David Copp (copp-d)

My contributions to Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Copp, David. 1973. “Leibniz’s Thesis That Not All Possibles are Compossible.” Studia Leibnitiana 5(1): 26–42.
Copp, David. 1984a. “What Collectives Are: Agency, Individualism and Legal Theory.” Dialogue. Revue canadienne de philosophie / Canadian Philosophical Review 23: 249–269.
Copp, David. 1984b. “Introduction.” in Morality, Reason and Truth: New Essays on the Foundations of Ethics, edited by David Copp and David Zimmerman, pp. 1–25. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield.
Copp, David. 1984c. “Considered Judgments and Moral Justification: Conservatism in Moral Theory.” in Morality, Reason and Truth: New Essays on the Foundations of Ethics, edited by David Copp and David Zimmerman, pp. 141–168. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield.
Copp, David. 1992. “The ‘Possibility’ of a Categorical Imperative: Kant’s Groundwork, Part III.” in Philosophical Perspectives 6: Ethics, edited by James E. Tomberlin, pp. 261–284. Atascadero, California: Ridgeview Publishing Co.
Copp, David. 1993. “Reasons and Needs.” in Value, Welfare and Morality, edited by Ray G. Frey and Christopher W. Morris, pp. 112–137. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Copp, David. 1995. Morality, Normativity, and Society. New York: Oxford University Press.
Copp, David. 1997a. “Defending the Principle of Alternate Possibilities: Blameworthiness and Moral Responsibility.” Noûs 31(4): 441–456.
Copp, David. 1997b. “The Ring of Gyges: Overridingness and the Unity of Reason.” Social Philosophy and Policy 14: 86–106. Reprinted in Copp (2007a, 284–308).
Copp, David. 1997c. “Does Moral Theory Need the Concept of Society?” Analyse & Kritik 19(2): 189–212.
Copp, David. 1998. “Morality and Society – The True and the Nasty. Reply to Leist (1997).” Analyse & Kritik 20(1): 123–140.
Copp, David. 2000a. “Milk, Honey, and the Good Life on Moral Twin Earth.” Synthese 124: 113–137. Reprinted in Copp (2007a, 203–229).
Copp, David. 2000b. “Four Epistemological Challenges to Ethical Naturalism: Naturalized Epistemology and the First-Person Perspective.” in Moral Epistemology Naturalized, edited by Richmond Campbell and Bruce Hunter, pp. 31–74. Calgary, Alberta: University of Calgary Press. Reprinted in Copp (2007a, 55–92).
Copp, David. 2001a. “Against Internalism about Reasons – Gert’s Rational Options [on Gert (1998)].” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62(2): 455–461.
Copp, David. 2001b. “Realist-Expressivism: A Neglected Option for Moral Realism.” Social Philosophy and Policy 18: 1–43. Reprinted in Copp (2007a, 153–202).
Copp, David. 2002. “Goldman on the Goals of Democracy [on Goldman (1999)].” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64(1): 207–214.
Copp, David. 2003. “Why Naturalism?” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 6(2): 179–200. Reprinted in Copp (2007a, 33–54), doi:10.1023/a:1024420725408.
Copp, David. 2004. “Moral Naturalism and Three Grades of Normativity.” in Normativity and Naturalism, edited by Peter Schaber, pp. 7–45. Heusenstamm b. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag. Reprinted in Copp (2007a, 249–283).
Copp, David. 2005a. “A Skeptical Challenge to Moral Non-Naturalism and a Defense of Constructivist Naturalism [on Shafer-Landau (2003)].” Philosophical Studies 126(2): 269–283.
Copp, David. 2005b. “The Normativity of Self-Grounded Reason.” Social Philosophy and Policy 22: 165–203. Reprinted in Copp (2007a, 309–354).
Copp, David, ed. 2006a. The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory. Oxford Handbooks. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0195147790.001.0001.
Copp, David. 2006b. “Introduction: Metaethics and Normative Ethics.” in The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory, edited by David Copp, pp. 3–38. Oxford Handbooks. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0195147790.001.0001.
