Juan Manuel Comesaña (comesana)

My contributions to Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Cohen, Stewart and Comesaña, Juan Manuel. 2013a. “Williamson on Gettier Cases and Epistemic Logic [on Williamson (2013a)].” Inquiry 56(1): 15–29.
Cohen, Stewart and Comesaña, Juan Manuel. 2013b. “Williamson on Gettier Cases in Epistemic Logic and the Knowledge Norm for Rational Belief: A Reply to a Reply to a Reply [on Williamson (2013b)].” Inquiry 56(4): 400–415.
Comesaña, Juan Manuel. 1995. “Análisis y elucidación: un módico homenaje a Simpson.” Crı́tica: Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofı́a 27(79): 55–65.
Comesaña, Juan Manuel. 2001. Lógica informal, falacias y argumentos filosóficos. Buenos Aires: Eudeba.
Comesaña, Juan Manuel. 2002. “The Diagonal and the Demon.” Philosophical Studies 110(3): 249–266.
Comesaña, Juan Manuel. 2005a. “Justified vs. Warranted Perceptual Belief: Resisting Disjunctivism.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71(2): 367–383.
Comesaña, Juan Manuel. 2005b. “We are (Almost) All Externalists Now.” in Philosophical Perspectives 19: Epistemology, edited by John Hawthorne, pp. 59–76. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Comesaña, Juan Manuel. 2005c. “Pyrrhonian Problematic, The.” in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Donald M. Borchert, 2nd ed. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.
Comesaña, Juan Manuel. 2006. “A Well-Founded Solution to the Generality Problem.” Philosophical Studies 129(1): 27–47.
Comesaña, Juan Manuel. 2007. “Knowledge and Subjunctive Conditionals.” Philosophy Compass 2(6): 781–791.
Comesaña, Juan Manuel. 2009. “What Lottery Problem for Reliabilism?” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90: 1–20.
Comesaña, Juan Manuel. 2010. “Evidentialist Reliabilism.” Noûs 44(4): 571–600.
Comesaña, Juan Manuel. 2011a. “Conservatism, Preservationism, Conservationism and Mentalism.” Analysis 71(3): 489–492.
Comesaña, Juan Manuel. 2011b. “Can Contemporary Semantics Help the Pyrrhonian Get a Life?” in Pyrrhonism in Ancient, Modern, and Contemporary Philosophy, edited by Diego E. Machuca, pp. 217–240. The New Synthese Historical Library n. 70. Dordrecht: Springer.
Comesaña, Juan Manuel. 2011c. “Reliabilism.” in The Routledge Companion to Epistemology, edited by Sven Bernecker and Duncan Pritchard, pp. 176–186. Routledge Philosophy Companions. London: Routledge.
Comesaña, Juan Manuel. 2012. “Conciliation and Peer-Demotion in the Epistemology of Disagreement.” American Philosophical Quarterly 49(3): 237–252.
Comesaña, Juan Manuel. 2013a. “On a Puzzle about Withholding.” The Philosophical Quarterly 63(251): 374–376.
Comesaña, Juan Manuel. 2013b. “Safety and Epistemic Frankfurt Cases.” in Virtuous Thoughts: The Philosophy of Ernest Sosa, edited by John Turri, pp. 165–178. Philosophical Studies Series n. 118. Dordrecht: Springer.
Comesaña, Juan Manuel. 2013c. “Epistemic Pragmatism: An Argument Against Moderation.” Res Philosophica 90(2): 237–260.
Comesaña, Juan Manuel. 2014a. “There is no Immediate Justification.” in Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, edited by Matthias Steup, John Turri, and Ernest Sosa, 2nd ed., pp. 222–234. Contemporary Debates in Philosophy n. 3. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell. First edition: Sosa and Steup (2005), doi:10.1002/9781394260744.
Comesaña, Juan Manuel. 2014b. “Defeasibility without Inductivism.” in Virtue Epistemology Naturalized. Bridges Between Virtue Epistemology and Philosophy of Science, edited by Abrol Fairweather, pp. 181–193. Synthese Library n. 366. Dordrecht: Springer.
Comesaña, Juan Manuel. 2014c. “Reply to Pryor (2014).” in Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, edited by Matthias Steup, John Turri, and Ernest Sosa, 2nd ed., pp. 239–243. Contemporary Debates in Philosophy n. 3. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell. First edition: Sosa and Steup (2005), doi:10.1002/9781394260744.
Comesaña, Juan Manuel. 2015a. “Can we Believe for Practical Reasons?” in Philosophical Issues 25: Normativity, edited by Ernest Sosa and Enrique Villanueva, pp. 189–207. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell.
Comesaña, Juan Manuel. 2015b. “Falsehood and Entailment.” in Philosophical Perspectives 29: Epistemology, edited by John Hawthorne, pp. 82–94. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley; Sons, Inc.
Comesaña, Juan Manuel. 2015c. “Normative Requirements and Contrary-to-Duty Obligations.” The Journal of Philosophy 112(11): 600–626.
Comesaña, Juan Manuel. 2017. “On Sharon and Spectre’s Argument against Closure.” Philosophical Studies 174(4): 1039–1046.
Comesaña, Juan Manuel. 2020a. Being Rational and Being Right. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198847717.001.0001.
Comesaña, Juan Manuel. 2020b. “Rigidity, Symmetry and Defeasibility: On Weisberg’s Puzzle for Perceptual Justification.” in Philosophical Issues 30: Perceptual Evidence, edited by Matthew McGrath and Susanna Schellenberg, pp. 54–70. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley; Sons, Inc., doi:10.1111/phis.12171.
Comesaña, Juan Manuel and Klein, Peter D. 2019. “Skepticism.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/skepticism/.
Comesaña, Juan Manuel and McGrath, Matthew. 2014. “Having False Reasons.” in Epistemic Norms. New Essays on Action, Belief, and Assertion, edited by Clayton Littlejohn and John Turri, pp. 59–80. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199660025.001.0001.
Comesaña, Juan Manuel and McGrath, Matthew. 2016. “Perceptual Reasons.” Philosophical Studies 173(4): 991–1006.
Comesaña, Juan Manuel and Sartorio, Carolina. 2014. “Difference-Making in Epistemology.” Noûs 48(2): 368–387.
Comesaña, Juan Manuel and Tal, Eyal. 2015. “Evidence of Evidence is Evidence (Trivially).” Analysis 75(4): 557–559.

Further References

Goodman, Jeremy. 2013. “Inexact Knowledge without Improbable Knowing [on Williamson (2013a)].” Inquiry 56(1): 30–53.
Nagel, Jennifer. 2013. “Motivating Williamson’s Model Gettier Cases [on Williamson (2013a)].” Inquiry 56(1): 54–62.
Pryor, James. 2014. “Reply to Comesaña (2014a).” in Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, edited by Matthias Steup, John Turri, and Ernest Sosa, 2nd ed., pp. 235–238. Contemporary Debates in Philosophy n. 3. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell. First edition: Sosa and Steup (2005), doi:10.1002/9781394260744.
Weatherson, Brian. 2013. “Margins and Errors [on Williamson (2013a)].” Inquiry 56(1): 63–76.
Williamson, Timothy. 2013a. “Gettier Cases in Epistemic Logic.” Inquiry 56(1): 1–14.
Williamson, Timothy. 2013b. “Response to Cohen and Comesaña (2013a), Goodman (2013), Nagel (2013) and Weatherson (2013) on Gettier Cases in Epistemic Logic.” Inquiry 56(1): 77–96.