Patrick Rysiew (rysiew)
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Bibliography
Bullot, Nicolas and Rysiew, Patrick. 2007. “A Study in the Cognition of Individuals’ Identity:
Solving the Problem of Singular Cognition in Object and Agent
Tracking.” Consciousness and Cognition 16:
276–293.
Dougherty, Trent and Rysiew, Patrick. 2009. “Fallibilism, Epistemic Possibility, and Concessive
Knowledge Attributions.” Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research 78(1): 123–132.
Dougherty, Trent and Rysiew, Patrick. 2011. “Clarity about Concessive Knowledge Attributions: Reply to
Dodd.” Synthese 181(3): 395–403.
Dougherty, Trent and Rysiew, Patrick. 2014a. “What is Knowledge-First Epistemology?” in
Contemporary Debates in
Epistemology, edited by Matthias Steup, John Turri, and Ernest Sosa, 2nd ed., pp. 10–16. Contemporary Debates in Philosophy n. 3. Malden,
Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell. First edition: Sosa and Steup
(2005), doi:10.1002/9781394260744.
Dougherty, Trent and Rysiew, Patrick. 2014b. “Experience
First.” in Contemporary Debates
in Epistemology, edited by Matthias Steup, John Turri, and Ernest Sosa, 2nd ed., pp. 17–21. Contemporary Debates in Philosophy n. 3. Malden,
Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell. First edition: Sosa and Steup
(2005), doi:10.1002/9781394260744.
Dougherty, Trent and Rysiew, Patrick. 2014c. “Still Nowhere Else to Start [reply to Williamson
(2014)].” in Contemporary
Debates in Epistemology, edited by Matthias Steup, John Turri, and Ernest Sosa, 2nd ed., pp. 25–26. Contemporary Debates in Philosophy n. 3. Malden,
Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell. First edition: Sosa and Steup
(2005), doi:10.1002/9781394260744.
Rysiew, Patrick. 2001. “The Context-Sensitivity of Knowledge
Attributions.” Noûs 35(4): 477–514.
Rysiew, Patrick. 2002. “Reid and Epistemic Naturalism.” The
Philosophical Quarterly 52(209): 437–456. Reprinted in Haldane and Read
(2002, 24–43).
Rysiew, Patrick. 2005.
“Contesting Contextualism.” Grazer
Philosophische Studien 69: 51–70. “Epistemological
Contextualism,” ed. by Martijn Blaauw.
Rysiew, Patrick. 2006. “Motivating the Relevant Alternatives
Approach.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36(2):
259–280.
Rysiew, Patrick. 2007a. “Speaking of Knowing.”
Noûs 41(4): 627–662.
Rysiew, Patrick. 2007b. “Beyond Words: Communication, Truthfulness, and
Understanding.” Episteme 4(3): 285–304.
Rysiew, Patrick. 2007c.
“Epistemic Contextualism.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study
of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2007/entries/contextualism-epistemology/.
Rysiew, Patrick. 2008. “Rationality Disputes – Psychology and
Epistemology.” Philosophy Compass 3(6):
1153–1176.
Rysiew, Patrick. 2011a. “Relativism and Contextualism.” in A Companion to Relativism, edited by Steven
D. Hales, pp. 286–305. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Chichester:
Wiley-Blackwell, doi:10.1002/9781444392494.
Rysiew, Patrick. 2011b. “Surveys, Intuitions, Knowledge Attributions, Comments on
DeRose
(2011).” Philosophical Studies 156(1):
111–120.
Rysiew, Patrick. 2011c. “Making it Evident: Evidence and Evidentness,
Justification, and Belief.” in Evidentialism and its Discontents, pp.
207–225. Sydney: Sydney University Extension Board, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199563500.001.0001.
Rysiew, Patrick. 2011d.
“Epistemic Contextualism.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study
of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2011/entries/contextualism-epistemology/.
Rysiew, Patrick. 2011e.
“Contextualism.” in The Routledge Companion to Epistemology,
edited by Sven Bernecker and Duncan Pritchard, pp. 523–535. Routledge
Philosophy Companions. London: Routledge.
Rysiew, Patrick. 2012a. “Elusive ‘Knowledge’ [review of DeRose
(2009)].” Analytic Philosophy 53(1):
130–138.
