Hartry Field (field-h)

Mentioned on the following portal pages

Contributions to Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Field, Hartry. 1972. “Tarski’s Theory of Truth.” The Journal of Philosophy 69(13): 347–375. Reprinted in Platts (1980, 83–110), Field (2001a, 3–26) and Jacquette (2002).
Field, Hartry. 1973. “Theory Change and the Indeterminacy of Reference.” The Journal of Philosophy 70: 462–481. Reprinted in Field (2001a, 177–193).
Field, Hartry. 1974. “Quine and the Correspondence Theory.” The Philosophical Review 83: 200–228. Reprinted in Field (2001a, 199–215).
Field, Hartry. 1975. “Conventionalism and Instrumentalism in Semantics.” Noûs 9(4): 375–405.
Field, Hartry. 1977. “Logic, Meaning, and Conceptual Role.” The Journal of Philosophy 74: 379–408.
Field, Hartry. 1978a. “Mental Representation.” Erkenntnis 13: 9–61. Reprinted in Field (2001a, 30–67).
Field, Hartry. 1978b. “A Note on Jeffrey Conditionalization.” Philosophy of Science 45: 361–367.
Field, Hartry. 1980. Science without Numbers: A Defense of Nominalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Second edition: Field (2016b), doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198777915.001.0001.
Field, Hartry. 1982a. “Realism and Relativism [on Putnam (1981)].” The Journal of Philosophy 79(10): 553–567.
Field, Hartry. 1982b. “Realism and Anti-Realism About Mathematics.” Philosophical Topics 13(1): 45–69. Reprinted, with a postscript, in Field (1989, 53–78).
Field, Hartry. 1984a. “Is Mathematical Knowledge Just Logical Knowledge?” The Philosophical Review 93: 509–552. Reprinted in revised form and with a postscript, in Field (1989, 79–124).
Field, Hartry. 1984b. “Platonism for Cheap? Crispin Wright (1983) on Frege’s Context Principle.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 14(4): 637–662. Reprinted in Field (1989, 147–170).
Field, Hartry. 1984c. “Review of Gottlieb (1980).” Noûs 18: 160–165.
Field, Hartry. 1985a. “Can we Dispense with Space-Time?” in PSA 1984: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, Part II: Symposium Papers, edited by Peter D. Asquith and Philip Kitcher, pp. 33–90. East Lansing, Michigan: Philosophy of Science Association.
Field, Hartry. 1985b. “On Conservativeness and Incompleteness.” The Journal of Philosophy 82: 239–260. Reprinted in Field (1989, 125–146).
Field, Hartry. 1986a. “The Deflationary Conception of Truth.” in Fact, Science, and Morality: Essays On A.J. Ayer’s “Language, Truth, and Logic” , edited by Graham F. Macdonald and Crispin Wright, pp. 55–117. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Field, Hartry. 1986b. “Stalnaker on Intentionality: On Robert Stalnaker’s Inquiry.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 67(2): 98–112. Reprinted in Field (2001a, 83–103).
Field, Hartry. 1986c. “Critical Notice of Stalnaker (1984).” Philosophy of Science 53: 425–448. Reprinted in Field (2001a).
Field, Hartry. 1988. “Realism, Mathematics, and Modality.” Philosophical Topics 16(1): 57–107. Reprinted in revised form in Field (1989, 227–281).
Field, Hartry. 1989. Realism, Mathematics, and Modality. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Field, Hartry. 1990a. “Mathematics and Modality.” in Meaning and Method – Essays in Honour of Hilary Putnam, edited by George Boolos, pp. 213–234. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Field, Hartry. 1990b. “Narrow Aspects of Intentionality and the Information-Theoretic Approach to Content.” in Information, Semantics, and Epistemology, edited by Enrique Villanueva, pp. 102–116. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Field, Hartry. 1990c. “Mathematics without Truth (a Reply to Maddy).” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 71: 206–222.
Field, Hartry. 1991. “Metalogic and Modality.” Philosophical Studies 62: 1–22.
Field, Hartry. 1992a. “Physicalism.” in Inference, Explanation and Other Philosophical Frustrations, edited by John S. Earman, pp. 271–292. Berkeley, California: University of California Press.
