Dan Marshall (marshall-d)

Email: look4dan(at)gmail.com, danmarshall(at)ln.edu.hk

Auf folgenden Portalseiten erwähnt

Articles of Dialectica, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Philosophers' Imprint, Responsibility First: How to Resist Agnosticism about Moral Responsibility, Self-Knowledge and Interpersonal Reasoning, Avner Baz's Ordinary Language Challenge to the Philosophical Method of Cases, Lewisian Worlds and Buridanian Possibilia, Weakly Discerning Vertices in a Plenitude of Graphs

Zitiert in den folgenden Artikeln

The Dual Detector Argument against the Modal Theory

Beiträge zu Philosophie.ch

The Dual Detector Argument against the Modal Theory

Beta version. This is a page made for testing purposes. For the official version of the article, please visit to OJS webpage at https://dialectica.philosophie.ch/.

Bibliography

Marshall, Dan. 2009. “Can ‘Intrinsic’ Be Defined Using Only Broadly Logical Notions?” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78(3): 646–672.

Marshall, Dan. 2012. “Analyses of Intrinsicality in Terms of Naturalness.” Philosophy Compass 7(8): 531–542.

Marshall, Dan. 2013. “Analyses of Intrinsicality without Naturalness.” Philosophy Compass 8(2): 186–197.

Marshall, Dan. 2014. “Yablo’s Account of Intrinsicality.” in A Companion to Intrinsic Properties, edited by Robert M. Francescotti, pp. 199–220. Berlin: de Gruyter.

Marshall, Dan. 2015. “Humean Laws and Explanation.” Philosophical Studies 172(12): 3145–3165.

Marshall, Dan. 2016a. “An Analysis of Intrinsicality.” Noûs 50(4): 704–739.

Marshall, Dan. 2016b. “A Puzzle for Modal Realism.” Philosophers' imprint 16(19).

Marshall, Dan. 2021. “Causation and Fact Granularity.” Synthese 199(3-4): 8029–8045, doi:10.1007/s11229-021-03151-2.

Marshall, Dan. 2022a. “The Dual Detector Argument against the Modal Theory.” Dialectica 76(4), doi:10.48106/dial.v76.i4.04.

Marshall, Dan. 2022b. “A Temporal Comparison Argument for Presentism.” in Philosophical Perspectives 36: Metaphysics, edited by John Hawthorne and Jason Turner, pp. 182–215. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley; Sons, Inc., doi:10.1111/phpe.12173.

Marshall, Dan and Parsons, Josh. 2001. “Langton and Lewis on ‘Intrinsic’ .” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63(2): 347–352.

Marshall, Dan and Weatherson, Brian. 2018. “Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Properties.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/intrinsic-extrinsic/.

Marshall, Dan and Weatherson, Brian. 2023. “Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Properties.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2023/entries/intrinsic-extrinsic/.

Weatherson, Brian and Marshall, Dan. 2012. “Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Properties.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2013/entries/intrinsic-extrinsic/.