Richard Jay Wallace (wallace-rj)

My contributions to Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Kolodny, Niko and Wallace, Richard Jay. 2003. “Promises and Practices Revisited.” Philosophy & Public Affairs 31(2): 119–154, doi:10.1111/j.1088-4963.2003.00119.x.
Wallace, Richard Jay. 1997. “Reason and Responsibility.” in Ethics and Practical Reason, edited by Garrett Cullity and Berys Gaut, pp. 321–344. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198236467.001.0001.
Wallace, Richard Jay. 1998. Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
Wallace, Richard Jay. 1999. “Autonomie, Charakter und praktische Vernunft: Überlegungen am Beispiel des Utilitarismus.” Analyse & Kritik 21(2): 213–230.
Wallace, Richard Jay. 2000a. “Review of Bok (1998).” The Philosophical Review 109(4): 592–595.
Wallace, Richard Jay. 2000b. “An Anti-Philosophy of the Emotions? [Review Essay of Stocker and Hegeman (1996)].” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60(2): 469–477.
Wallace, Richard Jay. 2001. “Normativity, Commitment, and Instrumental Reason.” Philosophers’ Imprint 1(4).
Wallace, Richard Jay. 2002a. “Scanlon’s Contractualism.” Ethics 112(3): 429–470.
Wallace, Richard Jay. 2002b. “Précis of Wallace (1998).” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64(3): 680–681.
Wallace, Richard Jay. 2002c. “Replies [to Bok (2002), Montmarquet (2002), Kane (2002), Rosen (2002)].” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64(3): 707–727.
Wallace, Richard Jay. 2003a. “Explanation, Deliberation, and Reasons [on Dancy (2000)].” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67(2): 429–435.
Wallace, Richard Jay. 2003b. “Practical Reason.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2003/entries/practical-reason/.
Wallace, Richard Jay. 2004a. “Normativity and the Will.” in Agency and Action, edited by John Hyman and Helen Steward, pp. 195–216. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement n. 55. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Wallace, Richard Jay. 2004b. “The Rightness of Acts and the Goodness of Lives.” in Reason and Value. Themes from the Moral Philosophy of Joseph Raz, edited by Richard Jay Wallace, Philip Pettit, Samuel Scheffler, and Michael A. Smith, pp. 385–411. New York: Oxford University Press.
Wallace, Richard Jay. 2004c. “Constructing Normativity.” Philosophical Topics 32(1–2): 451–476.
Wallace, Richard Jay. 2005a. “Moral Psychology.” in The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy, edited by Frank Jackson and Michael A. Smith, pp. 86–113. Oxford Handbooks. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199234769.001.0001.
Wallace, Richard Jay. 2005b. “Promises.” in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Donald M. Borchert, 2nd ed. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.
Wallace, Richard Jay. 2006a. Normativity & the Will. Selected Essays on Moral Psychology and Practical Reason. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Wallace, Richard Jay. 2006b. “Moral Motivation.” in Contemporary Debates in Moral Theory, edited by James Dreier, pp. 182–196. Contemporary Debates in Philosophy n. 6. Boston, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers.
Wallace, Richard Jay. 2007. “The Argument from Resentment.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107: 295–318.
Wallace, Richard Jay. 2008. “Practical Reason.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2008/entries/practical-reason/.
Wallace, Richard Jay. 2009. “The Publicity of Reasons.” in Philosophical Perspectives 23: Ethics, edited by John Hawthorne, pp. 471–497. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley; Sons, Inc.
Wallace, Richard Jay. 2010. “Reasons, Values and Agent-Relativity.” Dialectica 64(4): 503–528.
Wallace, Richard Jay. 2011a. “ ‘Ought,’ Reasons, and Vice: A Comment on Thomson (2008).” Philosophical Studies 154(3): 451–463.
Wallace, Richard Jay. 2011b. “Dispassionate Opprobrium: On Blame and Reactive Sentiments.” in Reasons and Recognition. Essays on the Philosophy of T.M. Scanlon, edited by Richard Jay Wallace, Rahul Kumar, and Samuel Freeman, pp. 348–372. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199753673.001.0001.
Wallace, Richard Jay. 2012a. “Justification, Regret, and Moral Complaint: Looking Forward and Looking Backward on (and in) Human Life.” in Luck, Value, and Commitment. Themes From the Ethics of Bernard Williams, edited by Ulrike Heuer and Gerald Lang, pp. 163–193. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199599325.001.0001.
Wallace, Richard Jay. 2012b. “Duties of Love.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 86: 175–198, doi:10.1111/j.1467-8349.2012.00213.x.
Wallace, Richard Jay. 2013a. The View from Here. On Affirmation, Attachment, and the Limits of Regret. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199941353.001.0001.
Wallace, Richard Jay. 2013b. “Comment on Blöser (2013).” Grazer Philosophische Studien 87: 151–156.  “Defeasibility in Philosophy. Knowledge, Agency, Responsibility, and the Law,” ed. by Claudia Blöser, Mikael Janvid, Hannes Ole Matthiessen and Marcus Willaschek.
Wallace, Richard Jay. 2013c. “The Deontic Structure of Morality.” in Thinking about Reasons: Themes from the Philosophy of Jonathan Dancy, edited by David Bakhurst, Brad Hooker, and Margaret Olivia Little, pp. 137–167. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199604678.001.0001.
Wallace, Richard Jay. 2014a. “Practical Reason.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2014/entries/practical-reason/.
Wallace, Richard Jay. 2014b. “Reasons, Policies, and the Real Self: Bratman on Identification.” in Rational and Social Agency. The Philosophy of Michael Bratman, edited by Manuel R. Vargas and Gideon Yaffe, pp. 106–128. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199794515.001.0001.
Wallace, Richard Jay. 2014c. “Emotions and Relationships: On a Theme from Strawson.” in Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility, volume II, edited by David W. Shoemaker and Neal A. Tognazzini, pp. 119–142. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198722120.001.0001.
Wallace, Richard Jay. 2015a. “Moral Subjectivism.” in The Norton Introduction to Philosophy, edited by Gideon Rosen, Alex Byrne, Joshua Cohen, and Seana Valentine Shiffrin, pp. 657–665. New York: W.W. Norton & Co. Reprinted in Rosen et al. (2018, 860–867).
Wallace, Richard Jay. 2015b. “The Fugitive Thought: Blackburn on Reason.” in Passions and Projections. Themes from the Philosophy of Simon Blackburn, edited by Robert N. Johnson and Michael A. Smith, pp. 246–266. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198723172.001.0001.
Wallace, Richard Jay. 2019a. The Moral Nexus. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, doi:10.23943/princeton/9780691172170.001.0001.
Wallace, Richard Jay. 2019b. “Discretionary Moral Duties.” in Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, volume IX, edited by Mark Timmons, pp. 50–72. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198846253.001.0001.
Wallace, Richard Jay. 2019c. “Moral Address: What it Is, Why it Matters.” in Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility. Themes from the Philosophy of Gary Watson, volume V, edited by D. Justin Coates and Neal A. Tognazzini, pp. 88–109. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198830238.001.0001.
Wallace, Richard Jay. 2020. “Practical Reason.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2020/entries/practical-reason/.
Wallace, Richard Jay. 2021. “Requirements of Reason.” in The Routledge Handbook of Practical Reason, edited by Ruth Chang and Kurt L. Sylvan, pp. 405–415. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge.
Wallace, Richard Jay and Freuder, Eugene C. 2002. “Meeting Scheduling with Preferences with Limited Comparability.” in AAAI-02. Preferences in AI and CP: Symbolic Approaches, edited by Ulrich Junker, pp. 107–114. Menlo Park, California: The AAAI Press.
Wallace, Richard Jay and Kiesewetter, Benjamin. 2024. “Practical Reason.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2024/entries/practical-reason/.
Wallace, Richard Jay, Kumar, Rahul and Freeman, Samuel, eds. 2011. Reasons and Recognition. Essays on the Philosophy of T.M. Scanlon. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199753673.001.0001.
Wallace, Richard Jay, Pettit, Philip, Scheffler, Samuel and Smith, Michael A., eds. 2004. Reason and Value. Themes from the Moral Philosophy of Joseph Raz. New York: Oxford University Press.

