Dan Marshall (marshall-d)

Email: look4dan(at)gmail.com, danmarshall(at)ln.edu.hk

Menzionato/a in queste pagine del portale

Articles of Dialectica, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Philosophers' Imprint, Responsibility First: How to Resist Agnosticism about Moral Responsibility, Self-Knowledge and Interpersonal Reasoning, Avner Baz's Ordinary Language Challenge to the Philosophical Method of Cases, Lewisian Worlds and Buridanian Possibilia, Weakly Discerning Vertices in a Plenitude of Graphs

Citato nei seguenti articoli

The Dual Detector Argument against the Modal Theory

Contributi a Philosophie.ch

The Dual Detector Argument against the Modal Theory

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Bibliography

Marshall, Dan. 2009. “Can ‘Intrinsic’ Be Defined Using Only Broadly Logical Notions?” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78(3): 646–672.

Marshall, Dan. 2012. “Analyses of Intrinsicality in Terms of Naturalness.” Philosophy Compass 7(8): 531–542.

Marshall, Dan. 2013. “Analyses of Intrinsicality without Naturalness.” Philosophy Compass 8(2): 186–197.

Marshall, Dan. 2014. “Yablo’s Account of Intrinsicality.” in A Companion to Intrinsic Properties, edited by Robert M. Francescotti, pp. 199–220. Berlin: de Gruyter.

Marshall, Dan. 2015. “Humean Laws and Explanation.” Philosophical Studies 172(12): 3145–3165.

Marshall, Dan. 2016a. “An Analysis of Intrinsicality.” Noûs 50(4): 704–739.

Marshall, Dan. 2016b. “A Puzzle for Modal Realism.” Philosophers' imprint 16(19).

Marshall, Dan. 2021. “Causation and Fact Granularity.” Synthese 199(3-4): 8029–8045, doi:10.1007/s11229-021-03151-2.

Marshall, Dan. 2022a. “The Dual Detector Argument against the Modal Theory.” Dialectica 76(4), doi:10.48106/dial.v76.i4.04.

Marshall, Dan. 2022b. “A Temporal Comparison Argument for Presentism.” in Philosophical Perspectives 36: Metaphysics, edited by John Hawthorne and Jason Turner, pp. 182–215. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley; Sons, Inc., doi:10.1111/phpe.12173.

Marshall, Dan and Parsons, Josh. 2001. “Langton and Lewis on ‘Intrinsic’ .” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63(2): 347–352.

Marshall, Dan and Weatherson, Brian. 2018. “Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Properties.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/intrinsic-extrinsic/.

Marshall, Dan and Weatherson, Brian. 2023. “Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Properties.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2023/entries/intrinsic-extrinsic/.

Weatherson, Brian and Marshall, Dan. 2012. “Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Properties.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2013/entries/intrinsic-extrinsic/.