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James Van Cleve (vancleve)

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Bibliography

    Van Cleve, James. 1977. Probability and Certainty: A Reexamination of the Lewis-Reichenbach Debate.” Philosophical Studies 32(4): 323–334.
    Van Cleve, James. 1979a. Foundationalism, Epistemic Principles and the Cartesian Circle.” The Philosophical Review 88(1): 55–91. Reprinted in Doney (1987, 245–281) and in Cottingham (1998, 101–131).
    Van Cleve, James. 1979b. Substance, Matter, and Kant’s First Analogy.” Kant-Studien 70(2): 149–161.
    Van Cleve, James. 1983. Conceivability and the Cartesian Argument for Dualism.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 64: 35–45.
    Van Cleve, James. 1984. Reliability, Justification, and the Problem of Induction.” in Midwest Studies in Philosophy 9: Causation and Causal Theories, edited by Peter A. French, Theodore E. Uehling Jr., and Howard K. Wettstein, pp. 555–567. Minneapolis, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press.
    Van Cleve, James. 1985a. Why a Set Contains its Members Essentially.” Noûs 19: 585–602.
    Van Cleve, James. 1985b. Three Versions of the Bundle Theory.” Philosophical Studies 47: 95–108.
    Van Cleve, James. 1985c. Epistemic Supervenience and the Circle of Belief.” The Monist 68: 90–104.
    Van Cleve, James. 1986. Mereological Essentialism, Mereological Conjunctivism, and Identity Through Time.” in Midwest Studies in Philosophy 11: Studies in Essentialism, edited by Peter A. French, Theodore E. Uehling Jr., and Howard K. Wettstein, pp. 141–156. Minneapolis, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press.
    Van Cleve, James. 1987. Right, Left and the Fourth Dimension.” The Philosophical Review 96: 33–68. Reprinted in Van Cleve and Frederick (1991, 203–234).
    Van Cleve, James. 1988. Inner States and Outer Relations: Kant and the Case for Monadism.” in Doing Philosophy Historically, edited by Peter H. Hare, pp. 231–249. Frontiers of Philosophy. Amherst, New York: Prometheus Books.
    Van Cleve, James. 1990a. Supervenience and Closure.” Philosophical Studies 58(3): 225–238.
    Van Cleve, James. 1990b. Mind – Dust or Magic? Panpsychism versus Emergence.” in Philosophical Perspectives 4: Action Theory and Philosophy of Mind, edited by James E. Tomberlin, pp. 215–226. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
    Van Cleve, James. 1991a. Entity, Identity, and Actuality: A Critical Review.” Philosophical Papers 20(1): 37–50.
    Van Cleve, James. 1991b. Introduction to the Arguments of 1770 and 1783.” in The Philosophy of Right and Left. Incongruent Counterparts and the Nature of Space, edited by James Van Cleve and Robert E. Frederick, pp. 15–26. The University of Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science n. 46. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
    Van Cleve, James. 1991c. Incongruent Counterparts and Things in Themselves.” in The Philosophy of Right and Left. Incongruent Counterparts and the Nature of Space, edited by James Van Cleve and Robert E. Frederick, pp. 341–352. The University of Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science n. 46. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
    Van Cleve, James. 1992a. Analyticity, Undeniability, and Truth.” in Return of the A Priori, edited by Philip P. Hanson and Bruce Hunter, pp. 89–111. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume n. 18. Calgary, Alberta: University of Calgary Press.
    Van Cleve, James. 1992b. The Argument from Geometry, Transcendental Idealism, and Kant’s Two Worlds.” in Minds, Ideas and Objects: Essays on the Theory of Representation in Modern Philosophy, edited by Phillip D. Cummins and Guenter Zoeller, pp. 291–302. Noth American Kant Society Studies in Philosophy n. 2. Atascadero, California: Ridgeview Publishing Co.
    Van Cleve, James. 1994a. Predication Without Universals? A Fling with Ostrich Nominalism.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54(3): 577–590.
    Van Cleve, James. 1994b. Descartes and the Destruction of the Eternal Truths.” Ratio 7(1): 58–62.
    Van Cleve, James. 1995a. Does Truth Supervene on Evidence? in Supervenience: New Essays, edited by Elias E. Savellos and Ümit D. Yalçin, pp. 306–316. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    Van Cleve, James. 1995b. Putnam, Kant, and Secondary Qualities.” Philosophical Papers 24(2): 83–109.
