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Patrick Rysiew (rysiew)

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Bibliography

    Bullot, Nicolas and Rysiew, Patrick. 2007. A Study in the Cognition of Individuals’ Identity: Solving the Problem of Singular Cognition in Object and Agent Tracking.” Consciousness and Cognition 16: 276–293.
    Dougherty, Trent and Rysiew, Patrick. 2009. Fallibilism, Epistemic Possibility, and Concessive Knowledge Attributions.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78(1): 123–132.
    Dougherty, Trent and Rysiew, Patrick. 2011. Clarity about Concessive Knowledge Attributions: Reply to Dodd.” Synthese 181(3): 395–403.
    Dougherty, Trent and Rysiew, Patrick. 2014a. What is Knowledge-First Epistemology? in Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, edited by Matthias Steup, John Turri, and Ernest Sosa, 2nd ed., pp. 10–16. Contemporary Debates in Philosophy n. 3. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell. First edition: Sosa and Steup (2005), doi:10.1002/9781394260744.
    Dougherty, Trent and Rysiew, Patrick. 2014b. Experience First.” in Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, edited by Matthias Steup, John Turri, and Ernest Sosa, 2nd ed., pp. 17–21. Contemporary Debates in Philosophy n. 3. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell. First edition: Sosa and Steup (2005), doi:10.1002/9781394260744.
    Dougherty, Trent and Rysiew, Patrick. 2014c. Still Nowhere Else to Start [reply to Williamson (2014)].” in Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, edited by Matthias Steup, John Turri, and Ernest Sosa, 2nd ed., pp. 25–26. Contemporary Debates in Philosophy n. 3. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell. First edition: Sosa and Steup (2005), doi:10.1002/9781394260744.
    Rysiew, Patrick. 2001. The Context-Sensitivity of Knowledge Attributions.” Noûs 35(4): 477–514.
    Rysiew, Patrick. 2002. Reid and Epistemic Naturalism.” The Philosophical Quarterly 52(209): 437–456. Reprinted in Haldane and Read (2002, 24–43).
    Rysiew, Patrick. 2005. Contesting Contextualism.” Grazer Philosophische Studien 69: 51–70. “Epistemological Contextualism,” ed. by Martijn Blaauw.
    Rysiew, Patrick. 2006. Motivating the Relevant Alternatives Approach.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36(2): 259–280.
    Rysiew, Patrick. 2007a. Speaking of Knowing.” Noûs 41(4): 627–662.
    Rysiew, Patrick. 2007b. Beyond Words: Communication, Truthfulness, and Understanding.” Episteme 4(3): 285–304.
    Rysiew, Patrick. 2007c. Epistemic Contextualism.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2007/entries/contextualism-epistemology/.
    Rysiew, Patrick. 2008. Rationality Disputes – Psychology and Epistemology.” Philosophy Compass 3(6): 1153–1176.
    Rysiew, Patrick. 2011a. Relativism and Contextualism.” in A Companion to Relativism, edited by Steven D. Hales, pp. 286–305. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, doi:10.1002/9781444392494.
    Rysiew, Patrick. 2011b. Surveys, Intuitions, Knowledge Attributions, Comments on DeRose (2011).” Philosophical Studies 156(1): 111–120.
    Rysiew, Patrick. 2011c. Making it Evident: Evidence and Evidentness, Justification, and Belief.” in Evidentialism and its Discontents, pp. 207–225. Sydney: Sydney University Extension Board, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199563500.001.0001.
    Rysiew, Patrick. 2011d. Epistemic Contextualism.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2011/entries/contextualism-epistemology/.
    Rysiew, Patrick. 2011e. Contextualism.” in The Routledge Companion to Epistemology, edited by Sven Bernecker and Duncan Pritchard, pp. 523–535. Routledge Philosophy Companions. London: Routledge.
    Rysiew, Patrick. 2012a. Elusive ‘Knowledge’ [review of DeRose (2009)].” Analytic Philosophy 53(1): 130–138.
    Rysiew, Patrick. 2012b. Epistemic Scorekeeping.” in Knowledge Ascriptions, edited by Jessica A. Brown and Mikkel Gerken, pp. 270–294. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199693702.001.0001.