Copp, David. 2006c. “On the Agency of Certain Collective Entities: An Argument from ‘Normative Autonomy’ .” in Midwest Studies in Philosophy 30: Shared Intentions and Collective Responsibility, edited by Peter A. French and Howard K. Wettstein, pp. 194–221. Boston, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers.
Copp, David. 2007a. Morality in a Natural World. Selected Essays in Metaethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, doi:10.1017/cbo9780511497940.
Copp, David. 2007b. “Introduction.” in Morality in a Natural World. Selected Essays in Metaethics, pp. 1–31. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, doi:10.1017/cbo9780511497940.
Copp, David. 2007c. “Moral Naturalism and Self-Evident Moral Truths.” in Morality in a Natural World. Selected Essays in Metaethics, pp. 93–112. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, doi:10.1017/cbo9780511497940.
Copp, David. 2007d. “Moral Necessities in a Contingent World.” in Morality in a Natural World. Selected Essays in Metaethics, pp. 113–151. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, doi:10.1017/cbo9780511497940.
Copp, David. 2007e. “Referring to Moral Properties: Moral Twin Earth, Again.” in Morality in a Natural World. Selected Essays in Metaethics, pp. 230–247. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, doi:10.1017/cbo9780511497940.
Copp, David. 2008a. “Darwinian Skepticism about Moral Realism.” in Philosophical Issues 18: Interdisciplinary Core Philosophy, edited by Ernest Sosa and Enrique Villanueva, pp. 186–206. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell.
Copp, David. 2008b. “ ‘Ought’ Implies ‘Can’ and the Derivation of the Principle of Alternate Possibilities.” Analysis 68(1): 67–75.
Copp, David. 2008c. “Do we have Any Justified Moral Beliefs? [on Sinnott-Armstrong (2006)].” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77(3): 811–819.
Copp, David. 2009a. “Toward a Pluralist and Teleological Theory of Normativity.” in Philosophical Issues 19: Metaethics, edited by Ernest Sosa and Enrique Villanueva, pp. 21–37. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell.
Copp, David. 2009b. “Realist-Expressivism and Conventional Implicature.” in Oxford Studies in Metaethics, volume IV, edited by Russ Shafer-Landau, pp. 167–202. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Copp, David. 2009c. “Is Society-Centered Moral Theory a Contemporary Version of Natural Law Theory?” Dialogue. Revue canadienne de philosophie / Canadian Philosophical Review 48(1): 19–36.
Copp, David. 2010. “Normativity, Deliberation, and Queerness.” in A World Without Values. Essays on John Mackie’s Moral Error Theory, edited by Richard Joyce and Simon Kirchin, pp. 141–166. Philosophical Studies Series n. 114. Dordrecht: Springer.
Copp, David. 2011a. “Review of Prinz (2007).” Noûs 45(3): 577–594.
Copp, David. 2011b. “Comment on Sacconi, Faillo and Ottone (2011).” Analyse & Kritik 33(1): 311–323.
Copp, David. 2012a. “Experiments, Intuitions, and Methodology in Moral and Political Theory.” in Oxford Studies in Metaethics, volume VII, edited by Russ Shafer-Landau, pp. 1–36. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199653492.001.0001.
Copp, David. 2012b. “Normativity and Reasons: Five Arguments from Parfit Against Normative Naturalism.” in Ethical Naturalism. Current Debates, edited by Susana Nuccetelli and Gary Seay, pp. 24–57. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Copp, David. 2013. “Is Constructivism an Alternative to Moral Realism?” in Constructivism in Ethics, edited by Carla Bagnoli, pp. 108–132. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Copp, David. 2014a. “Indirect Epistemic Teleology Explained and Defended.” in Naturalizing Epistemic Virtue, edited by Abrol Fairweather and Owen Flanagan Jr., pp. 70–91. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Copp, David. 2014b. “Can a Hybrid Theory Have It Both Ways? Moral Thought, Open Questions, and Moral Motivation.” in Having it Both Ways. Hybrid Theories and Modern Metaethics, edited by Guy Fletcher and Michael Ridge, pp. 51–74. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199347582.001.0001.