Rysiew, Patrick. 2012b.
“Epistemic Scorekeeping.” in
Knowledge Ascriptions, edited by Jessica A. Brown and Mikkel Gerken, pp. 270–294. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199693702.001.0001.
Rysiew, Patrick. 2013. “Is Knowledge a Non-Composite Mental State? [on Nagel
(2013)].” in Oxford
Studies in Epistemology, volume IV, edited by Tamar Szabó
Gendler and John Hawthorne, pp. 333–344. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199672707.001.0001.
Rysiew, Patrick, ed. 2015a. New Essays on Thomas Reid. London: Routledge.
Rysiew, Patrick. 2015b. “Thomas Reid on Language.” in Linguistic Content. New Essays on the History of
Philosophy of Language, edited by Margaret Anne Cameron and Robert J. Stainton, pp. 223–244. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198732495.001.0001.
Rysiew, Patrick. 2015c. “Pragmatism and Reid’s ‘Third
Way’ .” in Thomas Reid on
Mind, Knowledge and Value, edited by Rebecca Copenhaver and J. Todd Buras, pp. 178–192. Mind Association
Occasional Series. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Rysiew, Patrick. 2015d. “Argumentation and the Social Significance of
Reasons.” Episteme 12(2): 309–317.
Rysiew, Patrick. 2016a. “Naturalism in Epistemology.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study
of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2016/entries/epistemology-naturalized/.
Rysiew, Patrick. 2016b.
“Epistemic Contextualism.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study
of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2016/entries/contextualism-epistemology/.
Rysiew, Patrick. 2017a. “Review of Blome-Tillmann
(2014).” The Philosophical Review 126(1):
126–132.
Rysiew, Patrick. 2017b.
“Veritism, Values, Epistemic Norms.”
Philosophical Topics 45(1): 181–203.
Rysiew, Patrick. 2017c. “ ‘Knowledge’ and Pragmatics.”
in The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic
Contextualism, edited by Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa, pp. 205–217. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London:
Routledge.
Rysiew, Patrick. 2018a. “Factivity and Evidence.” in The Factive Turn in Epistemology, edited by
Veli Mitova, pp. 50–65. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, doi:10.1017/9781316818992.
Rysiew, Patrick. 2018b. “The Gettier Problem and the Program of
Analysis.” in The Gettier Problem,
edited by Stephen Cade Hetherington, pp.
159–176. Classic Philosophical Arguments. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, doi:10.1017/9781316827413.
Rysiew, Patrick. 2020a. “Assertion of Knowledge.” in The Oxford Handbook of Assertion, edited by
Sanford C. Goldberg, pp. 581–604.
Oxford Handbooks. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190675233.001.0001.
Rysiew, Patrick. 2020b. “Naturalism in Epistemology.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study
of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2020/entries/epistemology-naturalized/.
Rysiew, Patrick. 2020c.
“Epistemic Contextualism.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study
of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2020/entries/contextualism-epistemology/.
Further References
Blome-Tillmann, Michael. 2014. Knowledge and Presuppositions. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199686087.001.0001.
DeRose, Keith. 2009. The Case for Contextualism. Knowledge, Skepticism, and
Context, Vol. I. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199564460.001.0001.
DeRose, Keith. 2011. “Contextualism, Contrastivism, and X-Phi
Surveys.” Philosophical Studies 156(1): 81–110.
Haldane, John and Read, Stephen, eds. 2002. The Philosophy of Thomas Reid. Oxford:
Blackwell Publishers.
Nagel, Jennifer. 2013. “Knowledge as a Mental State.” in Oxford Studies in Epistemology, volume IV,
edited by Tamar Szabó Gendler and John
Hawthorne, pp. 273–308. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199672707.001.0001.
Williamson, Timothy. 2014. “Knowledge Still First [reply to Dougherty and Rysiew
(2014b)].” in Contemporary
Debates in Epistemology, edited by Matthias Steup, John Turri, and Ernest Sosa, 2nd ed., pp. 22–24. Contemporary Debates in Philosophy n. 3. Malden,
Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell. First edition: Sosa and Steup
(2005), doi:10.1002/9781394260744.