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Elia Zardini (zardini)

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Bibliography

    Dodd, Dylan and Zardini, Elia, eds. 2014a. Scepticism and Perceptual Justification. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199658343.001.0001.
    Dodd, Dylan and Zardini, Elia. 2014b. Introduction: Scepticism and Perceptual Justification.” in Scepticism and Perceptual Justification, edited by Dylan Dodd and Elia Zardini, pp. 1–11. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199658343.001.0001.
    López de Sa, Dan and Zardini, Elia. 2006. Does This Sentence Have No Truthmaker? Analysis 66(2): 154–157.
    López de Sa, Dan and Zardini, Elia. 2007. Truthmakers, Knowledge and Paradox.” Analysis 67(3): 242–250.
    López de Sa, Dan and Zardini, Elia. 2011. No-No. Paradox and Consistency.” Analysis 71(3): 472–478.
    Moruzzi, Sebastiano and Zardini, Elia. 2007. Conseguenza logica.” in Filosofia analitica. Temi e problemi, edited by Annalisa Coliva, pp. 157–194. Roma: Carocci editore S.p.a.
    Oms, Sergi and Zardini, Elia, eds. 2019. The Sorites Paradox. Classic Philosophical Arguments. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, doi:10.1017/9781316683064.
    Sgaravatti, Daniele and Zardini, Elia. 2008. Knowing How to Establish Intellectualism.” Grazer Philosophische Studien 77: 217–261. “Knowledge and Questions,” ed. by Franck Lihoreau.
    Sweeney, Paula and Zardini, Elia. 2011. Vagueness and Practical Interest.” in Vagueness and Language Use, edited by Paul Egré and Nathan Klinedinst, pp. 249–282. Palgrave Studies in Pragmatics, Language and Cognition. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.
    Zardini, Elia. 2005. From Vagueness to Response-Dependence and Back Again.” Unpublished manuscript.
    Zardini, Elia. 2006a. Some (Constructive) Reflections on (Higher-Order) Vagueness, Borderlineness, and Definiteness.” Unpublished manuscript.
    Zardini, Elia. 2006b. A Paradox of Higher-Order Vagueness.” Unpublished manuscript.
    Zardini, Elia. 2006c. Squeezing and Stretching: How Vagueness Can Outrun Borderlineness.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 106: 419–426.
    Zardini, Elia. 2008a. Truth and What is Said.” in Philosophical Perspectives 22: Philosophy of Language, edited by John Hawthorne, pp. 545–574. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley; Sons, Inc.
    Zardini, Elia. 2008b. Living on the Slippery Slope: the Nature, Sources and Logic of Vagueness.” PhD dissertation, St. Andrews: Arché – Philosophical Research Centre for Logic, Language, Metaphysics; Epistemology.
    Zardini, Elia. 2011. Truth without Contra(di)ction.” The Review of Symbolic Logic 4(4): 498–535.
    Zardini, Elia. 2012a. Luminosity and Vagueness.” Dialectica 66(3): 375–410.
    Zardini, Elia. 2012b. It Is Not the Case that [\(p\) and ’It Is Not the Case that \(p\)’ Is True] nor Is It the Case that [\(p\) and ’\(p\)’ Is Not True].” Thought 1(4): 309–319.
    Zardini, Elia. 2012c. Truth Preservation in Context and in Its Place.” in Insolubles and Consequences. Essays in Honour of Stephen Read, edited by Catarina Dutilh-Novaes and Ole Thomassen Hjortland. Tributes n. 18. London: King’s College Publications.
    Zardini, Elia. 2013a. Knowledge-How, True Indexical Belief, and Action.” Philosophical Studies 164(2): 341–355.
    Zardini, Elia. 2013b. Luminosity and Determinacy.” Philosophical Studies 165(3): 765–786.
    Zardini, Elia. 2013c. Higher-Order Sorites Paradox.” The Journal of Philosophical Logic 42(1): 25–48.
    Zardini, Elia. 2013d. Naive Modus Ponens.” The Journal of Philosophical Logic 42(4): 575–593.
    Zardini, Elia. 2013e. Naive Logical Properties and Structural Properties.” The Journal of Philosophy 110(11): 633–644.
    Zardini, Elia. 2014a. Possibility, Necessity and Probability: A Meditation on Underdetermination and Justification.” Erkenntnis 79(3): 639–667.
    Zardini, Elia. 2014b. Naive Truth and Naive Logical Properties.” The Review of Symbolic Logic 7(2): 351–384.
    Zardini, Elia. 2014c. Context and Consequence. An Intercontextual Substructural Logic.” Synthese 191(15): 3473–3500.
    Zardini, Elia. 2014d. Confirming the Less Likely, Discovering the Unknown: Dogmatisms – Surd and Doubly Surd, Natural, Flat and Doubly Flat.” in Scepticism and Perceptual Justification, edited by Dylan Dodd and Elia Zardini, pp. 33–70. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199658343.001.0001.
    Zardini, Elia. 2014e. The General Missing from the Hierarchy.” in New Frontiers in Truth, edited by Fabio Bacchini, Stefano Caputo, and Massimo Dell’Utri, pp. 176–200. Newcastle upon Tye: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.
    Zardini, Elia. 2014f. Evans Tolerated.” in Vague Objects and Vague Identity. New Essays on Ontic Vagueness, edited by Ken Akiba and Ali Abasnezhad, pp. 327–352. Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science n. 33. Cham: Springer.
    Zardini, Elia. 2015a. Breaking the Chains: Following-from and Transitivity.” in Foundations of Logical Consequence, edited by Colin R. Caret and Ole Thomassen Hjortland, pp. 221–275. Mind Association Occasional Series. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198715696.001.0001.
    Zardini, Elia. 2015b. \(\forall\) and \(\omega\).” in Quantifiers, Quantifiers, and Quantifiers: Themes in Logic, Metaphysics and Language, edited by Alessandro Torza, pp. 489–526. Synthese Library n. 373. Dordrecht: Springer, doi:10.1007/978-3-319-18362-6.
    Zardini, Elia. 2015c. Getting One for Two, or the Contractors’ Bad Deal. Towards a Unified Solution to the Semantic Paradoxes.” in Unifying the Philosophy of Truth, edited by Theodora Achourioti, Henri Galinon, José Martı́nez Fernández, and Kentaro Fujimoto, pp. 461–494. Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science n. 36. Cham: Springer.
    Zardini, Elia. 2016. No State a priori Known to Be Factive is Mental.” in Philosophical Issues 26: Knowledge and Mind, edited by Christoph Kelp and Jack C. Lyons, pp. 462–492. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell.
    Zardini, Elia. 2017. Further Reflections on Sentences Saying of Themselves Strange Things.” Logic and Logical Philosophy 26(4): 563–581.