David Papineau (papineau)

My contributions to Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Beebee, Helen and Papineau, David. 1997. “Probability as a Guide to Life.” The Journal of Philosophy 94(5): 217–243. Reprinted in Papineau (2003a, 130–166).
Butlin, Patrick and Papineau, David. 2016. “Normal and Addictive Desires.” in Addiction and Choice: Rethinking the Relationship, edited by Nick Heather and Gabriel M. A. Segal, pp. 99–115. New York: Oxford University Press.
Godman, Marion, Mallozzi, Antonella and Papineau, David. 2020. “Essential Properties are Super-Explanatory: Taming Metaphysical Modality.” The Journal of the American Philosophical Association 6(3): 316–334, doi:10.1017/apa.2019.48.
Godman, Marion and Papineau, David. 2020. “Species Have Historical Not Intrinsic Essences.” in Language and Reality from a Naturalistic Perspective. Themes from Michael Devitt, edited by Andrea Bianchi, pp. 355–370. Cham: Springer.
Goff, Philip and Papineau, David. 2014. “What’s Wrong with Strong Necessities? [on Chalmers (2010)].” Philosophical Studies 167(3): 749–762.
Macdonald, Graham F. and Papineau, David, eds. 2006a. Teleosemantics. New Philosophical Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Macdonald, Graham F. and Papineau, David. 2006b. “Introduction: Prospects and Problems for Teleosemantics.” in Teleosemantics. New Philosophical Essays, edited by Graham F. Macdonald and David Papineau, pp. 1–22. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Montero, Barbara Gail and Papineau, David. 2016. “Naturalism and Physicalism.” in The Blackwell Companion to Naturalism, edited by Kelly James Clark, pp. 182–195. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, doi:10.1002/9781118657775.
Papineau, David. 1977. “Meaning Variance and the Theory of Reference.” Methodology and Science 10: 189–219.
Papineau, David. 1978. “Salmon, Statistics, and Backwards Causation.” in PSA 1978: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, Part I: Contributed Papers, edited by Peter D. Asquith and Ian Hacking, pp. 302–313. East Lansing, Michigan: Philosophy of Science Association.
Papineau, David. 1979. Theory and Meaning. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198245858.001.0001.
Papineau, David. 1982. “Is Epistemology Dead?” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 82: 129–142.
Papineau, David. 1984. “Representation and Explanation.” Philosophy of Science 51: 550–572.
Papineau, David. 1985a. “Probabilities and Causes.” The Journal of Philosophy 82(2): 57–72.
Papineau, David. 1985b. “Social Facts and Psychological Facts.” in Popper and the Human Sciences, edited by Gregory Currie and Alan Musgrave, pp. 57–72. Nijhoff International Philosophy Series n. 19. Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.
Papineau, David. 1986a. “The Paradox of Instrumentalism.” in PSA 1986: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, Part I: Contributed Papers, edited by Arthur I. Fine and Peter K. Machamer, pp. 269–276. East Lansing, Michigan: Philosophy of Science Association.
Papineau, David. 1986b. “Causal Factors, Causal Inference, Causal Explanation.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 60: 115–136.
Papineau, David. 1986c. “Semantic Reductionism and Reference.” in Language, Mind and Logic, edited by Jeremy Butterfield, pp. 47–66. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Papineau, David. 1987a. Reality and Representation. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Papineau, David. 1987b. “Contents, Reasons and Knowledge [review of Peacocke (1986)].” Philosophical Books 28(1): 1–9.
Papineau, David. 1988a. “Mathematical Fictionalism.” International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 2: 151–173.
Papineau, David. 1988b. “Does the Sociology of Science Discredit Science?” in Relativism and Realism in Science, edited by Robert Nola, pp. 37–58. Australasian Studies in History and Philosophy of Science n. 6. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Papineau, David. 1989a. “Pure, Mixed, and Spurious Probabilities and Their Significance for a Reductionist Theory of Causation.” in Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Volume XIII: Scientific Explanation, edited by Philip Kitcher and Wesley C. Salmon, pp. 307–348. Minneapolis, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press.
Papineau, David. 1989b. “Has Popper Been a Good Thing?” in Imre Lakatos and Theories of Scientific Change, edited by Kostas Gavroglu, Yorgos Goudaroulis, and Pantelis D. Nicolacopoulos, pp. 431–440. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science n. 111. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Papineau, David. 1990a. “Why Supervenience?” Analysis 50: 66–71.
