Greg Restall (restall)

Mentioned on the following portal pages

Contributions to Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Asmus, Conrad M. and Restall, Greg. 2012. “History of the Consequence Relation.” in Handbook of the History of Logic. Volume 11: Logic: A History of its Central Concepts, edited by Dov M. Gabbay, Francis Jeffry Pelletier, and John Woods, pp. 11–62. Amsterdam: Elsevier Science Publishers B.V.
Beall, J. C. and Restall, Greg. 2000. “Logical Pluralism.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78(4): 475–493.
Beall, J. C. and Restall, Greg. 2005. “Logical Consequence.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2005/entries/logical-consequence/.
Beall, J. C. and Restall, Greg. 2006. Logical Pluralism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199288403.001.0001.
Beall, J. C. and Restall, Greg. 2013. “Logical Consequence.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2013/entries/logical-consequence/.
Beall, J. C., Restall, Greg and Sagi, Gil. 2019. “Logical Consequence.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2019/entries/logical-consequence/.
Bı́lková, Marta, Majer, Ondrej, Peliš, Michal and Restall, Greg. 2010. “Relevant Agents.” in Advances in Modal Logic, volume VIII, edited by Lev D. Beklemishev, Valentin Goranko, and Valentin Shehtman, pp. 22–38. London: King’s College Publications.
Dunn, Michael J. and Restall, Greg. 2002. “Relevance Logic.” in Handbook of Philosophical Logic, Volume VI, edited by Dov M. Gabbay and Franz Guenthner, 2nd ed., pp. 1–128. Dordrecht: Springer. First publication as Dunn (1986).
Mares, Edwin D., Seligman, Jerry and Restall, Greg. 2011. “Situations, Constraints and Channels.” in Handbook of Logic and Language, edited by Johan van Benthem and Alice G. B. ter Meulen, 2nd ed., pp. 329–344. Amsterdam: Elsevier Science Publishers B.V. First edition: van Benthem and ter Meulen (1997).
Meyer, Robert K. and Restall, Greg. 1999. “‘Strenge’ Arithmetics.” Logique et Analyse 42(167–168): 205–220.
Nolan, Daniel Patrick, Restall, Greg and West, Caroline. 2005. “Moral Fictionalism Versus the Rest.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83(3): 307–330.
Poggiolesi, Francesca and Restall, Greg. 2012. “Interpreting and Applying Proof Theories for Modal Logic.” in New Waves in Philosophical Logic, edited by Greg Restall and Gillian K. Russell, pp. 39–62. New Waves in Philosophy. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.
Restall, Greg. 1992a. “Arithmetic and Truth in Lukasiewicz’s Infinitely Valued Logic.” Logique et Analyse 35(139–140): 303–312.
Restall, Greg. 1992b. “A Note on Naive Set Theory in LP .” Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 33(3): 422–432, doi:10.1305/ndjfl/1093634406.
Restall, Greg. 1993a. “Modalities in Substructural Logics.” Logique et Analyse 36(141–142): 25–38.
Restall, Greg. 1993b. “Simplified Semantics for Relevant Logics (and Some of Their Rivals).” The Journal of Philosophical Logic 22(5): 481–511.
Restall, Greg. 1995. “Four-Valued Semantics for Relevant Logics (and Some of Their Rivals).” The Journal of Philosophical Logic 24(2): 139–160.
Restall, Greg. 1996a. “Truthmakers, Entailment and Necessity.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74(2): 331–340, doi:10.1080/00048409612347331.
Restall, Greg. 1996b. “Information Flow and Relevant Logics.” in Logic, Language and Computation .Volume 1, edited by Jerry Seligman and Dag Westerståhl, pp. 463–478. CSLI Lecture Notes n. 58. Stanford, California: CSLI Publications.
Restall, Greg. 1996c. “Notes on Situation Theory and Channel Theory.” Notes for some Workshop on Situation Theory, 16.7.1996.
Restall, Greg. 1996d. “Łukasiewicz, Supervaluations, and the Future.” tr–arp–21–96. Canberra: Automated Reasoning Project, Australian National University.
Restall, Greg. 1997a. “Ways Things Can’t Be.” Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 38: 583–596.
Restall, Greg. 1997b. “Combining Possibilities and Negations.” Studia Logica: An International Journal for Symbolic Logic 59(1): 121–141.
Restall, Greg. 1997c. “Review of Lavine (1994) and Shapiro (1996).” Unpublished manuscript.
Restall, Greg. 1997d. “Review of Akama (1997).” Unpublished manuscript.
Restall, Greg. 1998. “Displaying and Deciding Substructural Logics I: Logics with Contraposition.” The Journal of Philosophical Logic 27(2): 179–216.
