J. Robert G. Williams (williams-jrg)
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Bibliography
Barnes, Elizabeth and Williams, J. Robert G. 2009. “Vague Parts and Vague Identity.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90: 176–187.
Barnes, Elizabeth and Williams, J. Robert G. 2011a. “A Theory of Metaphysical Indeterminacy.” in Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, volume VI, edited by Karen Bennett and Dean W. Zimmerman, pp. 103–148. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199603039.001.0001.
Barnes, Elizabeth and Williams, J. Robert G. 2011b. “Response to Eklund (2011).” in Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, volume VI, edited by Karen Bennett and Dean W. Zimmerman, pp. 173–182. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199603039.001.0001.
Williams, J. Robert G. 2005. “The Inscrutability of Reference.” PhD dissertation, St. Andrews: Philosophy Department, University of St. Andrews.
Williams, J. Robert G. 2006a. “An Argument for the Many.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 106: 409–417.
Williams, J. Robert G. 2006b. “Illusions of Gunk.” in Philosophical Perspectives 20: Metaphysics, edited by John Hawthorne, pp. 493–513. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Williams, J. Robert G. 2007a. “Eligibility and Inscrutability.” The Philosophical Review 116(3): 361–399.
Williams, J. Robert G. 2007b. “The Possibility of Onion Worlds: Rebutting an Argument for Structural Universals.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85(2): 193–203.
Williams, J. Robert G. 2008a. “Multiple Actualities and Ontologically Vague Identity.” The Philosophical Quarterly 58(230): 134–154.
Williams, J. Robert G. 2008b. “Ontic Vagueness and Metaphysical Indeterminacy.” Philosophy Compass 3(4): 763–788.
Williams, J. Robert G. 2008c. “Working Parts: Reply to Mellor (2008).” in Being: Developments in Contemporary Metaphysics, edited by Robin Le Poidevin, pp. 81–106. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement n. 62. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Williams, J. Robert G. 2008d. “Conversation and Conditionals.” Philosophical Studies 138(2): 211–223.
Williams, J. Robert G. 2008e. “Chances, Counterfactuals, and Similarity.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77(2): 385–420.
Williams, J. Robert G. 2008f. “Aristotelian Indeterminacy and the Open Future.” Unpublished manuscript, dated August 29, 2008, available at PhilArchive, https://philpapers.org/rec/WILAIA-4.
Williams, J. Robert G. 2010a. “Fundamental and Derivative Truths.” Mind 119(473): 103–141.
Williams, J. Robert G. 2011. “Degree Supervaluational Logic.” The Review of Symbolic Logic 4(1): 130–149.
Williams, J. Robert G. 2012a. “Requirements on Reality.” in Metaphysical Grounding. Understanding the Structure of Reality, edited by Fabrice Correia and Benjamin Sebastian Schnieder, pp. 165–185. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, doi:10.1017/cbo9781139149136.
Williams, J. Robert G. 2012b. “Indeterminacy and Normative Silence.” Analysis 72(2): 217–225.
Williams, J. Robert G. 2012c. “Gradational Accuracy and Nonclassical Semantics.” The Review of Symbolic Logic 5(4): 513–537.
Williams, J. Robert G. 2012d. “Generalized Probabilism: Dutch Books and Accuracy Domination.” The Journal of Philosophical Logic 41(5): 811–840.
Williams, J. Robert G. 2012e. “Chancy Counterfactuals, Redux.” Analytic Philosophy 53(4): 352–361.
Williams, J. Robert G. 2012f. “Vagueness.” in The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Language, edited by Gillian K. Russell and Delia Graff Fara, pp. 143–152. Routledge Philosophy Companions. London: Routledge.
Williams, J. Robert G. 2013b. “Reference.” in A Companion to Donald Davidson, edited by Ernest LePore and Kirk A. Ludwig, pp. 264–286. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, doi:10.1002/9781118328408.
Williams, J. Robert G. 2014b. “Nonclassical Minds and Indeterminate Survival.” The Philosophical Review 123(4): 379–428.
Williams, J. Robert G. 2015a. “Accuracy, Logic, and Degree of Belief.” in Foundations of Logical Consequence, edited by Colin R. Caret and Ole Thomassen Hjortland, pp. 329–352. Mind Association Occasional Series. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198715696.001.0001.
Williams, J. Robert G. 2015b. “Lewis on Reference and Eligibility.” in A Companion to David Lewis, edited by Barry C. Loewer and Jonathan Schaffer, pp. 367–381. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley; Sons, Inc., doi:10.1002/9781118398593.
Williams, J. Robert G. 2016a. “Vagueness as Indecision.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 90: 285–309.
Williams, J. Robert G. 2016b. “Probability and Nonclassical Logic.” in The Oxford Handbook of Probability and Philosophy, edited by Alan Hájek and Christopher R. Hitchcock, pp. 248–276. Oxford Handbooks. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199607617.001.0001.
Williams, J. Robert G. 2016c. “Representational Scepticism: The Bubble Puzzle.” in Philosophical Perspectives 30: Metaphysics, edited by John Hawthorne, pp. 419–442. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley; Sons, Inc.
Williams, J. Robert G. 2016d. “Indeterminacy, Angst and Conflicting Values.” Ratio 29(4): 412–433.
Williams, J. Robert G. 2018a. “Rational Illogicality.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96(1): 127–141.
Williams, J. Robert G. 2018b. “Normative Reference Magnets.” The Philosophical Review 127(1): 41–71.
Williams, J. Robert G. 2020. The Metaphysics of Representation. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198850205.001.0001.
Further References
Eklund, Matti. 2011. “Being Metaphysically Unsettled: Barnes and Williams (2011a) on Metaphysical Indeterminacy and Vagueness.” in Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, volume VI, edited by Karen Bennett and Dean W. Zimmerman, pp. 149–172. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199603039.001.0001.
Mellor, David Hugh. 2008. “Micro-Composition.” in Being: Developments in Contemporary Metaphysics, edited by Robin Le Poidevin, pp. 65–80. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement n. 62. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.