. “Epistemic Two-Dimensional Semantics.” Philosophical Studies 118(1–2): 153–226.
Chalmers, David J. 2004b. “Phenomenal Concepts and the Knowledge Argument.” in There’s Something About Mary. Essays on Phenomenal Consciousness and Frank Jackson’s Knowledge Argument, edited by Peter J. Ludlow, Yujin Nagasawa, and Daniel Stoljar, pp. 269–298. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Chalmers, David J. 2004c. “The Representational Character of Experience.” in The Future for Philosophy, edited by Brian Leiter, pp. 153–181. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780199247288.003.0007.
Chalmers, David J. 2004d. “Imagination, Indexicality, and Intensions [on Perry (2001)].” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68(1): 182–190.
Chalmers, David J. 2006a. “Perception and the Fall from Eden.” in Perceptual Experience, edited by Tamar Szabó Gendler and John Hawthorne, pp. 49–125. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199289769.001.0001.
Chalmers, David J. 2006b. “The Foundations of Two-Dimensional Semantics.” in Two-Dimensional Semantics: Foundations and Applications, edited by Manuel Garcı́a-Carpintero and Josep Macià, pp. 55–140. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780199271955.003.0004.
Chalmers, David J. 2006c. “Strong and Weak Emergence.” in The Re-Emergence of Emergence. The Emergentist Hypothesis from Science to Religion, edited by Philip Clayton and Paul C. W. Davies, pp. 244–255. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Chalmers, David J. 2006d. “Two-Dimensional Semantics.” in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language, edited by Ernest LePore and Barry C. Smith, pp. 574–606. Oxford Handbooks. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199552238.001.0001.
Chalmers, David J. 2007a. “Phenomenal Concepts and the Explanatory Gap.” in Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism, edited by Torin Alter and Sven Walter, pp. 167–194. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195171655.001.0001.
Chalmers, David J. 2007b. “The Hard Problem of Consciousness.” in The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness, edited by Max Velmans and Susan Schneider, pp. 225–235. Blackwell Philosophy Guides. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Chalmers, David J. 2007c. “Naturalistic Dualism.” in The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness, edited by Max Velmans and Susan Schneider, pp. 359–368. Blackwell Philosophy Guides. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Chalmers, David J. 2009a. “Ontological Anti-Realism.” in Metametaphysics. New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology, edited by David J. Chalmers, David Manley, and Ryan Wasserman, pp. 77–129. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780199546046.001.0001.
Chalmers, David J. 2009b. “The Two-Dimensional Argument Against Materialism.” in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind, edited by Brian P. McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann, and Sven Walter, pp. 313–337. Oxford Handbooks. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Republished in expanded form, with an afterword, in Chalmers (2010, 141–191), doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195311105.003.0006.
Chalmers, David J. 2010. The Character of Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195311105.001.0001.
Chalmers, David J. 2011a. “Verbal Disputes.” The Philosophical Review 120(4): 515–566, doi:10.1215/00318108-1334478.
Chalmers, David J. 2011b. “Actuality and Knowability.” Analysis 71(3): 411–419.
Chalmers, David J. 2011c. “Frege’s Puzzle and the Objects of Credence.” Mind 120(479): 587–635.
Chalmers, David J. 2011d. “Propositions and Attitude Ascriptions: A Fregean Account.” Noûs 45(4): 595–639.
Chalmers, David J. 2011e. “The Nature of Epistemic Space.” in Epistemic Modality, edited by Andy Egan and Brian Weatherson, pp. 60–107. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199591596.001.0001.
Chalmers, David J. 2012. Constructing the World. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Chalmers, David J. 2013a. “Summary of Chalmers (2010).” Analysis 73(2): 303–304.
Chalmers, David J. 2013b. “The Contents of Consciousness: Reply to Hellie, Peacocke and Siegel [commentators on Chalmers (2010)].” Analysis 73(2): 345–368.
Chalmers, David J. 2013c. “Panpsychism and Panprotopsychism.” The Amherst Lecture in Philosophy 8. Reprinted in Alter and Nagasawa (2015, 246–276) and Brüntrup and Jaskolla (2017, 19–47).
Chalmers, David J. 2014a. “Précis of Chalmers (2010).” Philosophical Studies 167(3): 747–748.
Chalmers, David J. 2014b. “Strong Necessities and the Mind-Body Problem: A Reply [to Goff and Papineau (2014), Lee (2014), Levine (2014)].” Philosophical Studies 167(3): 785–800.
Chalmers, David J. 2014c. “Intuitions in Philosophy: a Minimal Defense [on Cappelen (2012)].” Philosophical Studies 171(3): 535–544, doi:10.1007/s11098-014-0288-x.
Chalmers, David J. 2015. “The Hard Problem of Consciousness.” in The Norton Introduction to Philosophy, edited by Gideon Rosen, Alex Byrne, Joshua Cohen, and Seana Valentine Shiffrin, pp. 431–438. New York: W.W. Norton & Co. Reprinted in Rosen et al. (2018, 384–390).
