Ian Rumfitt (rumfitt)

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Bibliography

Rumfitt, Ian. 1993. “Content and Context: The Paratactic Theory Revisited and Revised.” Mind 102(407): 429–454.
Rumfitt, Ian. 1994. “Frege’s Theory of Predication: An Elaboration and Defense, with Some New Applications.” The Philosophical Review 103(4): 599–637.
Rumfitt, Ian. 1995a. “Truth Conditions and Communication.” Mind 104(416): 827–862.
Rumfitt, Ian. 1995b. “Truth Wronged: Crispin Wright’s Truth and Objectivity.” Ratio 8(1): 100–107.
Rumfitt, Ian. 1995c. “Review of Coffa (1991).” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 3(1): 205–207.
Rumfitt, Ian. 1995d. “Review of Malpas (1992).” The Philosophical Quarterly 45(178): 136–137.
Rumfitt, Ian. 1996a. “The Vagaries of Paraphrase: A Reply to Holton (1996) on the Counting Problem.” Analysis 56(4): 246–250.
Rumfitt, Ian. 1996b. “Sentences, Names and Semantic Values.” The Philosophical Quarterly 46(182): 66–72.
Rumfitt, Ian. 1996c. “Review of Potts (1994).” The Philosophical Review 105(2): 264–267.
Rumfitt, Ian. 1997a. “The Categoricity Problem and Truth Value Gaps.” Analysis 57(4): 223–235.
Rumfitt, Ian. 1997b. “Review of Brandom (1994).” The Philosophical Review 106(3): 437–441.
Rumfitt, Ian. 1999. “Frege’s Logicism.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 73: 151–180.
Rumfitt, Ian. 2000. “ ‘Yes’ and ‘No’ .” Mind 109(436): 781–823.
Rumfitt, Ian. 2001a. “Hume’s Principle and the Number of All Objects.” Noûs 35(4): 515–541.
Rumfitt, Ian. 2001b. “Semantic Theory and Necessary Truth.” Synthese 126(1–2): 283–324.
Rumfitt, Ian. 2002a. “Unilateralism Disarmed: A Reply to Dummett (2002) and Gibbard (2002).” Mind 111(442): 305–321.
Rumfitt, Ian. 2002b. “Concepts and Counting.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 102: 41–68.
Rumfitt, Ian. 2003a. “Singular Terms and Arithmetical Logicism (review of Hale and Wright (2001)).” Philosophical Books 44(3): 193–219.
Rumfitt, Ian. 2003b. “Contingent Existents.” Philosophy 78: 461–481.
Rumfitt, Ian. 2003c. “Savoir Faire.” The Journal of Philosophy 100(3): 158–166.
Rumfitt, Ian. 2005a. “Logic as a Norm.” Unpublished manuscript.
Rumfitt, Ian. 2005b. “Plural Terms: Another Variety of Reference?” in Thought, Reference and Experience: Themes from the Philosophy of Gareth Evans, edited by José-Luis Bermúdez, pp. 84–123. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199248964.001.0001.
Rumfitt, Ian. 2005c. “Meaning and Understanding.” in The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy, edited by Frank Jackson and Michael A. Smith, pp. 427–453. Oxford Handbooks. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199234769.001.0001.
Rumfitt, Ian. 2007. “Asserting and Excluding: Steps Towards an Anti-Realist Account of Classical Consequence.” in The Philosophy of Michael Dummett, edited by Randall E. Auxier and Lewis Edwin Hahn, pp. 639–693. The Library of Living Philosophers n. 31. LaSalle, Illinois: Open Court Publishing Co.
Rumfitt, Ian. 2008a. “Knowledge by Deduction.” Grazer Philosophische Studien 77: 61–84. “Knowledge and Questions,” ed. by Franck Lihoreau.
Rumfitt, Ian. 2008b. “Co-ordination Principles: A Reply.” Mind 117(468): 1059–1063.
Rumfitt, Ian. 2010a. “Ricky Pointing and the Judges.” Analysis 70(2): 205–210.
Rumfitt, Ian. 2010b. “Logical Necessity.” in Modality: Metaphysics, Logic, and Epistemology, edited by Bob Hale and Aviv Hoffmann, pp. 34–64. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199565818.001.0001.
Rumfitt, Ian. 2011a. “Ramsey on Truth and Meaning.” in Episteme, etc. Essays in Honour of Jonathan Barnes, edited by Benjamin Morison and Katerina Ierodiakonou, pp. 213–245. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199696482.001.0001.