Restall, Greg. 1999a. An Introduction to Substructural Logics. London: Routledge.
Restall, Greg. 1999b. “Review of Hansen (1996).” Studia Logica: An International Journal for Symbolic Logic 63(1): 426–429.
Restall, Greg. 1999c. “Negation in Relevant Logics (How I Stopped Worrying and Learned to Love the Routley Star).” in What is Negation?, edited by Dov M. Gabbay and Heinrich Theodor Wansing, pp. 53–76. Applied Logic Series n. 13. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Restall, Greg. 2000a. “Modelling Truthmaking.” Logique et Analyse 43(169–170): 211–230.
Restall, Greg. 2000b. “Substructural Logics.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2000/entries/logic-substructural/.
Restall, Greg. 2001a. “Constructive Logic, Truth and Warranted Assertability.” The Philosophical Quarterly 51.
Restall, Greg. 2001b. “Substructural Logics.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2001/entries/logic-substructural/.
Restall, Greg. 2002a. “Carnap’s Tolerance, Meaning and Logical Pluralism.” The Journal of Philosophy 99(8): 426–443.
Restall, Greg. 2002b. “Paraconsistency Everywhere.” Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 43(3): 147–156.
Restall, Greg. 2003a. “Just What Is Full-Blooded Platonism?” Philosophia Mathematica 11(1): 82–91.
Restall, Greg. 2003b. “Review of Varzi (1999).” Studia Logica: An International Journal for Symbolic Logic 73: 445–448.
Restall, Greg. 2003c. “Review of Wansing (1998).” Studia Logica: An International Journal for Symbolic Logic 71. Unpublished manuscript.
Restall, Greg. 2004a. “One Way to Face Facts.” The Philosophical Quarterly 54(216): 420–426.
Restall, Greg. 2004b. “Minimalists about Truth Can (and Should) Be Epistemicists, and it Helps if They Are Revision Theorists too.” in Deflationism and Paradox, edited by J. C. Beall and Bradley Armour-Garb, pp. 97–106. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780199287116.001.0001.
Restall, Greg. 2004c. “Laws of Non-Contradiction, Laws of the Excluded Middle and Logics.” in The Law of Non-Contradiction: New Philosophical Essays, edited by Graham Priest, J. C. Beall, and Bradley Armour-Garb, pp. 73–84. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199265176.001.0001.
Restall, Greg. 2004d. “Logical Pluralism and the Preservation of Warrant.” in Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science, volume 1, edited by Shahid Rahman, John Symons, Dov M. Gabbay, and Jean Paul van Bendegem, pp. 163–174. Dordrecht: Springer.
Restall, Greg. 2005. “Multiple Conclusions.” in Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science XII: Proceedings of the Twelfth International Congress, Oviedo 2003, edited by Petr Hájek, Luis M. Valdés Villanueva, and Dag Westerståhl, pp. 1191–1131. London: King’s College Publications.
Restall, Greg. 2006a. Logic: An Introduction. Fundamentals of Philosophy. London: Routledge.
Restall, Greg. 2006b. “Relevant and Substructural Logics.” in Handbook of the History of Logic. Volume 7: Logic and the Modalities in the 20th Century, edited by Dov M. Gabbay and John Woods, pp. 289–398. Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Co.
Restall, Greg. 2007a. “Curry’s Revenge: The Costs of Non-classical Solutions to the Paradoxes of Self-reference.” in Revenge of the Liar. New Essays on the Paradox, edited by J. C. Beall, pp. 262–271. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780199233915.001.0001.
Restall, Greg. 2007b. “Multiple Conclusions.” Analysis and Metaphysics 6.
Restall, Greg. 2007c. “Proofnets for S5: Sequents and Circuits for Modal Logic.” in Logic Colloquium 2005: Proceedings of the Annual European Summer Meeting of the Association for Symbolic Logic, Held in Athens, Greece, July 28 – August 3, 2005, edited by Costas Dimitracopoulos, Ludomir Newelski, Dag Normann, and John R. Steel, pp. 151–172. Lecture Notes in Logic n. 28. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Restall, Greg. 2008a. “Models for Liars in Bradwardine’s Theory of Truth.” in Unity, Truth and the Liar: The Modern Relevance of Medieval Solutions to the Liar Paradox, edited by Shahid Rahman, Tero Tulenheimo, and Emmanuel J. Genot, pp. 135–146. Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science n. 8. Berlin: Springer.
Restall, Greg. 2008b. “Modal Models for Bradwardine’sTtheory of Truth.” The Review of Symbolic Logic 1(2): 225–240.