Copp, David. 2015a. “Rationality and Moral Authority.” in Oxford Studies in Metaethics, volume X, edited by Russ Shafer-Landau, pp. 134–159. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198738695.001.0001.
Copp, David. 2015b. “Social Glue and Norms of Sociality.” Philosophical Studies 172(12): 3387–3397.
Copp, David. 2017. “Normative Naturalism and Normative Nihilism: Parfit’s Dilemma for Naturalism.” in Reading Parfit on What Matters, edited by Simon Kirchin, pp. 28–53. Reading Parfit on What Matters. London: Routledge.
Copp, David. 2018a. “Are there Substantive Moral Conceptual Truths?” in Moral Skepticism. New Essays, edited by Diego E. Machuca, pp. 91–114. Routledge Studies in Ethics and Moral Theory. London: Routledge.
Copp, David. 2018b. “A Semantic Challenge to Non-Realist Cognitivism.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48(3–4): 569–591.
Copp, David. 2020a. “Just Too Different: Normative Properties and Natural Properties .” Philosophical Studies 177(1): 263–286, doi:10.1007/s11098-018-1189-1.
Copp, David. 2020b. “Collective Obligations and the Point of Morality.” in The Routledge Handbook of Collective Responsibility, edited by Saba Bazargan-Forward and Deborah Perron Tollefsen, pp. 94–112. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge.
Copp, David. 2020c. “The Rule Worship and Idealization Objects Revisited and Resisted.” in Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, volume X, edited by Mark Timmons, pp. 131–155. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198867944.001.0001.
Copp, David. 2021. “Normative Pluralism and Skepticism about ‘Ought Simpliciter’ .” in The Routledge Handbook of Practical Reason, edited by Ruth Chang and Kurt L. Sylvan, pp. 416–437. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge.
Copp, David, Hampton, Jean and Roemer, John E., eds. 1993. The Idea of Democracy. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Copp, David and Morton, Justin. 2022. “Normativity in Metaethics.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2022/entries/normativity-metaethics/.
Copp, David and Zimmerman, David, eds. 1984. Morality, Reason and Truth: New Essays on the Foundations of Ethics. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield.
Sennet, Adam and Copp, David. 2015. “What Kind of a Mistake is it to Use a Slur?” Philosophical Studies 172(4): 1079–1104, doi:10.1007/s11098-014-0338-4.
Sennet, Adam and Copp, David. 2017. “Pejoratives and Ways of Thinking.” Analytic Philosophy 58(3): 248–271.
Sobel, David and Copp, David. 2001. “Against Direction of Fit Accounts of Belief and Desire.” Analysis 61: 44–53.

Further References

Gert, Bernard. 1998. Morality. Its Nature and Justification. 1st ed. New York: Oxford University Press. Revised edition: Gert (2005).
Gert, Bernard. 2005. Morality. Its Nature and Justification. 2nd ed. New York: Oxford University Press. First edition: Gert (1998), doi:10.1093/0195176898.001.0001.
Goldman, Alvin I. 1999. Knowledge in a Social World. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0198238207.001.0001.
Leist, Anton. 1997. “For Society – Against Morality? On David Copp’s Attempt to Put Society at the Centre of Ethics.” Analyse & Kritik 19(2): 213–228.
Prinz, Jesse J. 2007. The Emotional Construction of Morals. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199571543.001.0001.
Sacconi, Lorenzo, Faillo, Marco and Ottone, Stefania. 2011. “Contractarian Compliance and the ‘Sense of Justice’: A Behavioral Conformity Model and Its Experimental Support.” Analyse & Kritik 33(1): 273–310.
Shafer-Landau, Russ. 2003. Moral Realism. A Defence. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0199259755.001.0001.
Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter. 2006. Moral Skepticisms. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0195187725.001.0001.