    Rysiew, Patrick. 2013. Is Knowledge a Non-Composite Mental State? [on Nagel (2013)].” in Oxford Studies in Epistemology, volume IV, edited by Tamar Szabó Gendler and John Hawthorne, pp. 333–344. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199672707.001.0001.
    Rysiew, Patrick, ed. 2015a. New Essays on Thomas Reid. London: Routledge.
    Rysiew, Patrick. 2015b. Thomas Reid on Language.” in Linguistic Content. New Essays on the History of Philosophy of Language, edited by Margaret Anne Cameron and Robert J. Stainton, pp. 223–244. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198732495.001.0001.
    Rysiew, Patrick. 2015c. Pragmatism and Reid’s ‘Third Way’.” in Thomas Reid on Mind, Knowledge and Value, edited by Rebecca Copenhaver and J. Todd Buras, pp. 178–192. Mind Association Occasional Series. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Rysiew, Patrick. 2015d. Argumentation and the Social Significance of Reasons.” Episteme 12(2): 309–317.
    Rysiew, Patrick. 2016a. Naturalism in Epistemology.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2016/entries/epistemology-naturalized/.
    Rysiew, Patrick. 2016b. Epistemic Contextualism.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2016/entries/contextualism-epistemology/.
    Rysiew, Patrick. 2017a. Review of Blome-Tillmann (2014).” The Philosophical Review 126(1): 126–132.
    Rysiew, Patrick. 2017b. Veritism, Values, Epistemic Norms.” Philosophical Topics 45(1): 181–203.
    Rysiew, Patrick. 2017c. ‘Knowledge’ and Pragmatics.” in The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Contextualism, edited by Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa, pp. 205–217. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge.
    Rysiew, Patrick. 2018a. Factivity and Evidence.” in The Factive Turn in Epistemology, edited by Veli Mitova, pp. 50–65. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, doi:10.1017/9781316818992.
    Rysiew, Patrick. 2018b. The Gettier Problem and the Program of Analysis.” in The Gettier Problem, edited by Stephen Cade Hetherington, pp. 159–176. Classic Philosophical Arguments. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, doi:10.1017/9781316827413.
    Rysiew, Patrick. 2020a. Assertion of Knowledge.” in The Oxford Handbook of Assertion, edited by Sanford C. Goldberg, pp. 581–604. Oxford Handbooks. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190675233.001.0001.
    Rysiew, Patrick. 2020b. Naturalism in Epistemology.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2020/entries/epistemology-naturalized/.
    Rysiew, Patrick. 2020c. Epistemic Contextualism.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2020/entries/contextualism-epistemology/.

Further References

    Blome-Tillmann, Michael. 2014. Knowledge and Presuppositions. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199686087.001.0001.
    DeRose, Keith. 2009. The Case for Contextualism. Knowledge, Skepticism, and Context, Vol. I. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199564460.001.0001.
    DeRose, Keith. 2011. Contextualism, Contrastivism, and X-Phi Surveys.” Philosophical Studies 156(1): 81–110.
    Haldane, John and Read, Stephen, eds. 2002. The Philosophy of Thomas Reid. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
    Nagel, Jennifer. 2013. Knowledge as a Mental State.” in Oxford Studies in Epistemology, volume IV, edited by Tamar Szabó Gendler and John Hawthorne, pp. 273–308. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199672707.001.0001.
    Williamson, Timothy. 2014. Knowledge Still First [reply to Dougherty and Rysiew (2014b)].” in Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, edited by Matthias Steup, John Turri, and Ernest Sosa, 2nd ed., pp. 22–24. Contemporary Debates in Philosophy n. 3. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell. First edition: Sosa and Steup (2005), doi:10.1002/9781394260744.