Field, Hartry. 1992b. “A Nominalistic Proof of the Conservativeness of Set Theory.” The Journal of Philosophical Logic 21(2): 111–123.
Field, Hartry. 1992c. “Critical Notice of Horwich (1990).” Philosophy of Science 59(2): 321–330.
Field, Hartry. 1993. “The Conceptual Contingency of Mathematical Objects.” Mind 102(411): 285–299.
Field, Hartry. 1994a. “Deflationist Views of Meaning and Content.” Mind 103(411): 249–285. Reprinted in Field (2001a, 104–140) and, with Field (2001d), in Armour-Garb and Beall (2005, 50–91).
Field, Hartry. 1994b. “Are Our Logical and Mathematical Concepts Highly Indeterminate?” in Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19: Philosophical Naturalism, edited by Peter A. French, Theodore E. Uehling Jr., and Howard K. Wettstein, pp. 391–429. Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press.
Field, Hartry. 1994c. “Disquotational Truth and Factually Defective Discourse.” The Philosophical Review 103: 405–452. Reprinted in Field (2001a, 222–258).
Field, Hartry. 1996. “The A Prioricity of Logic.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 96: 359–379.
Field, Hartry. 1998a. “Which Undecidable Mathematical Sentences Have Determinate Truth Values?” in Truth in Mathematics, edited by H. Garth Dales and Gianluigi Oliveri, pp. 291–310. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Reprinted in Field (2001a, 332–350).
Field, Hartry. 1998b. “Epistemological Nonfactualism and the A Prioricity of Logic.” Philosophical Studies 92(1–2): 1–24.
Field, Hartry. 1998c. “Some Thoughts on Radical Indeterminacy.” The Monist 81(2): 253–273. Reprinted in Field (2001a, 259–274).
Field, Hartry. 1998d. “Mathematical Objectivity and Mathematical Objects.” in Contemporary Readings in the Foundations of Metaphysics, edited by Stephen Laurence and Cynthia Macdonald, pp. 387–403. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. Reprinted in Field (2001a, 315–331).
Field, Hartry. 1998e. “Do we have a Determinate Conception of Finiteness and Natural Number?” in The Philosophy of Mathematics Today, edited by Matthias Schirn, pp. 99–129. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198236542.001.0001.
Field, Hartry. 1999. “Deflating the Conservativeness Argument.” The Journal of Philosophy 96(10): 533–540.
Field, Hartry. 2000a. “Apriority as an Evaluative Notion.” in New Essays on the A Priori, edited by Paul Artin Boghossian and Christopher Peacocke, pp. 117–149. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Reprinted in Field (2001a, 361–387), doi:10.1093/0199241279.001.0001.
Field, Hartry. 2000b. “Indeterminacy, Degree of Belief, and Excluded Middle.” Noûs 34(1): 1–30. Reprinted in Field (2001a, 278–306).
Field, Hartry. 2001a. Truth and the Absence of Facts. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0199242895.001.0001.
Field, Hartry. 2001b. “Postscript to Field (1972).” in Truth and the Absence of Facts, pp. 27–29. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0199242895.001.0001.
Field, Hartry. 2001c. “Postscript to Field (1978a).” in Truth and the Absence of Facts, pp. 68–82. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0199242895.001.0001.
Field, Hartry. 2001d. “Postscript to Field (1994a).” in Truth and the Absence of Facts, pp. 141–156. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0199242895.001.0001.
Field, Hartry. 2001e. “Attributions of Meaning and Content.” in Truth and the Absence of Facts, pp. 157–175. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0199242895.001.0001.
Field, Hartry. 2001f. “Postscript to Field (1973).” in Truth and the Absence of Facts, pp. 194–198. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0199242895.001.0001.
Field, Hartry. 2001g. “Appendix: Indeterminacy in the Metalanguage.” in Truth and the Absence of Facts, pp. 216–218. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0199242895.001.0001.
Field, Hartry. 2001h. “Postscript to Field (1974).” in Truth and the Absence of Facts, pp. 219–221. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0199242895.001.0001.
Field, Hartry. 2001i. “Postscript to Field (2000b).” in Truth and the Absence of Facts, pp. 307–314. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0199242895.001.0001.
Field, Hartry. 2001j. “Postscript [to Field (1998a)]: Categoricity Arguments.” in Truth and the Absence of Facts, pp. 351–360. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0199242895.001.0001.
