David Ripley (ripley-d)

My contributions to Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Baron, Sam, Colyvan, Mark and Ripley, David. 2017. “How Mathematics Can Make a Difference.” Philosophers’ Imprint 17(3).
Beall, J. C., Glanzberg, Michael and Ripley, David. 2016. “Liar Paradox.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/liar-paradox/.
Beall, J. C., Glanzberg, Michael and Ripley, David. 2018. Formal Theories of Truth. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Beall, J. C. and Ripley, David. 2018. “Non-Classical Theories of Truth.” in The Oxford Handbook of Truth, edited by Michael Glanzberg, pp. 739–754. Oxford Handbooks. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199557929.001.0001.
Cobreros, Pablo, Egré, Paul, Ripley, David and van Rooij, Robert. 2012. “Tolerant, Classical, Strict.” The Journal of Philosophical Logic 41(2): 347–385, doi:10.1007/s10992-010-9165-z.
Cobreros, Pablo, Egré, Paul, Ripley, David and van Rooij, Robert. 2013a. “Identity, Leibniz’s Law and Non-transitive Reasoning.” Metaphysica 14(2): 253–264.
Cobreros, Pablo, Egré, Paul, Ripley, David and van Rooij, Robert. 2013b. “Reaching Transparent Truth.” Mind 122(488): 841–866, doi:10.1093/mind/fzt110.
Cobreros, Pablo, Egré, Paul, Ripley, David and van Rooij, Robert. 2014. “Priest’s Motorbike and Tolerant Identity.” in Recent Trends in Philosophical Logic, edited by Roberto Ciuni, Heinrich Theodor Wansing, and Caroline Willkommen, pp. 75–84. Trends in Logic n. 41. New York: Springer.
Cobreros, Pablo, Egré, Paul, Ripley, David and van Rooij, Robert. 2015a. “Pragmatic Interpretations of Vague Expressions: Strongest Meaning and Nonmonotonic Consequence.” The Journal of Philosophical Logic 44(4): 375–393.
Cobreros, Pablo, Egré, Paul, Ripley, David and van Rooij, Robert. 2015b. “Vagueness, Truth and Permissive Consequence.” in Unifying the Philosophy of Truth, edited by Theodora Achourioti, Henri Galinon, José Martı́nez Fernández, and Kentaro Fujimoto, pp. 409–430. Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science n. 36. Cham: Springer.
Ripley, David. 2011a. “Negation, Denial, and Rejection.” Philosophy Compass 6(9): 622–629.
Ripley, David. 2011b. “Contradictions at the Borders.” in Vagueness in Communication. International Workshop, ViC 2009, held as part of ESSLLI 2009, Bordeaux, France, July 2009. Revised Selected Papers, edited by Rick W. F. Nouwen, Robert van Rooij, Uli Sauerland, and Hans-Christian Schmitz, pp. 169–188. Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence n. 6517. Berlin: Springer, doi:10.1007/978-3-642-18446-8.
Ripley, David. 2012a. “Conservatively Extending Classical Logic with Transparent Truth.” The Review of Symbolic Logic 5(2): 354–378, doi:10.1017/S1755020312000056.
Ripley, David. 2012b. “Response to Heck [on Heck (2012)].” Thought 1(4): 254–257.
Ripley, David. 2012c. “Structures and Circumstances: Two Ways to Fine-Grain Propositions.” Synthese 189(1): 97–118.
Ripley, David. 2013a. “Paradoxes and Failures of Cut.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91(1): 139–164, doi:10.1080/00048402.2011.630010.
Ripley, David. 2013b. “Revising Up: Strengthening Classical Logic in the Face of Paradox.” Philosophers’ Imprint 13(5).
Ripley, David. 2015a. “Embedding Denial.” in Foundations of Logical Consequence, edited by Colin R. Caret and Ole Thomassen Hjortland, pp. 289–309. Mind Association Occasional Series. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198715696.001.0001.
Ripley, David. 2015b. “Comparing Substructural Theories of Truth.” Ergo 2(13): 299–328.
Ripley, David. 2015c. “Contraction and closure.” Thought 4(2): 131–138.
Ripley, David. 2015d. “Paraconsistent Logic.” The Journal of Philosophical Logic 44(6): 771–780.
Ripley, David. 2015e. “Naive Set Theory and Nontransitive Logic .” The Review of Symbolic Logic 8(3): 553–571, doi:10.1017/s1755020314000501.
Ripley, David. 2017a. “Bilateralism, Coherence, Warrant.” in Act-Based Conceptions of Propositional Content. Contemporary and Historical Perspectives, edited by Friederike Moltmann and Mark Textor, pp. 307–324. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Ripley, David. 2017b. “Vagueness is a Kind of Conflation.” Logic and Logical Philosophy 26(1): 115–135.
Ripley, David. 2020. “Strong Normalization in Core Type Theory.” in The Logica Yearbook 2019, edited by Igor Sedlár and Martin Blicha, pp. 111–130. London: College Publications.
Weber, Zach, Ripley, David, Priest, Graham, Hyde, Dominic and Colyvan, Mark. 2014. “Tolerating Gluts.” Mind 123(491): 813–828.

Further References

Heck, Richard Kimberley. 2012. “A Liar Paradox.” Thought 1(1): 36–40. Originally published under the name “Richard G. Heck, Jr.” .