Rumfitt, Ian. 2011b. “Truth and the Determination of Content: Variations on Themes from Frege’s Logische Untersuchungen.” Grazer Philosophische Studien 82: 3–48. “Themes from Early Analytic Philosophy. Essays in Honour of Wolfgang Künne,” ed. by Benjamin Schnieder and Moritz Schulz.
Rumfitt, Ian. 2011c. “Inference, Deduction, Logic.” in Knowing How. Essays on Knowledge, Mind, and Action, edited by John Bengson and Marc A. Moffett, pp. 334–360. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195389364.001.0001.
Rumfitt, Ian. 2013a. “Old Adams Buried.” Analytic Philosophy 54(2): 157–188.
Rumfitt, Ian. 2013b. “Sense and Evidence.” The Monist 96(2): 177–204.
Rumfitt, Ian. 2014a. “Truth and Meaning.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 88: 21–55.
Rumfitt, Ian. 2014b. “Brouwer versus Wittgenstein on the Infinite and the Law of Excluded Middle.” Grazer Philosophische Studien 89: 93–109. “Themes from Wittgenstein and Quine,” ed. by Kai Büttner, Florian Demont, David Dolby, Anne-Katrin Schlegel and Dirk Greimann.
Rumfitt, Ian. 2015. The Boundary Stones of Thought. An Essay in the Philosophy of Logic. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198733638.001.0001.
Rumfitt, Ian. 2016. “Objects of Thought.” in Meanings and Other Things. Themes from the Work of Stephen Schiffer, edited by Gary Ostertag, pp. 73–94. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199684939.001.0001.
Rumfitt, Ian. 2017a. “The Liar Without Truth.” in Reflections on the Liar, edited by Bradley Armour-Garb, pp. 191–211. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780199896042.001.0001.
Rumfitt, Ian. 2017b. “Against Harmony.” in A Companion to the Philosophy of Language, edited by Bob Hale, Crispin Wright, and Alexander Miller, 2nd ed., pp. 225–249. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell. First edition: Hale and Wright (1997), doi:10.1002/9781118972090.ch10.
Rumfitt, Ian. 2018a. “Bivalence and Determinacy.” in The Oxford Handbook of Truth, edited by Michael Glanzberg, pp. 394–432. Oxford Handbooks. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199557929.001.0001.
Rumfitt, Ian. 2018b. “Neo-Fregeanism and the Burali-Forti Paradox.” in Being Necessary. Themes of Ontology and Modality from the Work of Bob Hale, edited by Ivette Fred-Rivera and Jessica F. Leech, pp. 188–223. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198792161.001.0001.
Rumfitt, Ian. 2020. “Vagueness and Intuitionistic Logic.” in Logic, Language, and Mathematics. Themes from the Philosophy of Crispin Wright, edited by Alexander Miller, pp. 135–153. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780199278343.001.0001.

Further References

Brandom, Robert B. 1994. Making It Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
Coffa, Alberto J. 1991. The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap: to the Vienna Station. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Edited by Linda Wessels.
Dummett, Michael A. E. 2002. “ ‘Yes,’ ‘No’ and ‘Can’t Say’ .” Mind 111(442): 289–295.
Gibbard, Peter J. 2002. “Price and Rumfitt on Rejective Negation and Classical Logic.” Mind 111(442): 297–303.
Hale, Bob and Wright, Crispin. 2001. The Reasons Proper Study. Essays Towards a Neo-Fregean Philosophy of Mathematics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0198236395.001.0001.
Holton, Richard. 1996. “Davidson, McFetridge and the Counting Problem.” Analysis 56(1): 46–50.
Malpas, Jeff E. 1992. Donald Davidson and the Mirror of Meaning. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Potts, Timothy C. 1994. Structures and Categories for the Representation of Meaning. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.