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Trent Dougherty (dougherty-t)

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Bibliography

    Buras, J. Todd and Dougherty, Trent. 2017. Parrying Parity: A Reply to a Reidian Critique of Idealism.” in Idealism. New Essays in Metaphysics, edited by Tyron Craig Goldschmidt and Kenneth L. Pearce, pp. 1–16. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198746973.001.0001.
    Colgrove, Nick and Dougherty, Trent. 2016. Hawthorne’s Might-Y Failure: A Reply to ‘Knowledge and Epistemic Necessity’ .” Philosophical Studies 173(5): 1165–1177.
    Dougherty, Trent. 2011a. Evidentialism and its Discontents. Sydney: Sydney University Extension Board, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199563500.001.0001.
    Dougherty, Trent. 2011b. Recent Work on the Problem of Evil.” Analysis 71(3): 560–573.
    Dougherty, Trent. 2011c. Introduction.” in Evidentialism and its Discontents, pp. 1–13. Sydney: Sydney University Extension Board, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199563500.001.0001.
    Dougherty, Trent. 2011d. In Defense of Propositionalism about Evidence.” in Evidentialism and its Discontents, pp. 226–231. Sydney: Sydney University Extension Board, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199563500.001.0001.
    Dougherty, Trent. 2011e. Fallibilism.” in The Routledge Companion to Epistemology, edited by Sven Bernecker and Duncan Pritchard, pp. 131–143. Routledge Philosophy Companions. London: Routledge.
    Dougherty, Trent. 2011f. Re-Reducing Responsibility: Reply to Axtell (2011).” Logos & Episteme 2(4): 625–632.
    Dougherty, Trent. 2012a. Reducing Responsibility: An Evidentialist Account of Epistemic Blame.” European Journal of Philosophy 20(4): 534–547.
    Dougherty, Trent. 2012b. Reconsidering the Parent Analogy: Unfinished Business for Skeptical Theists.” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 72(1): 17–25.
    Dougherty, Trent. 2013. Dealing with Disagreement from the First-Person Perspective: A Probabilist Proposal.” in Disagreement and Skepticism, edited by Diego E. Machuca, pp. 218–238. Routledge Studies in Contemporary Philosophy n. 46. London: Routledge.
    Dougherty, Trent. 2014a. The Problem of Animal Pain. A Theodicy for all Creatures Great and Small. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
    Dougherty, Trent. 2014b. Skeptical Theism.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/skeptical-theism/.
    Dougherty, Trent. 2014c. Phenomenal Conservatism, Skeptical Theism, and Probabilistic Reasoning.” in Skeptical Theism. New Essays, edited by Trent Dougherty and Justin P. McBrayer, pp. 21–31. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Dougherty, Trent. 2014d. Zagzebski, Authority, and Faith [on Zagzebski (2012)].” European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 6(4): 47–59.
    Dougherty, Trent. 2014e. The ‘Ethics of Belief’ is Ethics (Period): Reassigning Responsibilism.” in The Ethics of Belief, edited by Jonathan D. Matheson and Rico Vitz, pp. 146–168. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199686520.001.0001.
    Dougherty, Trent. 2014f. Faith, Trust, and Testimony: An Evidentialist Account.” in Religious Faith and Intellectual Virtue, edited by Laura Frances Callahan and Timothy O’Connor, pp. 97–123. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199672158.001.0001.
    Dougherty, Trent. 2016a. Principles of Inferential Justification.” in Intellectual Assurance. Essays on Traditional Epistemic Internalism, edited by Brett Coppenger and Michael Bergmann, pp. 127–143. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198719632.001.0001.
    Dougherty, Trent. 2016b. Reflections on the Deep Connection Between Problems of Evil and Problems of Divine Hiddenness.” European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 8(4): 65–84.
    Dougherty, Trent. 2017a. Epistemic Norms [Review of Littlejohn and Turri (2014)].” Analysis 77(1): 224–232.
    Dougherty, Trent. 2017b. Pain and the Divine.” in The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Pain, edited by Jennifer Corns, pp. 297–306. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge.