    Van Cleve, James. 1995c. The Ideality of Time.” in Proceedings of the 8th International Kant-Congress Memphis 1995, volume I.2, edited by Hoke Robinson, pp. 411–422. Milwaukee, Wisconsin: Marquette University Press.
    Van Cleve, James. 1996a. If Meinong Is Wrong, Is McTaggart Right? Philosophical Topics 24(1): 231–254.
    Van Cleve, James. 1996b. Minimal Truth Is Realist Truth.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56(4): 869–875.
    Van Cleve, James. 1998. Incongruent Counterparts and Higher Dimensions.” in Metaphysics: The Big Questions, edited by Peter van Inwagen and Dean W. Zimmerman, pp. 111–119. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
    Van Cleve, James. 1999. Problems from Kant. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Van Cleve, James. 2001a. C.D. Broad (1887–1971).” in A Companion to Analytic Philosophy, edited by Aloysius P. [Al] Martinich and David Sosa, pp. 57–67. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, doi:10.1002/9780470998656.
    Van Cleve, James. 2001b. Borges’s Two Refutations of Time.” Philosophic Exchange 31: 55–68.
    Van Cleve, James. 2002a. Time, Idealism, and the Identity of Indiscernibles.” in Philosophical Perspectives 16: Language and Mind, edited by James E. Tomberlin, pp. 379–393. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
    Van Cleve, James. 2002b. Can Atheists Know Anything? in Naturalism Defeated? Essays on Plantinga’s Evolutionary Argument against Naturalism, edited by James K. Beilby, pp. 103–127. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press.
    Van Cleve, James. 2002c. Receptivity and Our Knowledge of Intrinsic Properties [review of Langton (1998)].” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65(1): 218–237.
    Van Cleve, James. 2003a. Is Knowledge Easy – or Impossible? Externalism as the Only Alternative to Skepticism.” in The Skeptics: Contemporary Essays, edited by Steven Luper, pp. 45–60. Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate.
    Van Cleve, James. 2003b. Reid Versus Berkeley on the Inverted Retinal Image.” Philosophical Topics 31(1–2): 425–455.
    Van Cleve, James. 2003c. Précis of Van Cleve (1999).” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66(1): 190–195.
    Van Cleve, James. 2003d. Replies to Commentators [Ameriks (2003), George (2003) and Langton (2003)].” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66(1): 219–227.
    Van Cleve, James. 2003e. Lehrer, Reid, and the First of All Principles.” in The Epistemology of Keith Lehrer, edited by Erik J. Olsson, pp. 155–172. Philosophical Studies Series n. 95. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
    Van Cleve, James. 2004a. Externalism and Disjunctivism.” in The Externalist Challenge, edited by Richard Schantz, pp. 481–493. Current Issues in Theoretical Philosophy n. 2. Berlin: de Gruyter, doi:10.1515/9783110915273.
    Van Cleve, James. 2004b. On What There Is Now: Sosa on Two Forms of Relativity.” in Ernest Sosa and His Critics, edited by John Greco, pp. 249–262. Philosophers and Their Critics. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, doi:10.1002/9780470756140.
    Van Cleve, James. 2005. Coherence Is Not Enough: In Defense of Moderate Foundationalism.” in Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, edited by Ernest Sosa and Matthias Steup, 1st ed., pp. 326–349. Contemporary Debates in Philosophy n. 3. Boston, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers. Second edition: Steup, Turri and Sosa (2014, 255–266).
    Van Cleve, James. 2006a. Touch, Sound, and Things without the Mind.” Metaphilosophy 37(2): 162–182.
    Van Cleve, James. 2006b. Reid’s Theory of Perception.” in The Cambridge Companion to Thomas Reid, edited by Terence Cuneo and René van Woudenberg, pp. 101–133. Cambridge Companions to Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    Van Cleve, James. 2006c. Reid on the Credit of Human Testimony.” in The Epistemology of Testimony, edited by Jennifer Lackey and Ernest Sosa, pp. 50–75. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199276011.001.0001.
    Van Cleve, James. 2007a. The Moon and Sixpence: A Defense of Mereological Universalism.” in Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics, edited by Theodore Sider, John Hawthorne, and Dean W. Zimmerman, pp. 321–340. Contemporary Debates in Philosophy n. 10. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell.
    Van Cleve, James. 2007b. Reid’s Answer to Molyneux’s Question.” The Monist 90(2): 251–270.
    Van Cleve, James. 2008. Reid’s Response to the Skeptic.” in The Oxford Handbook of Skepticism, edited by John Greco, pp. 286–309. Oxford Handbooks. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195183214.001.0001.