Field, Hartry. 2001k. “Appendix: Rules and Basic Rules.” in Truth and the Absence of Facts, pp. 388–391. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0199242895.001.0001.
Field, Hartry. 2002. “Saving the Truth Schema from Paradox.” The Journal of Philosophical Logic 31(1): 1–27.
Field, Hartry. 2003a. “Causation in a Physical World.” in The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics, edited by Michael J. Loux and Dean W. Zimmerman, pp. 435–460. Oxford Handbooks. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199284221.001.0001.
Field, Hartry. 2003b. “The Semantic Paradoxes and the Paradoxes of Vagueness.” in Liars and Heaps: New Essays on Paradox, edited by J. C. Beall, pp. 262–311. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Field, Hartry. 2003c. “A Revenge-Immune Solution to the Semantic Paradoxes.” The Journal of Philosophical Logic 32(2): 139–177.
Field, Hartry. 2003d. “No Fact of the Matter.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81(4): 457–480.
Field, Hartry. 2004a. “Variations on a Theme by Yablo.” in Deflationism and Paradox, edited by J. C. Beall and Bradley Armour-Garb, pp. 53–73. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780199287116.001.0001.
Field, Hartry. 2004b. “The Consistency of the Naı̈ve Theory of Properties.” The Philosophical Quarterly 54(214): 78–104. Reprinted in Link (2004, 285–310).
Field, Hartry. 2004c. “Is the Liar Sentence Both True and False?” in Deflationism and Paradox, edited by J. C. Beall and Bradley Armour-Garb, pp. 23–40. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780199287116.001.0001.
Field, Hartry. 2005a. “Précis of Field (2001a).” Philosophical Studies 124(1): 41–44.
Field, Hartry. 2005b. “A Reply to Gupta and Martinez-Fernández (2005).” Philosophical Studies 124(1): 105–128.
Field, Hartry. 2005c. “Postscript to [the reprint of] Field (1994a).” in Deflationary Truth, edited by Bradley Armour-Garb and J. C. Beall, pp. 92–110. LaSalle, Illinois: Open Court Publishing Co.
Field, Hartry. 2005d. “Recent Debates about the A Priori.” in Oxford Studies in Epistemology, volume I, edited by Tamar Szabó Gendler and John Hawthorne, pp. 69–88. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780199285891.001.0001.
Field, Hartry. 2006a. “Maudlin’s ‘Truth and Paradox’ [on Maudlin (2004)].” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73(3): 713–720.
Field, Hartry. 2006b. “Truth and the Unprovability of Consistency.” Mind 115(459): 567–?
Field, Hartry. 2006c. “Compositional Principles Versus Schematic Reasoning.” The Monist 89(1): 9–27.
Field, Hartry. 2007. “Solving the Paradoxes, Escaping Revenge.” in Revenge of the Liar. New Essays on the Paradox, edited by J. C. Beall, pp. 78–144. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780199233915.003.0004.
Field, Hartry. 2008. Saving Truth From Paradox. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199230747.001.0001.
Field, Hartry. 2009a. “Epistemology without Metaphysics.” Philosophical Studies 143(2): 249–290.
Field, Hartry. 2009b. “What is the Normative Role of Logic?” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 83: 251–268.
Field, Hartry. 2009c. “La théorie de la vérité de Tarski.” in Philosophie de la logique: Conséquence, preuve et vérité, edited by Denis Bonnay and Mikaël Cozic, pp. 287–328. Textes clés. Paris: Librairie philosophique Jean Vrin. Traduction de Field (1972).
Field, Hartry. 2009d. “Pluralism in Logic.” The Review of Symbolic Logic 2(2): 342–359, doi:10.1017/s1755020309090182.
Field, Hartry. 2010a. “The Magic Moment: Horwich on the Boundaries of Vague Terms.” in Cuts and Clouds. Vagueness, Its Nature, and Its Logic, edited by Richard Dietz and Sebastiano Moruzzi, pp. 200–208. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199570386.001.0001.
Field, Hartry. 2010b. “Précis of Field (2008).” Philosophical Studies 147(3): 415–420.
