Andrew Reisner
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Bibliography
Hirose, Iwao and Reisner, Andrew, eds. 2015. Weighing and Reasoning. Themes from the Philosophy of John Broome. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199684908.001.0001.
Reisner, Andrew. 2007. “Evidentialism and the Numbers Game.” Theoria 73(4): 304–316.
Reisner, Andrew. 2008. “Weighing Pragmatic and Evidential Reasons for Belief.” Philosophical Studies 138(1): 17–27.
Reisner, Andrew. 2009a. “The Possibility of Pragmatic Reasons for Belief and the Wrong Kind of Reason Problem.” Philosophical Studies 145(2): 257–272.
Reisner, Andrew. 2009b. “Abandoning the Buck-Passing Analysis of Final Value.” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12(4): 379–395.
Reisner, Andrew. 2009c. “Unifying the Requirements of Rationality.” Philosophical Explorations: An International Journal for the Philosophy of Mind and Action 12(3): 243–260.
Reisner, Andrew. 2011. “Is there Reason to Be Theoretically Rational?” in Reasons for Belief, edited by Andrew Reisner and Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen, pp. 34–53. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Reisner, Andrew. 2014. “Leaps of Knowledge.” in The Aim of Belief, edited by Timothy Chan, pp. 167–183. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199672134.001.0001.
Reisner, Andrew. 2015a. “Normative Conflicts and the Structure of Normativity.” in Weighing and Reasoning. Themes from the Philosophy of John Broome, edited by Iwao Hirose and Andrew Reisner, pp. 189–206. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199684908.001.0001.
Reisner, Andrew. 2015b. “A Short Refutation of Strict Normative Evidentialism.” Inquiry 58(5): 477–485.
Reisner, Andrew. 2015c. “Fittingness, Value, and Trans-World Attitudes.” The Philosophical Quarterly 65(260): 464–485.
Reisner, Andrew. 2018a. “Two Theses about the Distinctness of Practical and Theoretical Normativity.” in Normativity: Epistemic and Practical, edited by Conor McHugh, Jonathan Way, and Daniel Whiting, pp. 221–239. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198758709.001.0001.
Reisner, Andrew. 2018b. “Pragmatic Reasons for Belief.” in The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity, edited by Daniel Star, pp. 705–730. Oxford Handbooks. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199657889.001.0001.
Reisner, Andrew and Steglich-Petersen, Asbjørn, eds. 2011a. Reasons for Belief. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Reisner, Andrew and Steglich-Petersen, Asbjørn. 2011b. “Introduction.” in Reasons for Belief, edited by Andrew Reisner and Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen, pp. 1–10. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.