André Norman Gallois (gallois-an)

Mentionné.e sur les pages du portail suivantes

Contributions à Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Elliot, Robert and Gallois, André Norman. 1984. “Would It Have Been Me? (Against the Necessity of Origin).” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62: 292–293.
Gallois, André Norman. 1977. “Van Inwagen on Free Will and Determinism.” Philosophical Studies 32(1): 99–105.
Gallois, André Norman. 1986. “Rigid Designation and the Contingency of Identity.” Mind 95: 54–54.
Gallois, André Norman. 1990. “Occasional Identity.” Philosophical Studies 58: 203–224.
Gallois, André Norman. 1992. “Putnam, Brains in Vats, and Arguments for Scepticism.” Mind 101: 273–285.
Gallois, André Norman. 1993a. “Ramachandran On Restricting Rigidity [on Ramachandran (1992)].” Mind 102: 151–155.
Gallois, André Norman. 1993b. “Is Global Scepticism Self-Refuting?” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 71: 36–46.
Gallois, André Norman. 1993c. “Reply to Ramachandran [on Ramachandran (1993)].” Mind 102: 159–162.
Gallois, André Norman. 1994. “Deflationary Self Knowledge.” in Philosophy in Mind: the Place of Philosophy in the Study of Mind, edited by Michaelis S. Michael and John Hawthorne, pp. 49–64. Philosophical Studies Series n. 60. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. Reprinted in Hatzimoysis (2011, 146–169).
Gallois, André Norman. 1996. The World Without, the Mind Within. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Gallois, André Norman. 1997. “Can an Anti-Realist Live with the Past?” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 75: 288–303.
Gallois, André Norman. 1998a. Occasions of Identity: The Metaphysics of Persistence, Change, and Sameness. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199261833.001.0001.
Gallois, André Norman. 1998b. “Does Ontology Rest on a Mistake?” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 72: 263–283.
Gallois, André Norman. 2000a. “The Indubitability of the Cogito.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 81(4): 363–384.
Gallois, André Norman. 2000b. “First-Person Accessibility and Consciousness.” Philosophical Topics 28(2): 101–124.
Gallois, André Norman. 2001. “Langford and Ramachandran on Occasional Identities [on Langford and Ramachandran (2011)].” The Philosophical Quarterly 51.
Gallois, André Norman. 2004. “Comments on Sider (2001).” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68(3): 648–657.
Gallois, André Norman. 2005a. “The Simplicity of Identity.” The Journal of Philosophy 102(6): 273–302.
Gallois, André Norman. 2005b. “Identity Over Time.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2005/entries/identity-time/.
Gallois, André Norman. 2006. “Is Knowing Having the Right to be Sure?” in Aspects of Knowing. Epistemological Essays, edited by Stephen Cade Hetherington, pp. 169–182. Amsterdam: Elsevier Science Publishers B.V.
Gallois, André Norman. 2007. “Review of Mackie (2006).” The Philosophical Quarterly 57(227): 297–300.
Gallois, André Norman. 2009. “The Fixity of Reasons.” Philosophical Studies 146(2): 233–248.
Gallois, André Norman. 2011a. “Occasional Identity: Thereby Hangs the Tale.” Analytic Philosophy 52(3): 188–202.
Gallois, André Norman. 2011b. “Identity Over Time.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2011/entries/identity-time/.
Gallois, André Norman. 2016. “Identity Over Time.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/identity-time/.
Gallois, André Norman and Hawthorne, John. 1996. “Externalism and Scepticism.” Philosophical Studies 81: 1–26.

Further References

Hatzimoysis, Anthony, ed. 2011. Self-Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199590728.001.0001.
Langford, Simon and Ramachandran, Murali. 2011. “Occasional Identity: A Tale of Two Approaches.” Analytic Philosophy 52(3): 175–187.
Mackie, Penelope. 2006. How Things Might Have Been. Individuals, Kinds, and Essential Properties. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0199272204.001.0001.
Ramachandran, Murali. 1992. “On Restricting Rigidity.” Mind 101: 141–144.
Ramachandran, Murali. 1993. “Restricted Rigidity: The Deeper Problem.” Mind 102: 157–158.
Sider, Theodore. 2001. Four-Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/019924443X.001.0001.