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Peter D. Klein (klein-pd)

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Bibliography

    Comesaña, Juan Manuel and Klein, Peter D. 2019. Skepticism.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/skepticism/.
    Klein, Peter D. 1969. ‘Are Strawson’s Persons Immortal?’ A Reply [to Gustafson (1967)].” Philosophical Studies 20(5): 65–70.
    Klein, Peter D. 1976. Knowledge, Causality, and Defeasibility.” The Journal of Philosophy 73(18): 792–812.
    Klein, Peter D. 1981. Certainty: A Refutation of Skepticism. Minneapolis, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press.
    Klein, Peter D. 1985. The Virtues of Inconsistency.” The Monist 68(1): 105–135.
    Klein, Peter D. 1986a. Radical Interpretation and Global Scepticism.” in Truth and Interpretation: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson, edited by Ernest LePore, pp. 369–386. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
    Klein, Peter D. 1986b. Immune Belief Systems.” Philosophical Topics 14(1): 259–280.
    Klein, Peter D. 1987. On Behalf of the Skeptic.” in The Possibility of Knowledge. Nozick and His Critics, edited by Steven Luper, pp. 267–281. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield. Published under the name “Luper-Foy”.
    Klein, Peter D. 1990. Epistemic Compatibilism and Canonical Beliefs.” in Doubting: Contemporary Perspectives on Skepticism, edited by Michael D. Roth and Glenn Ross, pp. 99–119. Philosophical Studies Series n. 48. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co.
    Klein, Peter D. 1995. Skepticism and Closure: Why the Evil Genius Argument Fails.” Philosophical Topics 23(1): 213–236.
    Klein, Peter D. 1996. Warrant, Proper Function, Reliabiliism, and Defeasibility.” in Warrant in Contemporary Epistemology. Essays in Honor of Plantinga’s Theory of Knowledge, edited by Jonathan L. Kvanvig, pp. 97–130. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield.
    Klein, Peter D. 1998. Certainty.” in The Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Edward J. Craig. London: Routledge. The Routledge Encyclopedia was made available online in 2002 and is now regularly updated., doi:10.4324/9780415249126-P005-1.
    Klein, Peter D. 1999. Human Knowledge and the Infinite Regress of Reasons.” in Philosophical Perspectives 13: Epistemology, edited by James E. Tomberlin, pp. 297–325. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
    Klein, Peter D. 2000a. Contextualism and Academic Skepticism [on Cohen (2000)].” in Philosophical Issues 10: Skepticism, edited by Ernest Sosa and Enrique Villanueva, pp. 108–116. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
    Klein, Peter D. 2000b. The Failures of Dogmatism and a New Pyrrhonism.” Acta Analytica 15(24): 7–24.
    Klein, Peter D. 2001. Skepticism.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2001/entries/skepticism/.
    Klein, Peter D. 2002. Skepticism.” in The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology, edited by Paul K. Moser, pp. 336–361. Oxford Handbooks. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0195130057.001.0001.
    Klein, Peter D. 2003a. How a Pyrrhonian Skeptic Might Respond to Academic Skepticism.” in The Skeptics: Contemporary Essays, edited by Steven Luper, pp. 75–94. Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate.
    Klein, Peter D. 2003b. Coherence, Knowledge and Skepticism.” in The Epistemology of Keith Lehrer, edited by Erik J. Olsson, pp. 281–298. Philosophical Studies Series n. 95. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
    Klein, Peter D. 2003c. When Infinite Regresses Are Not Vicious.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66(3): 718–729.
    Klein, Peter D. 2004a. Closure Matters: Academic Skepticism and Easy Knowledge.” in Philosophical Issues 14: Epistemology, edited by Ernest Sosa and Enrique Villanueva, pp. 165–184. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
    Klein, Peter D. 2004b. Skepticism: Ascent and Assent? in Ernest Sosa and His Critics, edited by John Greco, pp. 112–125. Philosophers and Their Critics. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, doi:10.1002/9780470756140.
    Klein, Peter D. 2004c. What is Wrong with Foundationalism is that it Cannot Solve the Epistemic Regress Problem.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68(1): 166–171.
