Elizabeth Harman (harman-e)

Contributions to Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Harman, Elizabeth. 2003. “The Potentiality Problem.” Philosophical Studies 114(1–2): 173–198.
Harman, Elizabeth. 2004. “Can we Harm and Benefit in Creating?” in Philosophical Perspectives 18: Ethics, edited by Dean W. Zimmerman and John Hawthorne, pp. 89–113. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Harman, Elizabeth. 2007a. “Sacred Mountains and Beloved Fetuses: Can Loving or Worshipping Something Give It Moral Status?” Philosophical Studies 133(1): 55–81.
Harman, Elizabeth. 2007b. “Discussion of Arpaly (2003).” Philosophical Studies 134(3): 433–439.
Harman, Elizabeth. 2009a. “ ‘I’ll be Glad I Did It’ Reasoning and the Significance of Future Desires.” in Philosophical Perspectives 23: Ethics, edited by John Hawthorne, pp. 177–199. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley; Sons, Inc.
Harman, Elizabeth. 2009b. “Review of Benatar (2006).” Noûs 43(4): 776–785.
Harman, Elizabeth. 2011. “Does Moral Ignorance Exculpate?” Ratio 24(4): 443–468. Reprinted in Hooker (2012, 95–120).
Harman, Elizabeth. 2015a. “Is it Reasonable to ‘Rely on Intuitions’ in Ethics?” in The Norton Introduction to Philosophy, edited by Gideon Rosen, Alex Byrne, Joshua Cohen, and Seana Valentine Shiffrin, pp. 795–802. New York: W.W. Norton & Co. Reprinted in Rosen et al. (2018, 895–902).
Harman, Elizabeth. 2015b. “Morality Within the Realm of the Morally Permissible.” in Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, volume V, edited by Mark Timmons, pp. 221–244. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198744665.001.0001.
Harman, Elizabeth. 2015c. “The Irrelevance of Moral Uncertainty.” in Oxford Studies in Metaethics, volume X, edited by Russ Shafer-Landau, pp. 53–79. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198738695.001.0001.
Harman, Elizabeth. 2015d. “Transformative Experiences and Reliance on Moral Testimony [on Paul (2015)].” Res Philosophica 92(2): 323–339.
Harman, Elizabeth. 2017. “When is Failure to Realize Something Exculpatory?” in Responsibility. The Epistemic Condition, edited by Philip Robichaud and Jan Willem Wieland, pp. 117–126. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198779667.001.0001.
Harman, Elizabeth. 2018. “The Moral Significance of Animal Pain and Animal Death.” in The Norton Introduction to Philosophy, edited by Gideon Rosen, Alex Byrne, Joshua Cohen, and Seana Valentine Shiffrin, 2nd ed., pp. 714–720. New York: W.W. Norton & Co.
Harman, Elizabeth. 2019. “Moral Testimony Goes Only So Far.” in Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility, volume VI, edited by David W. Shoemaker, pp. 165–185. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198845539.001.0001.
Harman, Elizabeth. 2021. “There is no Moral Ought and no Prudential Ought.” in The Routledge Handbook of Practical Reason, edited by Ruth Chang and Kurt L. Sylvan, pp. 438–456. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge.

Further References

Arpaly, Nomy. 2003. Unprincipled Virtue: an Inquiry into Moral Agency. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0195152042.001.0001.
Benatar, David. 2006. Better Never to Have Been. The Harm of Coming into Existence. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199296422.001.0001.
Hooker, Brad, ed. 2012. Developing Deontology: New Essays in Ethical Theory. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley; Sons, Inc., doi:10.1002/9781118368794.
Paul, Laurie A. 2015. Transformative Experience. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198717959.001.0001.
Rosen, Gideon, Byrne, Alex, Cohen, Joshua and Shiffrin, Seana Valentine, eds. 2018. The Norton Introduction to Philosophy. 2nd ed. New York: W.W. Norton & Co.