    Dougherty, Trent. 2019a. There are no Epistemic Virtues.” in The Routledge Handbook of Virtue Epistemology, edited by Heather Battaly, pp. 127–139. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge, doi:10.4324/9781315712550.
    Dougherty, Trent. 2019b. Divine Union With and Without the Gospel: A Probabilistic Problem of Pluralism.” European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 11(1): 135–143.
    Dougherty, Trent. 2021. The Scope of Consent. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780192894793.001.0001.
    Dougherty, Trent and Gage, Logan Paul. 2015. New Atheist Approaches to Religion.” in The Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy of Religion, edited by Graham Oppy, pp. 51–62. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge.
    Dougherty, Trent and McBrayer, Justin P., eds. 2014. Skeptical Theism. New Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Dougherty, Trent and Pruss, Alexander R. 2014. Evil and the Problem of Anomaly.” in Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion, volume V, edited by Jonathan L. Kvanvig, pp. 49–87. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198704768.001.0001.
    Dougherty, Trent and Rickabaugh, Brandon L. 2017. Natural Theology, Evidence, and Epistemic Humility.” European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 9(2): 19–42.
    Dougherty, Trent and Rysiew, Patrick. 2009. Fallibilism, Epistemic Possibility, and Concessive Knowledge Attributions.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78(1): 123–132.
    Dougherty, Trent and Rysiew, Patrick. 2011. Clarity about Concessive Knowledge Attributions: Reply to Dodd.” Synthese 181(3): 395–403.
    Dougherty, Trent and Rysiew, Patrick. 2014a. What is Knowledge-First Epistemology? in Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, edited by Matthias Steup, John Turri, and Ernest Sosa, 2nd ed., pp. 10–16. Contemporary Debates in Philosophy n. 3. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell. First edition: Sosa and Steup (2005), doi:10.1002/9781394260744.
    Dougherty, Trent and Rysiew, Patrick. 2014b. Experience First.” in Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, edited by Matthias Steup, John Turri, and Ernest Sosa, 2nd ed., pp. 17–21. Contemporary Debates in Philosophy n. 3. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell. First edition: Sosa and Steup (2005), doi:10.1002/9781394260744.
    Dougherty, Trent and Rysiew, Patrick. 2014c. Still Nowhere Else to Start [reply to Williamson (2014)].” in Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, edited by Matthias Steup, John Turri, and Ernest Sosa, 2nd ed., pp. 25–26. Contemporary Debates in Philosophy n. 3. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell. First edition: Sosa and Steup (2005), doi:10.1002/9781394260744.
    Dougherty, Trent and Tweedt, Chris. 2015. Religious Epistemology.” Philosophy Compass 10(8): 547–559.
    Dougherty, Trent and Walls, Jerry L. 2013. Arguments from Evil.” in The Routledge Companion to Theism, edited by R. Charles Taliaferro, Victoria S. Harrison, and Stewart C. Goetz, pp. 369–382. London: Routledge.

Further References

    Axtell, Guy. 2011. Recovering Responsibility.” Logos & Episteme 2(3): 429–454.
    Littlejohn, Clayton and Turri, John, eds. 2014. Epistemic Norms. New Essays on Action, Belief, and Assertion. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199660025.001.0001.
    Williamson, Timothy. 2014. Knowledge Still First [reply to Dougherty and Rysiew (2014b)].” in Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, edited by Matthias Steup, John Turri, and Ernest Sosa, 2nd ed., pp. 22–24. Contemporary Debates in Philosophy n. 3. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell. First edition: Sosa and Steup (2005), doi:10.1002/9781394260744.
    Zagzebski, Linda Trinkaus. 2012. Epistemic Authority. A Theory of Trust, Authority, and Autonomy in Belief. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199936472.001.0001.