Akeel Bilgrami (bilgrami)

Mentioned on the following portal pages

Contributions to Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Bernstein, Jay M., Ophir, Adi, Stoler, Ann Laura, Gourgouris, Stathis, Anidjar, Gil, Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty, Balibar, Étienne, et al. 2018. Political Concepts. A Critical Lexicon. New York: Fordham University Press, doi:10.5422/fordham/9780823276684.001.0001.
Bilgrami, Akeel. 1986. “Meaning, Holism, and Use.” in Truth and Interpretation: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson, edited by Ernest LePore, pp. 101–123. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Bilgrami, Akeel. 1987. “An Externalist Account of Psychological Content.” Philosophical Topics 15(1): 191–226.
Bilgrami, Akeel. 1988. “Comments on Loar (1988).” in Contents of Thought, edited by Robert Grimm and Daniel D. Merrill, pp. 110–120. Tucson, Arizona: University of Arizona Press.
Bilgrami, Akeel. 1991. “Thought and Its Objects.” in Philosophical Issues 1: Consciousness, edited by Enrique Villanueva, pp. 215–232. Atascadero, California: Ridgeview Publishing Co.
Bilgrami, Akeel. 1992a. Belief and Meaning: The Unity and Locality of Mental Content. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Bilgrami, Akeel. 1992b. “Can Externalism Be Reconciled with Self-Knowledge?” Philosophical Topics 20(1): 233–267.
Bilgrami, Akeel. 1993. “Norms and Meaning.” in Reflecting Davidson, edited by Ralf Stoecker, pp. 121–144. Berlin: de Gruyter.
Bilgrami, Akeel. 1994a. “On McDowell on the Content of Perceptual Experience.” The Philosophical Quarterly 44(175): 206–213.
Bilgrami, Akeel. 1994b. “Dummett, Realism and Other Minds.” in The Philosophy of Michael Dummett, edited by Brian McGuinness and Gianluigi Oliveri, pp. 205–228. Synthese Library n. 239. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. Papers presented at the First International Philosophy Conference of Mussomeli, Sicily, Sept. 1991.
Bilgrami, Akeel. 1995. “Self-Knowledge and Resentment.” in The Philosophy of P.F. Strawson, edited by Pranab Kumar Sen and Roop Rekha Verma, pp. 213–233. New Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research.
Bilgrami, Akeel. 1998a. “Self-Knowledge and Resentment.” in Knowing Our Own Minds, edited by Crispin Wright, Barry C. Smith, and Cynthia Macdonald, pp. 207–242. Mind Association Occasional Series. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0199241406.001.0001.
Bilgrami, Akeel. 1998b. “Why Holism is Harmless and Necessary.” in Philosophical Perspectives 12: Language, Mind, and Ontology, edited by James E. Tomberlin, pp. 105–126. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Bilgrami, Akeel. 1998c. “Comment on Rorty [on Rorty (1998b)].” Crı́tica: Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofı́a 30(88): 93–112.
Bilgrami, Akeel. 1999a. “Why is Self-Knowledge Different from Other Kinds of Knowledge?” in The Philosophy of Donald Davidson, edited by Lewis Edwin Hahn, pp. 211–224. The Library of Living Philosophers n. 27. LaSalle, Illinois: Open Court Publishing Co.
Bilgrami, Akeel. 1999b. “Internalism and Scepticism.” in Interpretations and Causes. New Perspectives on Donald Davidson’s Philosophy, edited by Mario De Caro, pp. 217–250. Synthese Library n. 285. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Bilgrami, Akeel. 2000. “Is Truth a Goal of Inquiry? Rorty and Davidson on Truth [on Rorty (1995) and Davidson (1999)].” in Rorty and His Critics, edited by Robert B. Brandom, pp. 242–261. Philosophers and Their Critics. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Bilgrami, Akeel. 2002. “Realism and Relativism.” in Philosophical Issues 12: Realism and Relativism, edited by Ernest Sosa and Enrique Villanueva, pp. 1–25. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Bilgrami, Akeel. 2003. “A Trilemma for Redeployment.” in Philosophical Issues 13: Philosophy of Mind, edited by Ernest Sosa and Enrique Villanueva, pp. 22–30. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Bilgrami, Akeel. 2004. “Scepticism and Pragmatism.” in Wittgenstein and Scepticism, edited by Denis McManus, pp. 56–75. London: Routledge.