Chalmers, David J. 2016. “Referentialism and the Objects of Credence: A Reply to Braun (2016).” Mind 125(498): 499–510.
Chalmers, David J. 2017a. “Why Isn’t There More Progress in Philosophy?” in Being, Freedom, and Method: Themes from the Philosophy of Peter van Inwagen, edited by John Adorno Keller, pp. 277–298. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198715702.001.0001.
Chalmers, David J. 2017b. “The Combination Problem for Panpsychism.” in Panpsychism. Contemporary Perspectives, edited by Godehard Brüntrup and Ludwig Jaskolla, pp. 179–214. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199359943.003.0008.
Chalmers, David J. 2018. “Structuralism as a Response to Skepticism.” The Journal of Philosophy 115(12): 625–660.
Chalmers, David J. 2019a. “Three Puzzles about Spatial Experience.” in Blockheads! Essays on Ned Block’s Philosophy of Mind and Consciousness, edited by Adam Pautz and Daniel Stoljar, pp. 109–138. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, doi:10.7551/mitpress/9196.003.0008.
Chalmers, David J. 2019b. “Extended Cognition and Extended Consciousness.” in Andy Clark and His Critics, edited by Matteo Colombo, Elizabeth Irvinie, and Mog Stapleton, pp. 9–20. Philosophers and Their Critics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780190662813.001.0001.
Chalmers, David J. 2020a. “Idealism and the Mind-Body Problem.” in The Routledge Handbook of Panpsychism, edited by William E. Seager, pp. 353–373. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge, doi:10.4324/9781315717708.
Chalmers, David J. 2020b. “Carnap’s Second Aufbau and David Lewis’s Aufbau.” in Franz Brentano and Austrian Philosophy, edited by Denis Fisette, Guillaume Fréchette, and Friedrich Stadler, pp. 329–352. Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook n. 24. Berlin: Springer. Reprinted in Beebee and Fisher (2022, 92–117), doi:10.1007/978-3-030-40947-0_16.
Chalmers, David J. 2022. Reality+. Virtual Worlds and the Problems of Philosophy. New York: W.W. Norton & Co.
Chalmers, David J., French, Robert M. and Hofstadter, Douglas R. 1992. “High-Level Perception, Representation, and Analogy: A Critique of AI Methodology.” Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence 4.
Chalmers, David J. and Hájek, Alan. 2007. “Ramsey + Moore = God.” Analysis 67(2): 170–172, doi:10.1111/j.1467-8284.2007.00670.x.
Chalmers, David J. and Jackson, Frank. 2001. “Conceptual Analysis and Reductive Explanation.” The Philosophical Review 110(3): 315–361.
Chalmers, David J., Manley, David and Wasserman, Ryan, eds. 2009. Metametaphysics. New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780199546046.001.0001.
Chalmers, David J. and Rabern, Brian. 2014. “Two-Dimensional Semantics and the Nesting Problem.” Analysis 74(2): 210–224.
Clark, Andy and Chalmers, David J. 1998. “The Extended Mind.” Analysis 58(1): 7–19.
Hameroff, Stuart R., Kaszniak, Alfred W. and Chalmers, David J., eds. 1999. Toward a Science of Consciousness III: The Third Tucson Discussions and Debates. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.

Further References

Alter, Torin and Nagasawa, Yujin, eds. 2015. Consciousness in the Physical World. Perspectives on Russellian Monism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Beebee, Helen and Fisher, Anthony Robert James, eds. 2022. Perspectives on the Philosophy of David K. Lewis. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780192845443.001.0001.
Braun, David. 2016. “The Objects of Belief and Credence [on Chalmers (2011c)].” Mind 125(498): 469–497.
Brüntrup, Godehard and Jaskolla, Ludwig, eds. 2017. Panpsychism. Contemporary Perspectives. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199359943.001.0001.
Cappelen, Herman. 2012. Philosophy without Intuitions. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199644865.001.0001.
Goff, Philip and Papineau, David. 2014. “What’s Wrong with Strong Necessities? [on Chalmers (2010)].” Philosophical Studies 167(3): 749–762.
Lee, Geoffrey. 2014. “Unity and the Essence in Chalmer’s Theory of Consciousness [on Chalmers (2010)].” Philosophical Studies 167(3): 763–773.
Levine, Joseph. 2014. “Modality, Semantics, and Consciousness [on Chalmers (2010)].” Philosophical Studies 167(3): 775–784.
Perry, John R. 2001. Knowledge, Possibility, and Consciousness. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Rosen, Gideon, Byrne, Alex, Cohen, Joshua and Shiffrin, Seana Valentine, eds. 2018. The Norton Introduction to Philosophy. 2nd ed. New York: W.W. Norton & Co.
Shear, Jonathan, ed. 1997. Explaining Consciousness: The Hard Problem. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.