    Van Cleve, James. 2011a.Sosa (2009) on Easy Knowledge and the Problem of the Criterion.” Philosophical Studies 153(1): 19–28.
    Van Cleve, James. 2011b. Reid on the Real Foundation of the Primary-Secondary Quality Distinction.” in Primary and Secondary Qualities. The Historical and Ongoing Debate, edited by Lawrence Nolan, pp. 274–303. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199556151.001.0001.
    Van Cleve, James. 2011c. Epistemic Humility and Causal Structuralism.” in Perception, Causation, and Objectivity, edited by Johannes Roessler, Hemdat Lerman, and Naomi Eilan, pp. 82–91. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199692040.001.0001.
    Van Cleve, James. 2011d. Rates of Passage.” Analytic Philosophy 52(3): 141–170.
    Van Cleve, James. 2014a. Reply to Elgin (2014).” in Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, edited by Matthias Steup, John Turri, and Ernest Sosa, 2nd ed., pp. 271–273. Contemporary Debates in Philosophy n. 3. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell. First edition: Sosa and Steup (2005), doi:10.1002/9781394260744.
    Van Cleve, James. 2014b. Berkeley, Reid, and Sinha on Molyneux’s Question.” in Sensory Integration and the Unity of Consciousness, edited by David J. Bennett and Christopher S. Hill, pp. 193–208. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, doi:10.7551/mitpress/9780262027786.001.0001.
    Van Cleve, James. 2015a. Problems from Reid. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Van Cleve, James. 2015b. Troubles for Radical Transparency.” in Qualia and Mental Causation in a Physical World. Themes from the Philosophy of Jaegwon Kim, edited by Terence E. Horgan, Marcelo Sabatés, and David Sosa, pp. 209–230. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, doi:10.1017/cbo9781139939539.
    Van Cleve, James. 2015c. Four Questions about Acquired Perception.” in Thomas Reid on Mind, Knowledge and Value, edited by Rebecca Copenhaver and J. Todd Buras, pp. 75–99. Mind Association Occasional Series. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Van Cleve, James. 2016. Objectivity without Objects: A Priorian Program.” Synthese 193(11): 3535–3549.
    Van Cleve, James. 2017. Reid’s Opposition to Berkeley.” in The Bloomsbury Companion to Berkeley, edited by Bertil Belfrage and Richard J. Brook, pp. 299–313. Bloomsbury Companions. London: Bloomsbury Academic.
    Van Cleve, James. 2018. Brute Necessity.” Philosophy Compass 13(9), doi:10.1111/phc3.12516.
    Van Cleve, James. 2021. Humean Humility and Its Contemporary Echoes.” in The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Humility, edited by Mark Alfano, Michael Patrick Lynch, and Alessandra Tanesini, pp. 359–372. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge.
    Van Cleve, James and Frederick, Robert E., eds. 1991. The Philosophy of Right and Left. Incongruent Counterparts and the Nature of Space. The University of Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science n. 46. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

Further References

    Ameriks, Karl. 2003. Problems from Van Cleve’s ‘Kant’: Experience and Objects [on Van Cleve (1999)].” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66(1): 196–202.
    Cottingham, John G., ed. 1998. Descartes. Oxford Readings in Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Doney, Willis, ed. 1987. Eternal Truths and the Cartesian Circle: a Collection of Studies. New York: Garland Publishing Co.
    Elgin, Catherine Z. 2014. Reply to Van Cleve (2005).” in Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, edited by Matthias Steup, John Turri, and Ernest Sosa, 2nd ed., pp. 267–270. Contemporary Debates in Philosophy n. 3. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell. First edition: Sosa and Steup (2005), doi:10.1002/9781394260744.
    George, Rolf. 2003. Van Cleve and Kant’s Analogies [on Van Cleve (1999)].” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66(1): 203–210.
    Langton, Rae. 1998. Kantian Humility: Our Ignorance of Things in Themselves. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0199243174.001.0001.
    Langton, Rae. 2003. Review of Van Cleve (1999).” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66(1): 211–228.
    Sosa, Ernest. 2009. Reflective Knowledge: Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge. Volume II. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199217250.001.0001.
    Sosa, Ernest and Steup, Matthias, eds. 2005. Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. 1st ed. Contemporary Debates in Philosophy n. 3. Boston, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers. Second edition: Steup, Turri and Sosa (2014).
    Steup, Matthias, Turri, John and Sosa, Ernest, eds. 2014. Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. 2nd ed. Contemporary Debates in Philosophy n. 3. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell. First edition: Sosa and Steup (2005), doi:10.1002/9781394260744.