Papineau, David. 1990b. “Truth and Teleology.” Acta Analytica 5(6). Reprinted in Knowles (1990).
Papineau, David. 1990c. “Truth and Teleology.” in Explanation and its Limits, edited by Dudley Knowles, pp. 21–44. Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures n. 27. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Papineau, David. 1990d. “Knowledge of Mathematical Objects.” in Physicalism in Mathematics, edited by Andrew David Irvine, pp. 155–182. The University of Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science n. 45. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, doi:10.1007/978-94-009-1902-0.
Papineau, David. 1991. “Teleology and Mental States.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 65: 33–54.
Papineau, David. 1992. “Irreducibility and Teleology.” in Reduction, Explanation, and Realism, edited by David Charles and Kathleen Lennon, pp. 45–68. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Papineau, David. 1993a. Philosophical Naturalism. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Papineau, David. 1993b. “Physicalism, Consciousness, and the Antipathetic Fallacy.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 71: 169–183.
Papineau, David. 1993c. “Can we Reduce Causal Direction to Probabilities?” in PSA 1992: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, Part II: Symposium Papers, edited by David L. Hull, Micky Forbes, and Kathleen Okruhlik, pp. 238–252. East Lansing, Michigan: Philosophy of Science Association.
Papineau, David. 1994. “Mental Disorder, Illness and Biological Disfunction.” in Philosophy, Psychology and Psychiatry, edited by A. Phillips Griffiths, pp. 73–82. Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures n. 37. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Papineau, David. 1995a. “Arguments for Supervenience and Physical Realization.” in Supervenience: New Essays, edited by Elias E. Savellos and Ümit D. Yalçin, pp. 226–243. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Papineau, David. 1995b. “The Antipathetic Fallacy and the Boundaries of Consciousness.” in Conscious Experience, edited by Thomas Metzinger, pp. 259–271. Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh.
Papineau, David, ed. 1996a. The Philosophy of Science. Oxford Readings in Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Papineau, David. 1996b. “Doubtful Intuitions.” Mind and Language 11: 130–132.
Papineau, David. 1996c. “Discussion of Christopher Peacoke’s A Study of Concepts.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56(2): 425–432.
Papineau, David. 1997. “Uncertain Decisions and the Many-Mind Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics.” The Monist 80(1): 97–117. Reprinted in Papineau (2003a, 212–239).
Papineau, David. 1998a. “Mind the Gap.” in Philosophical Perspectives 12: Language, Mind, and Ontology, edited by James E. Tomberlin, pp. 373–388. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Papineau, David. 1998b. “Teleosemantics and Indeterminacy.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76: 1–14.
Papineau, David. 1999. “Normativity and Judgement.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 73: 17–43. Reprinted in Papineau (2003a, 6–38).
Papineau, David. 2000. “The Evolution of Knowledge.” in Evolution and the Human Mind, edited by Peter Carruthers and Andrew Chamberlain, pp. 170–206. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Reprinted in Papineau (2003a, 39–82).
Papineau, David. 2001a. “The Status of Teleosemantics, or How to Stop Worrying about Swampman.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79.
Papineau, David. 2001b. “The Evolution of Means-End Reasoning.” in Naturalism, Evolution and Mind, edited by Denis M. Walsh, pp. 145–179. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement n. 49. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Reprinted in Papineau (2003a, 83–129).
Papineau, David. 2001c. “Evidentialism Reconsidered.” Noûs 35(2): 239–259. Substantially revised version: Papineau (2003c).
Papineau, David. 2001d. “The Rise of Physicalism.” in Physicalism and its Discontents, edited by Carl Gillett and Barry C. Loewer, pp. 3–36. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Papineau, David. 2003a. The Roots of Reason. Philosophical Essays on Rationality, Evolution, and Probability. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Papineau, David. 2003b. “Could There Be a Science of Consciousness?” in Philosophical Issues 13: Philosophy of Mind, edited by Ernest Sosa and Enrique Villanueva, pp. 205–220. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Papineau, David. 2003c. “Causation as a Guide to Life.” in The Roots of Reason. Philosophical Essays on Rationality, Evolution, and Probability, pp. 167–211. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Substantially revised version of Papineau (2001c).