Bilgrami, Akeel. 2006a. Self-Knowledge and Resentment. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, doi:10.2307/j.ctv1nzfgcn.
Bilgrami, Akeel. 2006b. “Some Philosophical Integrations.” in McDowell and His Critics, edited by Cynthia Macdonald and Graham F. Macdonald, pp. 50–65. Philosophers and Their Critics. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, doi:10.1002/9780470776254.
Bilgrami, Akeel. 2006c. “Psychoanalysis as Technology.” in Knowledge and Inquiry. Essays on the Pragmatism of Isaac Levi, edited by Erik J. Olsson, pp. 266–288. Cambridge Studies in Probability, Induction, and Decision Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Bilgrami, Akeel. 2007. “Pursuing an Analogy.” in The Philosophy of Michael Dummett, edited by Randall E. Auxier and Lewis Edwin Hahn, pp. 383–408. The Library of Living Philosophers n. 31. LaSalle, Illinois: Open Court Publishing Co.
Bilgrami, Akeel. 2008. “Gandhi, Newton and the Enlightenment.” Philosophic Exchange 38: 61–77.
Bilgrami, Akeel. 2010. “The Wider Significance of Naturalism: A Genealogical Essay.” in Naturalism and Normativity, edited by Mario De Caro and David Macarthur, pp. 23–54. New York: Columbia University Press.
Bilgrami, Akeel. 2011a. “Secularism, Liberalism and Relativism.” in A Companion to Relativism, edited by Steven D. Hales, pp. 326–345. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, doi:10.1002/9781444392494.
Bilgrami, Akeel. 2011b. “Why Meanings Are Not Normative.” in Games, Norms and Reasons. Logic at the Crossroads, edited by Johan van Benthem, Amitabha Gupta, and Eric Pacuit, pp. 39–60. Synthese Library n. 353. Dordrecht: Springer.
Bilgrami, Akeel. 2012a. “The Unique Status of Self-Knowledge.” in The Self and Self-Knowledge, edited by Annalisa Coliva, pp. 263–278. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199590650.001.0001.
Bilgrami, Akeel. 2012b. “Why Meaning Intentions are Degenerate.” in Mind, Meaning, and Knowledge.Themes from the Philosophy of Crispin Wright, volume 1, edited by Annalisa Coliva, pp. 96–125. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199278053.001.0001.
Bilgrami, Akeel. 2014. Secularism, Identity, and Enchantment. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
Bilgrami, Akeel. 2015. “Truth, Balance, and Freedom.” in Who’s Afraid of Academic Freedom?, edited by Akeel Bilgrami and Jonathan Cole, pp. 10–26. New York: Columbia University Press, doi:10.7312/columbia/9780231168809.001.0001.
Bilgrami, Akeel and Cole, Jonathan, eds. 2015. Who’s Afraid of Academic Freedom? New York: Columbia University Press, doi:10.7312/columbia/9780231168809.001.0001.
Bilgrami, Akeel and Rovane, Carol. 2005. “Mind, Language, and the Limits of Inquiry.” in The Cambridge Companion to Chomsky, edited by James A. McGilvray, pp. 181–203. Cambridge Companions to Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, doi:10.1017/9781316716694.

Further References

Davidson, Donald. 1999. “Is Truth a Goal of Inquiry? Discussion with Rorty [on Rorty (1995)].” in Donald Davidson: Truth, Meaning, and Knowledge, edited by Urszula M. Żegleń, pp. 15–17. Routledge Studies in Twentieth-Century Philosophy n. 2. London: Routledge.
Loar, Brian. 1988. “Social Content and Psychological Content.” in Contents of Thought, edited by Robert Grimm and Daniel D. Merrill, pp. 99–109. Tucson, Arizona: University of Arizona Press.
Rorty, Richard M. 1995. “Is Truth a Goal of Inquiry? Davidson vs. Wright [review of Wright (1992)].” The Philosophical Quarterly 45(180): 281–300. Enlarged version reprinted in Rorty (1998a, 19–42).
Rorty, Richard M. 1998a. Truth and Progress: Philosophical Papers Volume 3. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Rorty, Richard M. 1998b. “Davidson between Wittgenstein and Tarski.” Crı́tica: Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofı́a 30(88): 49–71.
Wright, Crispin. 1992. Truth and Objectivity. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, doi:10.2307/j.ctv1rr6cwg.