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Gila Y. Sher (sher-gy)

Zitiert in den folgenden Artikeln

The Formalization of Arguments: An Overview [introduction to the special issue], Considerations on Logical Consequence and Natural Language

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Bibliography

    Sher, Gila Y. 1989. “A Conception of Tarskian Logic.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 70: 341–368.
    Sher, Gila Y. 1990. “Ways of Branching Quantifiers.” Linguistics and Philosophy 13(4): 393–422.
    Sher, Gila Y. 1991. The Bounds of Logic. A Generalized Viewpoint. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
    Sher, Gila Y. 1996a. “Did Tarski Commit ‘Tarski’s Fallacy’?” The Journal of Symbolic Logic 61(2): 653–686, doi:10.2307/2275681.
    Sher, Gila Y. 1996b. “Semantics and Logic.” in The Handbook of Contemporary Semantic Theory, edited by Shalom Lappin, pp. 511–537. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. Second edition: Lappin and Fox (2015).
    Sher, Gila Y. 1997. “Partially-Ordered (Branching) Generalized Quantifiers: A General Definition.” The Journal of Philosophical Logic 26(1): 1–43.
    Sher, Gila Y. 1999. “Is Logic a Theory of the Obvious?” in The Nature of Logic, edited by Achille C. Varzi, pp. 207–228. European Review of Philosophy n. 4. Stanford, California: CSLI Publications.
    Sher, Gila Y. 2000. “The Logical Roots of Indeterminacy.” in Between Logic and Intuition: Essays in Honor of Charles Parsons, edited by Gila Y. Sher and Richard Tieszen, pp. 100–123. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    Sher, Gila Y. 2001a. “The Formal-Structural View of Logical Consequence.” The Philosophical Review 110(2): 241–261.
    Sher, Gila Y. 2001b. “Truth, Logical Structure, and Compositionality.” Synthese 126(1–2): 195–219.
    Sher, Gila Y. 2002a. “Logical Consequence: An Epistemic Outline.” The Monist 85(4): 555–579.
    Sher, Gila Y. 2002b. “Truth, the Liar, and Tarski’s Semantics.” in A Companion to Philosophical Logic, edited by Dale Jacquette, pp. 145–163. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, doi:10.1002/9780470996751.
    Sher, Gila Y. 2003. “A Characterization of Logical Constants is Possible.” Theoria (San Sebastian), Secunda época 18(47): 189–198.
    Sher, Gila Y. 2004. “In Search of a Substantive Theory of Truth.” The Journal of Philosophy 101(1): 5–36.
    Sher, Gila Y. 2005. “Functional Pluralism [on Lynch (2004)].” Philosophical Books 46(4): 311–330.
    Sher, Gila Y. 2008. “Tarski’s Thesis.” in New Essays on Tarski and Philosophy, edited by Douglas Eden Patterson, pp. 300–339. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199296309.001.0001.
    Sher, Gila Y. 2009. “Review of Azzouni (2006).” Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 50(1): 97–117.
    Sher, Gila Y. 2011. “Is Logic in the Mind or in the World?” Synthese 181(2): 353–365.
    Sher, Gila Y. 2012a. “Truth & Knowledge in Logic & Mathematics.” in The Logica Yearbook 2011, edited by Michal Peliš and Vı́t Punčochář, pp. 289–289. London: College Publications.
    Sher, Gila Y. 2012b. “Logical Quantifiers.” in The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Language, edited by Gillian K. Russell and Delia Graff Fara, pp. 579–595. Routledge Philosophy Companions. London: Routledge.
    Sher, Gila Y. 2012c. “Forms of Correspondence: The Intricate Route from Thought to Reality.” in Truth and Pluralism: Current Debates, pp. 157–179. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195387469.001.0001.
    Sher, Gila Y. 2015. “Truth as Composite Correspondence.” in Unifying the Philosophy of Truth, edited by Theodora Achourioti, Henri Galinon, José Martı́nez Fernández, and Kentaro Fujimoto, pp. 191–210. Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science n. 36. Cham: Springer.
    Sher, Gila Y. 2016a. Epistemic Friction. An Essay on Knowledge, Truth, and Logic. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198768685.001.0001.
    Sher, Gila Y. 2016b. “The Model-Theoretic Argument: From Skepticism to a New Understanding.” in The Brain in a Vat, edited by Sanford C. Goldberg, pp. 208–225. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, doi:10.1017/cbo9781107706965.
    Sher, Gila Y. 2016c. “Substantivism about Truth.” Philosophy Compass 11(12): 818–828.
    Sher, Gila Y. 2017a. “Truth and Transcendence: Turning the Tables on the Liar Paradox.” in Reflections on the Liar, edited by Bradley Armour-Garb, pp. 281–306. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780199896042.001.0001.
    Sher, Gila Y. 2017b. “Lessons on Truth from Kant.” Analytic Philosophy 58(3): 171–201.
    Sher, Gila Y. 2018. “On the Explanatory Power of Truth in Logic.” in Philosophical Issues 28: Philosophy of Logic and Inferential Reasoning, edited by Cory Juhl and Joshua Schechter, pp. 348–373. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley; Sons, Inc., doi:10.1111/phis.12129.
    Sher, Gila Y. 2019a. “Review of Chakravartty (2017).” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97(3): 618–623.
    Sher, Gila Y. 2019b. “Where Are You Going, Metaphysics, and How Are You Getting There? Grounding Theory as a Case Study.” in Quo Vadis, Metaphysics? Essays in Honor of Peter van Inwagen, edited by Mirosław Szatkowski, pp. 37–58. Philosophical Analysis n. 81. Berlin: de Gruyter, doi:10.1515/9783110664812.
    Sher, Gila Y. and Tieszen, Richard, eds. 2000. Between Logic and Intuition: Essays in Honor of Charles Parsons. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    Sher, Gila Y. and Wright, Cory D. 2007. “Truth as a Normative Modality of Cognitive Acts.” in Truth and Speech Acts: Studies in the Philosophy of Language, edited by Dirk Greimann and Geo Siegwart, pp. 280–306. Routledge Studies in Contemporary Philosophy n. 6. London: Routledge.

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