    Klein, Peter D. 2005a. Infinitism Is the Solution to the Regress Problem.” in Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, edited by Ernest Sosa and Matthias Steup, 1st ed., pp. 257–276. Contemporary Debates in Philosophy n. 3. Boston, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers. Second edition: Steup, Turri and Sosa (2014, 274–282).
    Klein, Peter D. 2005b. Reply to Ginet (2005).” in Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, edited by Ernest Sosa and Matthias Steup, 1st ed., pp. 292–298. Contemporary Debates in Philosophy n. 3. Boston, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers. Second edition: Steup, Turri and Sosa (2014, 291–294).
    Klein, Peter D. 2005c. Skepticism.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2005/entries/skepticism/.
    Klein, Peter D. 2007a. Human Knowledge and the Infinite Progress of Reasoning.” Philosophical Studies 134(1): 1–17.
    Klein, Peter D. 2007b. How to Be an Infinitist about Doxastic Justification.” Philosophical Studies 134(1): 25–29.
    Klein, Peter D. 2008a. Useful False Beliefs.” in Epistemology: New Essays, edited by Quentin Smith, pp. 25–62. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199264933.001.0001.
    Klein, Peter D. 2008b. Contemporary Responses to Agrippa’s Trilemma.” in The Oxford Handbook of Skepticism, edited by John Greco, pp. 484–503. Oxford Handbooks. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195183214.001.0001.
    Klein, Peter D. 2010. Skepticism.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2010/entries/skepticism/.
    Klein, Peter D. 2011a. Infinitism.” in The Routledge Companion to Epistemology, edited by Sven Bernecker and Duncan Pritchard, pp. 245–256. Routledge Philosophy Companions. London: Routledge.
    Klein, Peter D. 2011b. Epistemic Justification and the Limits of Pyrrhonism.” in Pyrrhonism in Ancient, Modern, and Contemporary Philosophy, edited by Diego E. Machuca, pp. 79–97. The New Synthese Historical Library n. 70. Dordrecht: Springer.
    Klein, Peter D. 2012. What Makes Knowledge the Most Highly Prized Form of True Belief? in The Sensitivity Principle in Epistemology, edited by Kelly Becker and Tim Black, pp. 152–169. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, doi:10.1017/cbo9780511783630.
    Klein, Peter D. 2014a. Infinitism.” in The Bloomsbury Companion to Epistemology, edited by Andrew Cullison, pp. 83–104. Bloomsbury Companions. London: Bloomsbury Academic.
    Klein, Peter D. 2014b. No Final End in Sight.” in Current Controversies in Epistemology, edited by Ram Neta, pp. 95–115. Current Controversies in Philosophy. New York: Routledge.
    Klein, Peter D. 2015. Skepticism.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2015/entries/skepticism/.
    Klein, Peter D. 2017. The Nature of Knowledge.” in Explaining Knowledge. New Essays on the Gettier Problem, edited by Rodrigo Martins Borges, Claudio de Almeida, and Peter Klein, pp. 35–56. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198724551.001.0001.
    Klein, Peter D. 2019. How to Get Certain Knowledge from Fallible Justification.” Episteme 16(4): 395–412.
    Turri, John and Klein, Peter D., eds. 2014. Ad Infinitum. New Essays on Epistemological Infinitism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199609598.001.0001.

Further References

    Cohen, Stewart. 2000. Contextualism and Skepticism.” in Philosophical Issues 10: Skepticism, edited by Ernest Sosa and Enrique Villanueva, pp. 94–107. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
    Ginet, Carl. 2005. Infinitism is Not the Solution to the Regress Problem.” in Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, edited by Ernest Sosa and Matthias Steup, 1st ed., pp. 277–291. Contemporary Debates in Philosophy n. 3. Boston, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers. Second edition: Steup, Turri and Sosa (2014, 283–290).
    Gustafson, Donald F. 1967. Are Strawson’s Persons Immortal? Philosophical Studies 18(3): 45–47.
    Sosa, Ernest and Steup, Matthias, eds. 2005. Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. 1st ed. Contemporary Debates in Philosophy n. 3. Boston, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers. Second edition: Steup, Turri and Sosa (2014).
    Steup, Matthias, Turri, John and Sosa, Ernest, eds. 2014. Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. 2nd ed. Contemporary Debates in Philosophy n. 3. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell. First edition: Sosa and Steup (2005), doi:10.1002/9781394260744.