Clayton Littlejohn (littlejohn-c)

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Contributi a Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Alvarez, Maria and Littlejohn, Clayton. 2017. “When Ignorance is No Excuse.” in Responsibility. The Epistemic Condition, edited by Philip Robichaud and Jan Willem Wieland, pp. 64–81. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198779667.001.0001.
Côté-Bouchard, Charles and Littlejohn, Clayton. 2018. “Knowledge, Reasons, and Errors About Error Theory.” in Metaepistemology. Realism and Anti-Realism, edited by Christos Kyriacou and Robin McKenna, pp. 147–172. Innovations in Philosophy. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Lasonen-Aarnio, Maria and Littlejohn, Clayton, eds. 2024. The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence. Routledge Handbooks. New York: Routledge, doi:10.4324/9781315672687.
Littlejohn, Clayton. 2008. “From E=K to Scepticism?” The Philosophical Quarterly 58(233): 679–684.
Littlejohn, Clayton. 2009a. “ ‘Ought,’ ‘Can,’ and Practical Reasons.” American Philosophical Quarterly 46(4): 363–372.
Littlejohn, Clayton. 2009b. “The Externalist’s Demon.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39(3): 399–434.
Littlejohn, Clayton. 2009c. “On the Coherence of Inversion.” Acta Analytica 24(2): 127–137.
Littlejohn, Clayton. 2011a. “Evidence and Knowledge.” Erkenntnis 74(2): 241–262.
Littlejohn, Clayton. 2011b. “Defeating Phenomenal Conservatism.” Analytic Philosophy 52(1): 35–48.
Littlejohn, Clayton. 2011c. “Evidence and Armchair Access.” Synthese 179(3): 479–500.
Littlejohn, Clayton. 2011d. “Reasons and Belief’s Justification.” in Reasons for Belief, edited by Andrew Reisner and Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen, pp. 111–130. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Littlejohn, Clayton. 2012. Justification and the Truth-Connection. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Littlejohn, Clayton. 2013a. “No Evidence is False.” Acta Analytica 28(2): 145–159.
Littlejohn, Clayton. 2013b. “Disagreement and Defeat.” in Disagreement and Skepticism, edited by Diego E. Machuca, pp. 169–192. Routledge Studies in Contemporary Philosophy n. 46. London: Routledge.
Littlejohn, Clayton. 2013c. “The Russellian Retreat.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 113(3): 293–320.
Littlejohn, Clayton. 2013d. “A Note Concerning Justification and Access.” Episteme 10(4): 369–386.
Littlejohn, Clayton. 2014a. “Know Your Rights: On Warranted Assertion and Truth.” Erkenntnis 79(6): 1355–1365.
Littlejohn, Clayton. 2014b. “Introduction.” in Epistemic Norms. New Essays on Action, Belief, and Assertion, edited by Clayton Littlejohn and John Turri, pp. 1–10. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199660025.001.0001.
Littlejohn, Clayton. 2014c. “The Unity of Reason.” in Epistemic Norms. New Essays on Action, Belief, and Assertion, edited by Clayton Littlejohn and John Turri, pp. 135–154. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199660025.001.0001.
Littlejohn, Clayton. 2014d. “Fake Barns and False Dilemmas.” Episteme 11(4): 369–389.
Littlejohn, Clayton. 2015a. “Who Cares What You Accurately Believe?” in Philosophical Perspectives 29: Epistemology, edited by John Hawthorne, pp. 217–248. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley; Sons, Inc.
Littlejohn, Clayton. 2015b. “Knowledge and Awareness [on Pritchard (2012)].” Analysis 75(4): 596–603.
Littlejohn, Clayton. 2017. “How and Why Knowledge is First.” in Knowledge First. Approaches in Epistemology and Mind, edited by J. Adam Carter, Emma C. Gordon, and Benjamin W. Jarvis, pp. 19–45. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198716310.001.0001.
Littlejohn, Clayton. 2018a. “Evidence and Its Limits.” in Normativity: Epistemic and Practical, edited by Conor McHugh, Jonathan Way, and Daniel Whiting, pp. 115–136. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198758709.001.0001.
Littlejohn, Clayton. 2018b. “Stop Making Sense? On a Puzzle About Rationality.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96(2): 257–272, doi:10.1111/phpr.12271.
Littlejohn, Clayton. 2018c. “The Right in the Good: A Defense of Teleological Non-Consequentialism.” in Epistemic Consequentialism, edited by Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij and Jeffrey Dunn, pp. 23–47. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198779681.001.0001.
Littlejohn, Clayton. 2018d. “Objectivism and Subjectivism in Epistemology.” in The Factive Turn in Epistemology, edited by Veli Mitova, pp. 142–160. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, doi:10.1017/9781316818992.
Littlejohn, Clayton. 2018e. “Reasons and Theoretical Rationality.” in The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity, edited by Daniel Star, pp. 529–552. Oxford Handbooks. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199657889.013.24.
Littlejohn, Clayton. 2018f. “Knowledge and Normativity.” in The Philosophy of Knowledge: A History, Volume 4: Knowledge in Contemporary Philosophy, edited by Stephen Cade Hetherington and Markos Valaris, pp. 249–268. London: Bloomsbury Academic, doi:10.5040/9781474258814.
Littlejohn, Clayton. 2018g. “Gettier Cases and Evidence.” in The Gettier Problem, edited by Stephen Cade Hetherington, pp. 48–65. Classic Philosophical Arguments. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, doi:10.1017/9781316827413.
Littlejohn, Clayton. 2020a. “Moore’s Paradox and Assertion.” in The Oxford Handbook of Assertion, edited by Sanford C. Goldberg, pp. 707–725. Oxford Handbooks. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190675233.001.0001.
Littlejohn, Clayton. 2020b. “Do You See What I Know? On Reasons, Perceptual Evidence, and Epistemic Status.” in Philosophical Issues 30: Perceptual Evidence, edited by Matthew McGrath and Susanna Schellenberg, pp. 205–220. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley; Sons, Inc., doi:10.1111/phis.12181.
Littlejohn, Clayton. 2021. “Eleven Angry Men.” in Philosophical Issues 31: Law and Epistemology, edited by Alexander A. Guerrero, pp. 227–239. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley; Sons, Inc., doi:10.1111/phis.12197.
Littlejohn, Clayton and Turri, John, eds. 2014. Epistemic Norms. New Essays on Action, Belief, and Assertion. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199660025.001.0001.

Further References

Pritchard, Duncan. 2012. Epistemological Disjunctivism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199557912.001.0001.