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Jon Cogburn (cogburn)

Zitiert in den folgenden Artikeln

Sensitivity and Inductive Knowledge Revisited

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Bibliography

    Cogburn, Jon. 2002. Logical Revision Revisited: On the Wright/Salerno Case for Intuitionism.” Philosophical Studies 110(3): 231–248.
    Cogburn, Jon. 2003. Deconstructing Dummett’s Anti-Realism: A New Argument Against Church’s Thesis.” in The Logica Yearbook 2002, edited by Timothy Childers and Ondrej Majer, pp. 57–68. Praha: Filosofia. Nakladetelstvı́ Filosofického ústavu AV ČR.
    Cogburn, Jon. 2004a. Paradox Lost.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 34(2).
    Cogburn, Jon. 2004b. The Philosophical Basis of What? The Anti-Realist Route to Dialetheism.” in The Law of Non-Contradiction: New Philosophical Essays, edited by Graham Priest, J. C. Beall, and Bradley Armour-Garb, pp. 217–234. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199265176.001.0001.
    Cogburn, Jon. 2004c. Tonking a Theory of Content: An Inferentialist Rejoinder.” Logic and Logical Philosophy 13: 31–55.
    Cogburn, Jon. 2005. The Logic of Logical Revision: Formalizing Dummett’s Argument.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83(1): 15–32.
    Cogburn, Jon. 2010. Critical Notice of Brandom (2008).” Philosophical Books 51(3): 160–174.
    Cogburn, Jon. 2017a. Garcian Meditations: The Dialectics of Persistence in Form and Object. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, doi:10.3366/edinburgh/9781474415910.001.0001.
    Cogburn, Jon. 2017b. Review of Akiba and Abasnezhad (2014).” Analysis 77(2): 468–473.
    Cogburn, Jon and Cook, Roy T. 2005. Inverted Space: Minimal Verificationism, Propositional Attitudes, and Compositionality.” Philosophia: Philosophical Quarterly of Israel 32(1–4): 73–92.
    Cogburn, Jon and Roland, Jeffrey W. 2012. Strong, Therefore Sensitive: Misgivings About DeRose’s Contextualism.” Grazer Philosophische Studien 85: 237–253. “Bolzano & Kant,” ed. by Sandra Lapointe.
    Cogburn, Jon and Roland, Jeffrey W. 2013. Safety and the True-True Problem.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94(2): 246–267, doi:10.1111/j.1468-0114.2012.01454.x.
    Cogburn, Jon and Silcox, Mark. 2011. Computability Theory and Ontological Emergence.” American Philosophical Quarterly 48(1): 63–74.
    Cook, Roy T. and Cogburn, Jon. 2001. What Negation is Not: Intuitionism and ’0 = 1’ .” Analysis 61.
    Roland, Jeffrey W. and Cogburn, Jon. 2011. Anti-Luck Epistemologies and Necessary Truths.” Philosophia 39(3): 547–561.

Further References

    Akiba, Ken and Abasnezhad, Ali, eds. 2014. Vague Objects and Vague Identity. New Essays on Ontic Vagueness. Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science n. 33. Cham: Springer.
    Brandom, Robert B. 2008. Between Saying and Doing: Towards an Analytic Pragmatism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199542871.001.0001.