Papineau, David. 2003d. “Philosophy of Science.” in The Blackwell Companion to Philosophy, edited by Nicholas Bunnin and Eric P. Tsui-James, 2nd ed., pp. 286–316. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. First edition: Bunnin and Tsui-James (1996).
Papineau, David. 2003e. “Theories of Consciousness.” in Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives, edited by Aleksandar Jokić and Quentin Smith, pp. 353–383. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780199241286.001.0001.
Papineau, David. 2003f. “Human Minds.” in Minds and Persons, edited by Anthony O’Hear, pp. 159–183. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement n. 53. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Papineau, David. 2004a. Thinking about Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0199243824.001.0001.
Papineau, David. 2004b. “David Lewis and Schrödinger’s Cat.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82(1): 153–169. Reprinted in Jackson and Priest (2004, 156–172).
Papineau, David. 2005a. “Précis of Papineau (2004a).” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71(1): 143–146.
Papineau, David. 2005b. “Replies to Commentators [Hill (2005), Crane (2005), Raffman (2005)].” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71(1): 171–186.
Papineau, David. 2005c. “The Cultural Origins of Cognitive Adaptations.” in Philosophy, Biology and Life, edited by Anthony O’Hear, pp. 24–25. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement n. 56. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Papineau, David. 2005d. “Causal Closure of the Physical Domain.” in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Donald M. Borchert, 2nd ed. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.
Papineau, David. 2006a. “Comments on Galen Strawson (2006).” Journal of Consciousness Studies 13(10–11): 100–109.
Papineau, David. 2006b. “Naturalist Theories of Meaning.” in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language, edited by Ernest LePore and Barry C. Smith, pp. 175–188. Oxford Handbooks. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199552238.001.0001.
Papineau, David. 2007a. “Phenomenal and Perceptual Concepts.” in Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism, edited by Torin Alter and Sven Walter, pp. 111–144. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195171655.001.0001.
Papineau, David. 2007b. “Kripke’s Proof is Ad Hominem Not Two-Dimensional.” in Philosophical Perspectives 21: Philosophy of Mind, edited by John Hawthorne, pp. 475–494. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Papineau, David. 2007c. “Naturalism.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2007/entries/naturalism/.
Papineau, David. 2007d. “Phenomenal Concepts are Not Demonstrative.” in Perspectives on Perception. Papers offered to Alan Lacey, edited by Mary Margaret McCabe and Mark Textor, pp. 87–110. Philosophische Forschung / Philosophical Research n. 6. Heusenstamm b. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag.
Papineau, David. 2008. “Must a Physicalist be a Microphysicalist?” in Being Reduced. New Essays on Reduction, Explanation, and Causation, edited by Jakob Hohwy and Jesper Kallestrup, pp. 126–148. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199211531.001.0001.
Papineau, David. 2009a. “The Causal Closure of the Physical and Naturalism.” in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind, edited by Brian P. McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann, and Sven Walter, pp. 53–65. Oxford Handbooks. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199262618.001.0001.
Papineau, David. 2009b. “The Poverty of Analysis.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 83: 1–30.
Papineau, David. 2010a. “Can Any Sciences Be Special?” in Emergence in Mind, edited by Cynthia Macdonald and Graham F. Macdonald, pp. 179–197. Mind Association Occasional Series. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199583621.001.0001.
Papineau, David. 2010b. “A Fair Deal for Everettians.” in Many Worlds? Everett, Quantum Theory, and Reality, edited by Simon W. Saunders, Jonathan Barrett, Adrian Kent, and David Wallace, pp. 206–226. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199560561.001.0001.
Papineau, David. 2010c. “Realism, Ramsey Sentences and the Pessimistic Meta-Induction.” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 41(4): 375–385.
Papineau, David. 2011a. “Phenomenal Concepts and the Private Language Argument.” American Philosophical Quarterly 48(2): 175–184.
Papineau, David. 2011b. “What Exactly is the Explanatory Gap?” Philosophia 39(1): 5–19.
Papineau, David. 2012. Philosophical Devices: Proofs, Probabilities, Possibilities, and Sets. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Papineau, David. 2013a. “Causation is Macroscopic but Not Irreducible.” in Mental Causation and Ontology, edited by Sophie C. Gibb, Edward Jonathan Lowe, and Rögnvaldur D. Ingthorsson, pp. 126–151. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199603770.001.0001.