Field, Hartry. 2010c. “Replies to Commentators [McGee (2010), Restall (2010) and Shapiro (2010)].” Philosophical Studies 147(3): 457–470.
Field, Hartry. 2011a. “Introduction to Author Meets Critics Session on Field (2008).” The Review of Symbolic Logic 4(3): 337–338.
Field, Hartry. 2011b. “Comments on Martin’s and Welch’s Comments [Martin (2011) and Welch (2011)].” The Review of Symbolic Logic 4(3): 360–366.
Field, Hartry. 2014. “Naı̈ve Truth and Restricted Quantification: Saving Truth a Whole Lot Better.” The Review of Symbolic Logic 7(1): 147–191.
Field, Hartry. 2015a. “What is Logical Validity?” in Foundations of Logical Consequence, edited by Colin R. Caret and Ole Thomassen Hjortland, pp. 33–70. Mind Association Occasional Series. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198715696.001.0001.
Field, Hartry. 2015b. “Mathematical Undecidables, Metaphysical Realism, and Equivalent Descriptions.” in The Philosophy of Hilary Putnam, edited by Randall E. Auxier, Douglas R. Anderson, and Lewis Edwin Hahn, pp. 145–172. The Library of Living Philosophers n. 34. LaSalle, Illinois: Open Court Publishing Co.
Field, Hartry. 2016a. “Vagueness, Partial Belief, and Logic.” in Meanings and Other Things. Themes from the Work of Stephen Schiffer, edited by Gary Ostertag, pp. 172–189. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199684939.001.0001.
Field, Hartry. 2016b. Science without Numbers: A Defense of Nominalism. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press. First edition: Field (1980), doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198777915.001.0001.
Field, Hartry. 2018. “Epistemology from an Evaluativist Perspective.” Philosophers' imprint 18(12).
Field, Hartry. 2019. “Paraconsistent or Paracomplete?” in Graham Priest on Dialetheism and Paraconsistency, edited by Can Başkent and Thomas Macaulay Ferguson, pp. 73–126. Cham: Springer Nature, doi:10.1007/978-3-030-25365-3.

Further References

Armour-Garb, Bradley and Beall, J. C., eds. 2005. Deflationary Truth. LaSalle, Illinois: Open Court Publishing Co.
Gottlieb, Dale V. 1980. Ontological Economy: Substitutional Quantification and Mathematics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Gupta, Anil and Martinez-Fernández, José. 2005. “Field on the Concept of Truth – Comment [review of Field (2001a)].” Philosophical Studies 124(1): 45–58.
Horwich, Paul. 1990. Truth. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. Second edition: Horwich (1998).
Horwich, Paul. 1998. Truth. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press. First edition: Horwich (1990), doi:10.1093/0198752237.001.0001.
Jacquette, Dale, ed. 2002. Philosophy of Logic: An Anthology. Blackwell Philosophy Anthologies. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Link, Godehard, ed. 2004. One Hundred Years of Russell’s Paradox. Mathematics, Logic, Philosophy. de Gruyter Series in Logic and Its Applications n. 6. Berlin: de Gruyter.
Martin, Donald A. 2011. “Field’s Saving Truth from Paradox: Some Things it Doesn’t Do [on Field (2008)].” The Review of Symbolic Logic 4(3): 339–347.
Maudlin, Tim. 2004. Truth and Paradox. Solving the Riddles. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0199247293.001.0001.
McGee, Vann. 2010. “Field’s Logic of Truth.” Philosophical Studies 147(3): 421–432.
Platts, Mark, ed. 1980. Reference, Truth, and Reality: Essays on the Philosophy of Language. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Putnam, Hilary. 1981. Reason, Truth and History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, doi:10.1017/cbo9780511625398.
Restall, Greg. 2010. “What are we to Accept, and What are We to Reject, While Saving Truth from Paradox?” Philosophical Studies 147(3): 433–443.
Shapiro, Stewart. 2010. “So Truth is Safe from Paradox: Now What?” Philosophical Studies 147(3): 445–455.
Stalnaker, Robert C. 1984. Inquiry. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Welch, Philip D. 2011. “Truth, Logical Validity and Determinateness: A commentary on Field (2008).” The Review of Symbolic Logic 4(3): 348–359.
Wright, Crispin. 1983. Frege’s Conception of Numbers as Objects. Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press.