Carl Gillett (gillett-c)

Beiträge zu Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Aizawa, Kenneth and Gillett, Carl. 2009. “Levels, Individual Variation, and Massive Multiple Realization in Neurobiology.” in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Neuroscience, edited by John Bickle, pp. 539–581. Oxford Handbooks. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195304787.001.0001.
Aizawa, Kenneth and Gillett, Carl. 2011. “The Autonomy of Psychology in the Age of Neuroscience.” in Causality in the Sciences, edited by Phyllis Illari, Federica Russo, and Jon Williamson, pp. 202–223. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Aizawa, Kenneth and Gillett, Carl, eds. 2016a. Scientific Composition and Metaphysical Ground. New Directions in the Philosophy of Science. London: Palgrave Macmillan, doi:10.1057/978-1-137-56216-6.
Aizawa, Kenneth and Gillett, Carl. 2016b. “Introduction: Vertical Relations in Science, Philosophy, and the World: Understanding the New Debates over Verticality.” in Scientific Composition and Metaphysical Ground, edited by Kenneth Aizawa and Carl Gillett, pp. 1–37. New Directions in the Philosophy of Science. London: Palgrave Macmillan, doi:10.1057/978-1-137-56216-6.
Crook, S. and Gillett, Carl. 2001. “Why Physics Alone Cannot Define the ‘Physical’: Materialism, Metaphysics, and the Formulation of Physicalism.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 31: 333–360.
Gillett, Carl. 2001. “The Methodological Role of Physicalism: A Minimal Skepticism.” in Physicalism and its Discontents, edited by Carl Gillett and Barry C. Loewer, pp. 225–250. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Gillett, Carl. 2002a. “The Varieties of Emergence: Their Purposes, Obligations and Importance.” Grazer Philosophische Studien 65: 95–121. “Mental Causation, Multiple Realization, and Emergence,” ed. by Marc Slors and Sven Walter.
Gillett, Carl. 2002b. “The Dimensions of Realization: A Critique of the Standard View.” Analysis 62: 316–323.
Gillett, Carl. 2003a. “The Metaphysics of Realization, Multiple Realizability, and the Special Sciences.” The Journal of Philosophy 100(11): 591–603.
Gillett, Carl. 2003b. “Non-Reductive Realization and Non-Reductive Identity: What Physicalism Does Not Entail.” in Physicalism and Mental Causation. The Metaphysics of Mind and Action, edited by Sven Walter and Heinz-Dieter Heckmann, pp. 31–58. Exeter: Imprint Academic.
Gillett, Carl. 2003c. “Infinitism Redux? A Response to Klein (2003).” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66(3): 709–717.
Gillett, Carl. 2006a. “Samuel Alexander’s Emergentism.” Synthese 153: 261–296.
Gillett, Carl. 2006b. “The Hidden Battles over Emergence.” in The Oxford Handbook of Religion and Science, edited by Philip Clayton and Zachary Simpson, pp. 801–818. Oxford Handbooks. New York: Oxford University Press.
Gillett, Carl. 2007a. “Hyper-Extending the Mind? Setting Boundaries in the Special Sciences.” Philosophical Topics 35(1–2): 161–187.
Gillett, Carl. 2007b. “The Metaphysics of Mechanisms and the Challenge of the New Reductionism.” in The Matter of Mind: Philosophical Essays on Psychology, Neuroscience and Reduction, edited by Maurice K. D. Schouten and Huib Looren de Jong, pp. 76–100. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Gillett, Carl. 2010. “On the Implications of Scientific Composition and Completeness: Or, the Troubles, and Troubles, of Non-Reductive Physicalism.” in Emergence in Science and Philosophy, edited by Antonella Corradini and Timothy O’Connor, pp. 25–45. Routledge Studies in the Philosophy of Science n. 6. London: Routledge.
Gillett, Carl. 2013a. “Understanding the Sciences Through the Fog of ‘Functionalism(s)’ .” in Functions: Selection and Mechanisms, edited by Philippe Huneman, pp. 159–183. Synthese Library n. 363. Dordrecht: Springer.
Gillett, Carl. 2013b. “What you are and the Evolution of Organs, Souls and Superorganism: A Reply to Blatti (2012).” Analysis 73(2): 271–279.
Gillett, Carl. 2016a. Reduction and Emergence in Science and Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, doi:10.1017/cbo9781139871716.
Gillett, Carl. 2016b. “The Metaphysics of Nature, Science, and the Rules of Engagement.” in Scientific Composition and Metaphysical Ground, edited by Kenneth Aizawa and Carl Gillett, pp. 205–248. New Directions in the Philosophy of Science. London: Palgrave Macmillan, doi:10.1057/978-1-137-56216-6.
Gillett, Carl. 2017. “Scientific Emergentism and Its Move beyond (Direct) Downward Causation.” in Philosophical and Scientific Perspectives on Downward Causation, edited by Michele Paolini Paoletti and Francesco Orilia, pp. 242–263. New York: Routledge, doi:10.4324/9781315638577.
Gillett, Carl. 2019. “Emergence, Downward Causation and Its Alternatives: Critically Surveying a Foundational Issue.” in The Routledge Handbook of Emergence, edited by Sophie C. Gibb, Robin Findlay Hendry, and Tom Lancaster, pp. 99–110. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge.
Gillett, Carl and Loewer, Barry C., eds. 2001. Physicalism and its Discontents. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Gillett, Carl and Rives, Bradley. 2005. “The Non-Existence of Determinables; Or, A World of Absolute Determinates as Default Hypothesis.” Noûs 39(3): 483–504.

Further References

Blatti, Stephan. 2012. “A New Argument for Animalism.” Analysis 72(4): 685–690.
Klein, Peter D. 2003. “When Infinite Regresses Are Not Vicious.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66(3): 718–729.