Sharon Street (street-s)
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Moorean Metaethics and Evolutionary Metaethics: Moore’s Principia Ethica facing Street’s Darwinian Dilemma, Thomas Nagel, 'Mente e Cosmo'Citato nei seguenti articoli
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Bibliography
Schapiro, Tamar, Ebels-Duggan, Kyla and Street, Sharon, eds. 2022. Normativity and Agency: Themes from the Philosophy of Christine M. Korsgaard. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198843726.001.0001.
Street, Sharon. 2006. “A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value.” Philosophical Studies 127(1): 109–166, doi:10.1007/s11098-005-1726-6.
Street, Sharon. 2008a. “Reply to Copp (2008): Naturalism, Normativity, and the Varieties of Realism Worth Worrying About.” in Philosophical Issues 18: Interdisciplinary Core Philosophy, edited by Ernest Sosa and Enrique Villanueva, pp. 207–228. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell.
Street, Sharon. 2008b. “Constructivism about Reasons.” in Oxford Studies in Metaethics, volume III, edited by Russ Shafer-Landau, pp. 208–245. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780199542062.003.0009.
Street, Sharon. 2009. “In Defense of Future Tuesday Indifference: Ideally Coherent Eccentrics and the Contingency of What Matters.” in Philosophical Issues 19: Metaethics, edited by Ernest Sosa and Enrique Villanueva, pp. 273–298. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell.
Street, Sharon. 2010. “What is Constructivism in Ethics and Metaethics?” Philosophy Compass 5(5): 363–384.
Street, Sharon. 2011. “Mind-Independence without the Mystery: Why Quasi-Realists Can’t Have it Both Ways.” in Oxford Studies in Metaethics, volume VI, edited by Russ Shafer-Landau, pp. 1–32. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199606375.001.0001.
Street, Sharon. 2014. “If Everything Happens for a Reason, Then We Don’t Know What Reasons Are: Why the Price of Theism is Normative Skepticism.” in Challenges to Moral and Religious Belief. Disagreement and Evolution, edited by Michael Bergmann and Patrick Kain, pp. 172–194. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199669776.001.0001.
Street, Sharon. 2015. “Does Anything Really Matter or Did We Just Evolve to Think So?” in The Norton Introduction to Philosophy, edited by Gideon Rosen, Alex Byrne, Joshua Cohen, and Seana Valentine Shiffrin, pp. 686–692. New York: W.W. Norton & Co. Reprinted in Rosen et al. (2018, 904–911).
Street, Sharon. 2016. “Objectivity and Truth: You’d Better Rethink It.” in Oxford Studies in Metaethics, volume XI, edited by Russ Shafer-Landau, pp. 293–334. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198784647.001.0001.
Street, Sharon. 2017. “Nothing ‘Really’ Matters, but That’s Not What Matters.” in Does Anything Really Matter? Essays on Parfit on Objectivity, edited by Peter Singer, pp. 121–148. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199653836.001.0001.
Further References
Copp, David. 2008. “Darwinian Skepticism about Moral Realism.” in Philosophical Issues 18: Interdisciplinary Core Philosophy, edited by Ernest Sosa and Enrique Villanueva, pp. 186–206. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell.