André Norman Gallois (gallois-an)

Mentioned on the following portal pages

Contributions to Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Elliot, Robert and Gallois, André Norman. 1984. “Would It Have Been Me? (Against the Necessity of Origin).” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62: 292–293.
Gallois, André Norman. 1977. “Van Inwagen on Free Will and Determinism.” Philosophical Studies 32(1): 99–105.
Gallois, André Norman. 1986. “Rigid Designation and the Contingency of Identity.” Mind 95: 54–54.
Gallois, André Norman. 1990. “Occasional Identity.” Philosophical Studies 58: 203–224.
Gallois, André Norman. 1992. “Putnam, Brains in Vats, and Arguments for Scepticism.” Mind 101: 273–285.
Gallois, André Norman. 1993a. “Ramachandran On Restricting Rigidity [on Ramachandran (1992)].” Mind 102: 151–155.
Gallois, André Norman. 1993b. “Is Global Scepticism Self-Refuting?” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 71: 36–46.
Gallois, André Norman. 1993c. “Reply to Ramachandran [on Ramachandran (1993)].” Mind 102: 159–162.
Gallois, André Norman. 1994. “Deflationary Self Knowledge.” in Philosophy in Mind: the Place of Philosophy in the Study of Mind, edited by Michaelis S. Michael and John Hawthorne, pp. 49–64. Philosophical Studies Series n. 60. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. Reprinted in Hatzimoysis (2011, 146–169).
Gallois, André Norman. 1996. The World Without, the Mind Within. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Gallois, André Norman. 1997. “Can an Anti-Realist Live with the Past?” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 75: 288–303.
Gallois, André Norman. 1998a. Occasions of Identity: The Metaphysics of Persistence, Change, and Sameness. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199261833.001.0001.
Gallois, André Norman. 1998b. “Does Ontology Rest on a Mistake?” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 72: 263–283.
Gallois, André Norman. 2000a. “The Indubitability of the Cogito.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 81(4): 363–384.
Gallois, André Norman. 2000b. “First-Person Accessibility and Consciousness.” Philosophical Topics 28(2): 101–124.
Gallois, André Norman. 2001. “Langford and Ramachandran on Occasional Identities [on Langford and Ramachandran (2011)].” The Philosophical Quarterly 51.
Gallois, André Norman. 2004. “Comments on Sider (2001).” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68(3): 648–657.
Gallois, André Norman. 2005a. “The Simplicity of Identity.” The Journal of Philosophy 102(6): 273–302.
Gallois, André Norman. 2005b. “Identity Over Time.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2005/entries/identity-time/.
Gallois, André Norman. 2006. “Is Knowing Having the Right to be Sure?” in Aspects of Knowing. Epistemological Essays, edited by Stephen Cade Hetherington, pp. 169–182. Amsterdam: Elsevier Science Publishers B.V.
Gallois, André Norman. 2007. “Review of Mackie (2006).” The Philosophical Quarterly 57(227): 297–300.
Gallois, André Norman. 2009. “The Fixity of Reasons.” Philosophical Studies 146(2): 233–248.
Gallois, André Norman. 2011a. “Occasional Identity: Thereby Hangs the Tale.” Analytic Philosophy 52(3): 188–202.
Gallois, André Norman. 2011b. “Identity Over Time.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2011/entries/identity-time/.
Gallois, André Norman. 2016. “Identity Over Time.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/identity-time/.
Gallois, André Norman and Hawthorne, John. 1996. “Externalism and Scepticism.” Philosophical Studies 81: 1–26.

Further References

Hatzimoysis, Anthony, ed. 2011. Self-Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199590728.001.0001.
Langford, Simon and Ramachandran, Murali. 2011. “Occasional Identity: A Tale of Two Approaches.” Analytic Philosophy 52(3): 175–187.
Mackie, Penelope. 2006. How Things Might Have Been. Individuals, Kinds, and Essential Properties. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0199272204.001.0001.
Ramachandran, Murali. 1992. “On Restricting Rigidity.” Mind 101: 141–144.
Ramachandran, Murali. 1993. “Restricted Rigidity: The Deeper Problem.” Mind 102: 157–158.
Sider, Theodore. 2001. Four-Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/019924443X.001.0001.