Restall, Greg. 2008c. “Substructural Logics.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2008/entries/logic-substructural/.
Restall, Greg. 2008d. “Proof Theory and Meaning: On Second-Order Logic.” in The Logica Yearbook 2007, edited by Michal Peliš, pp. 157–170. Praha: Filosofia. Nakladetelstvı́ Filosofického ústavu AV ČR.
Restall, Greg. 2008e. “Assertion and Denial, Commitment and Entitlement, and Incompatibility (and Some Consequence).” Studies in Logical Theory 1: 26–36.
Restall, Greg. 2009a. “Postscript to Restall (1996a).” in Truth and Truth-Making, edited by Edward Jonathan Lowe and Adolf Rami, pp. 98–101. Stocksfield: Acumen Publishing.
Restall, Greg. 2009b. “Not Every Truth Can Be Known (at least, not all at once).” in, pp. 339–354.
Restall, Greg. 2009c. “A Priori Truths.” in Central Issues of Philosophy, edited by John Shand, pp. 37–50. Stocksfield: Acumen Publishing.
Restall, Greg. 2010a. “On T and U, and What They Can Do.” Analysis 70(4): 673–676.
Restall, Greg. 2010b. “What are we to Accept, and What are We to Reject, While Saving Truth from Paradox?” Philosophical Studies 147(3): 433–443.
Restall, Greg. 2010c. “Always more.” in The Logica Yearbook 2009, edited by Michal Peliš, pp. 223–230. London: College Publications.
Restall, Greg. 2011. “Molinism and the Thin Red Line.” in Molinism. The Contemporary Debate, edited by Kenneth J. Perszyk, pp. 227–238. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199590629.001.0001.
Restall, Greg. 2012. “Bradwardine Hypersequents.” in Insolubles and Consequences. Essays in Honour of Stephen Read, edited by Catarina Dutilh-Novaes and Ole Thomassen Hjortland. Tributes n. 18. London: King’s College Publications.
Restall, Greg. 2014. “Pluralism and Proofs.” Erkenntnis 79(suppl., 2): 279–291.
Restall, Greg. 2015. “Assertion, Denial, Accepting, Rejecting, Symmetry, and Paradox.” in Foundations of Logical Consequence, edited by Colin R. Caret and Ole Thomassen Hjortland, pp. 310–321. Mind Association Occasional Series. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198715696.001.0001.
Restall, Greg. 2016. “On Priest on Nonmonotonic and Inductive Logic.” Thought 5(2): 119–124.
Restall, Greg. 2017. “First Degree Entailment, Symmetry and Paradox.” Logic and Logical Philosophy 26(1): 3–18.
Restall, Greg. 2018. “Substructural Logics.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/logic-substructural/.
Restall, Greg. 2019. “Two Negations Are More than One.” in Graham Priest on Dialetheism and Paraconsistency, edited by Can Başkent and Thomas Macaulay Ferguson, pp. 455–468. Cham: Springer Nature, doi:10.1007/978-3-030-25365-3.
Restall, Greg. 2024. “Substructural Logics.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2024/entries/logic-substructural/.
Restall, Greg and Russell, Gillian K., eds. 2012a. New Waves in Philosophical Logic. New Waves in Philosophy. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.
Restall, Greg and Russell, Gillian K. 2012b. “Introduction.” in New Waves in Philosophical Logic, edited by Greg Restall and Gillian K. Russell, pp. 1–78. New Waves in Philosophy. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.
Rogerson, Susan and Restall, Greg. 2004. “Routes to Triviality.” The Journal of Philosophical Logic 33(4): 421–436.
Slaney, John K., Meyer, Robert K. and Restall, Greg. 1996. “Linear Arithmetic Desected.” Logique et Analyse 39(155–156): 379–387.

Further References

Akama, Seiki, ed. 1997. Logic, Language, and Computation. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Dunn, Michael J. 1986. “Relevance Logic and Entailment.” in Handbook of Philosophical Logic, Volume III: Alternatives to Classical Logic, edited by Dov M. Gabbay and Franz Guenthner, pp. 117–224. Synthese Library n. 166. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co.
Hansen, Kaj Börge. 1996. Applied Logic. Uppsala: Studia Philosophica Upsaliensala.
Lavine, Shaughan. 1994. Understanding the Infinite. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
Shapiro, Stewart. 1996. The Limits of Logic: Second-Order Logic and the Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem. Brookfield, Vermont: Aldershot.
Varzi, Achille C., ed. 1999. The Nature of Logic. European Review of Philosophy n. 4. Stanford, California: CSLI Publications.
Wansing, Heinrich Theodor. 1998. Displaying Modal Logic. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.