Papineau, David. 2013b. “Comments on Récanati (2012): Doubts about Indexicality.” Disputatio 5(36): 159–175.
Papineau, David. 2013c. “In the Zone.” in Philosophy and Sport, edited by Anthony O’Hear, pp. 175–196. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement n. 73. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Papineau, David. 2014a. “The Poverty of Conceptual Analysis.” in Philosophical Methodology: The Armchair or the Laboratory?, edited by Matthew C. Haug, pp. 166–194. London: Routledge.
Papineau, David. 2014b. “Sensory Experience and Representational Properties.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 114(1): 1–33.
Papineau, David. 2014c. “There are no Norms of Belief.” in The Aim of Belief, edited by Timothy Chan, pp. 64–79. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199672134.001.0001.
Papineau, David. 2015a. “Can we Really See a Million Colours?” in Phenomenal Qualities. Sense, Perception, and Consciousness, edited by Paul Coates and Sam Coleman, pp. 274–297. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198712718.001.0001.
Papineau, David. 2015b. “The Nature of a Priori Intuitions: Analytic or Synthetic?” in Experimental Philosophy, Rationalism, and Naturalism. Rethinking Philosophical Method, edited by Eugen Fischer and John Collins, pp. 51–71. London: Routledge. Reprinted in Schumann (2019, 51–71), doi:10.4324/9781315714196.
Papineau, David. 2015c. “Naturalism.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2015/entries/naturalism/.
Papineau, David. 2016a. “The Foundations of Narrative.” in Art, Mind, and Narrative. Themes from the Work of Peter Goldie, edited by Julian Dodd, pp. 61–79. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198769736.001.0001.
Papineau, David. 2016b. “Teleosemantics.” in How Biology Shapes Philosophy. New Foundations for Naturalism, edited by David Livingstone Smith, pp. 95–120. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, doi:10.1017/9781107295490.
Papineau, David. 2020a. “The Problem of Consciousness.” in The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness, edited by Uriah Kriegel, pp. 14–37. Oxford Handbooks. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Papineau, David. 2020b. “Naturalism.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2020/entries/naturalism/.
Papineau, David. 2021. The Metaphysics of Sensory Experience. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198862390.001.0001.
Papineau, David and Durà-Vilà, Victor. 2009a. “A Thirder and an Everettian: A Reply to Lewis (2007).” Analysis 69(1): 78–86.
Papineau, David and Durà-Vilà, Victor. 2009b. “Reply to Lewis (2009): Metaphysics versus Epistemology.” Analysis 69(1): 89–91.
Papineau, David and Shea, Nicholas. 2002. “Review of Millikan (2000).” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65(2): 453–466.

Further References

Chalmers, David J. 2010. The Character of Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195311105.001.0001.
Crane, Tim. 2005. “Papineau on Phenomenal Concepts [on Papineau (2004a)].” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71(1): 155–162.
Hill, Christopher S. 2005. “Remarks on Papineau (2004a).” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71(1): 147–154.
Jackson, Frank and Priest, Graham, eds. 2004. Lewisian Themes: The Philosophy of David Lewis. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780199274550.001.0001.
Knowles, Dudley, ed. 1990. Explanation and its Limits. Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures n. 27. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Lewis, Peter J. 2007. “Quantum Sleeping Beauty.” Analysis 67(1): 59–65.
Lewis, Peter J. 2009. “Reply to Papineau and Durà-Vilà (2009a).” Analysis 69(1): 86–89.
Millikan, Ruth Garrett. 2000. On Clear and Confused Ideas – An Essay about Substance Concepts. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Peacocke, Christopher. 1986. Thoughts: An Essay on Content. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Raffman, Diana. 2005. “Some Thoughts about Thinking About Consciousness [Papineau (2004a)].” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71(1): 163–170.
Récanati, François. 2012. Mental Files. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199659982.001.0001.
Schumann, Gunnar, ed. 2019. Explanation in Action Theory and Historiography. Causal and Teleological Approaches. London: Routledge, doi:10.4324/9780429506048.
Strawson, Galen. 2006. “Realistic Monism: Why Physicalism Entails Panpsychism.” Journal of Consciousness Studies 13(10–11): 3–31. Reprinted in Strawson (2008, 53–74).
Strawson, Galen. 2008. Real Materialism, and Other Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199267422.001.0001.