Brian Loar (loar)

Contributions to Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Loar, Brian. 1976. “Two Theories of Meaning.” in Truth and Meaning: Essays in Semantics, edited by Gareth Evans and John Henry McDowell, pp. 138–161. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198250074.001.0001.
Loar, Brian. 1980. “Ramsey’s Theory of Belief and Truth.” in Prospects for Pragmatism: Essays in Memory of F.P. Ramsey, edited by David Hugh Mellor, pp. 49–70. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Loar, Brian. 1981. Mind and Meaning. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Loar, Brian. 1982. “Conceptual Role and Truth Conditions.” Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 23(3): 272–283.
Loar, Brian. 1983a. “Must Beliefs Be Sentences?” in PSA 1982: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, Part II: Symposia and Invited Papers, edited by Peter D. Asquith and Thomas Nickles, pp. 627–643. East Lansing, Michigan: Philosophy of Science Association.
Loar, Brian. 1983b. “Reply to Fodor (1983) and Harman (1983).” in PSA 1982: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, Part II: Symposia and Invited Papers, edited by Peter D. Asquith and Thomas Nickles, pp. 662–666. East Lansing, Michigan: Philosophy of Science Association.
Loar, Brian. 1987a. “Subjective Intentionality.” Philosophical Topics 15(1): 89–124.
Loar, Brian. 1987b. “Truth Beyond All Verification.” in Michael Dummett: Contributions to Philosophy, edited by Barry Taylor, pp. 81–116. Nijhoff International Philosophy Series n. 25. Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.
Loar, Brian. 1988a. “Social Content and Psychological Content.” in Contents of Thought, edited by Robert Grimm and Daniel D. Merrill, pp. 99–109. Tucson, Arizona: University of Arizona Press.
Loar, Brian. 1988b. “Reply [to Bilgrami (1988)]: A New Kind of Content.” in Contents of Thought, edited by Robert Grimm and Daniel D. Merrill, pp. 121–139. Tucson, Arizona: University of Arizona Press.
Loar, Brian. 1990a. “Phenomenal States.” in Philosophical Perspectives 4: Action Theory and Philosophy of Mind, edited by James E. Tomberlin, pp. 81–108. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. Reprinted in revised form in Block, Flanagan and Güzeldere (1997, 597–616) and in Ludlow, Nagasawa and Stoljar (2004, 219–240).
Loar, Brian. 1990b. “Personal References.” in Information, Semantics, and Epistemology, edited by Enrique Villanueva, pp. 117–133. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Loar, Brian. 1991. “Can we Explain Intentionality?” in Meaning in Mind: Fodor and His Critics, edited by Barry C. Loewer and Georges Rey, pp. 119–135. Philosophers and Their Critics. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Loar, Brian. 1992. “Elimination versus Nonreductive Physicalism.” in Reduction, Explanation, and Realism, edited by David Charles and Kathleen Lennon, pp. 239–264. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Loar, Brian. 1993. “Can we confirm supervenient properties?” in Philosophical Issues 4: Naturalism and Normativity, edited by Enrique Villanueva, pp. 74–92. Atascadero, California: Ridgeview Publishing Co.
Loar, Brian. 1994. “Self-Interpretation and the Constitution of Reference.” in Philosophical Perspectives 8: Logic and Language, edited by James E. Tomberlin, pp. 51–74. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Loar, Brian. 1995. “Reference from the First Person Perspective.” in Philosophical Issues 6: Content, edited by Enrique Villanueva, pp. 53–72. Atascadero, California: Ridgeview Publishing Co.
Loar, Brian. 1996. “Comments on Campbell (1996).” in Philosophical Issues 7: Perception, edited by Enrique Villanueva, pp. 319–324. Atascadero, California: Ridgeview Publishing Co.
Loar, Brian. 1998. “Is there a Good Epistemological Argument Against Concept-Externalism? [on Boghossian (1997)].” in Philosophical Issues 9: Concepts, edited by Enrique Villanueva, pp. 213–217. Atascadero, California: Ridgeview Publishing Co.
Loar, Brian. 2003a. “Phenomenal Intentionality as the Basis of Mental Content.” in Reflections and Replies. Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge, edited by Martin Hahn and Bjørn T. Ramberg, pp. 229–258. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Loar, Brian. 2003b. “Qualia, Properties, Modality.” in Philosophical Issues 13: Philosophy of Mind, edited by Ernest Sosa and Enrique Villanueva, pp. 113–129. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Loar, Brian. 2003c. “Transparent Experience and the Availability of Qualia.” in Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives, edited by Aleksandar Jokić and Quentin Smith, pp. 77–95. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780199241286.001.0001.
Loar, Brian. 2006. “Language, Thought, and Meaning.” in The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Language, edited by Michael Devitt and Richard Hanley, pp. 77–90. Blackwell Philosophy Guides. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, doi:10.1002/9780470757031.
Loar, Brian. 2007. “Thinking about Qualia.” in Situating Semantics: Essays on the Philosophy of John Perry, edited by Michael O’Rourke and Corey Washington, pp. 451–468. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Loar, Brian. 2017. Consciousness and Meaning. Selected Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Edited by Katalin Balog and Stephanie Beardman, with introductions by Stephen Schiffer and Katalin Balog, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199673353.001.0001.

Further References

Bilgrami, Akeel. 1988. “Comments on Loar (1988a).” in Contents of Thought, edited by Robert Grimm and Daniel D. Merrill, pp. 110–120. Tucson, Arizona: University of Arizona Press.
Block, Ned, Flanagan, Owen, Jr. and Güzeldere, Güven, eds. 1997. The Nature of Consciousness. Philosophical Debates. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Boghossian, Paul Artin. 1997. “What the Externalist Can Know A Priori.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 97: 161–175. Reprinted in Villanueva (1998, 197–211), in Wright, Smith and Macdonald (1998) and in Boghossian (2008, 177–188).
Boghossian, Paul Artin. 2008. Content & Justification. Philosophical Papers. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780199292103.001.0001.
Campbell, John A. 1996. “Molyneux’s Question.” in Philosophical Issues 7: Perception, edited by Enrique Villanueva, pp. 301–318. Atascadero, California: Ridgeview Publishing Co.
Fodor, Jerry A. 1983. The Modularity of Mind: An Essay on Faculty Psychology. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Harman, Gilbert H. 1983. “Human Flourishing, Ethics, and Liberty.” Philosophy & Public Affairs 12: 307–332. Reprinted in Harman (2000, 151–163).
Harman, Gilbert H. 2000. Explaining Value; and other Essays in Moral Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0198238045.001.0001.
Ludlow, Peter J., Nagasawa, Yujin and Stoljar, Daniel, eds. 2004. There’s Something About Mary. Essays on Phenomenal Consciousness and Frank Jackson’s Knowledge Argument. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Villanueva, Enrique, ed. 1998. Philosophical Issues 9: Concepts. Atascadero, California: Ridgeview Publishing Co.
Wright, Crispin, Smith, Barry C. and Macdonald, Cynthia, eds. 1998. Knowing Our Own Minds. Mind Association Occasional Series. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0199241406.001.0001.