Further References

Blöser, Claudia. 2013. “The Defeasible Structure of Ascriptions of Responsibility.” Grazer Philosophische Studien 87: 129–150.  “Defeasibility in Philosophy. Knowledge, Agency, Responsibility, and the Law,” ed. by Claudia Blöser, Mikael Janvid, Hannes Ole Matthiessen and Marcus Willaschek.
Bok, Hilary. 1998. Freedom and Responsibility. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
Bok, Hilary. 2002. “Wallace’s ‘Normative Approach’ to Moral Responsibility [on Wallace (1998)].” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64(3): 682–686.
Dancy, Jonathan. 2000. Practical Reality. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0199253056.001.0001.
Kane, Robert H. 2002. “Responsibility, Reactive Attitudes and Free Will: Reflections on Wallace’s Theory [on Wallace (1998)].” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64(3): 693–698.
Montmarquet, James A. 2002. “Wallace’s ‘Kantian’ Strawsonianism [on Wallace (1998)].” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64(3): 687–692.
Rosen, Gideon. 2002. “The Case for Incompatibilism [on Wallace (1998)].” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64(3): 699–706.
Rosen, Gideon, Byrne, Alex, Cohen, Joshua and Shiffrin, Seana Valentine, eds. 2018. The Norton Introduction to Philosophy. 2nd ed. New York: W.W. Norton & Co.
Stocker, Michael and Hegeman, Elizabeth. 1996. Valuing Emotions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Thomson, Judith Jarvis. 2008. Normativity. LaSalle, Illinois: Open Court Publishing Co.