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José L. Zalabardo (zalabardo)

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Logik in der Philosophie

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Sensitivity and Inductive Knowledge Revisited

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Bibliography

    Zalabardo, José L. 1989. “Rules, Communities and Judgements.” Crı́tica: Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofı́a 21(63): 33–58.
    Zalabardo, José L. 1995. “A Problem for Information-Theoretic Semantics.” Synthese 105: 1–29.
    Zalabardo, José L. 1996. “Predicates, Properties and the Goal of a Theory of Reference.” Grazer Philosophische Studien 51.
    Zalabardo, José L. 1998. “Putting Reference Beyond Belief.” Philosophical Studies 91(3): 221–257. Reprinted in Miller and Wright (2002, 274–294).
    Zalabardo, José L. 2000a. Introduction to the Theory of Logic. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press.
    Zalabardo, José L. 2000b. “Realism Detranscendentalized.” European Journal of Philosophy 8(1): 63–88.
    Zalabardo, José L. 2001. “Towards a Nominalist Empiricism.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 101: 29–52.
    Zalabardo, José L. 2005. “Externalism, Skepticism, and the Problem of Easy Knowledge.” The Philosophical Review 114(1): 33–61.
    Zalabardo, José L. 2008. “Internalish Foundationalism and the Problem of the Epistemic Regress.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77(1): 34–58.
    Zalabardo, José L. 2009a. “An Argument for the Likelihood-Ratio Measure of Confirmation.” Analysis 69(4): 630–635.
    Zalabardo, José L. 2009b. “How I Know I’m Not a Brain in a Vat.” in Epistemology, edited by Anthony O’Hear, pp. 65–88. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement n. 64. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    Zalabardo, José L. 2010a. “The Tractatus on Logical Consequence.” European Journal of Philosophy 18(3): 425–442.
    Zalabardo, José L. 2010b. “Why Believe the Truth? Shah and Velleman on the Aim of Belief.” Philosophical Explorations: An International Journal for the Philosophy of Mind and Action 13(1): 1–21.
    Zalabardo, José L. 2011. “Boghossian on Inferential Knowledge.” Analytic Philosophy 52(2): 124–139.
    Zalabardo, José L. 2012a. Scepticism and Reliable Belief. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199656073.001.0001.
    Zalabardo, José L., ed. 2012b. Wittgenstein’s Early Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199691524.001.0001.
    Zalabardo, José L. 2012c. “Introduction.” in Wittgenstein’s Early Philosophy, edited by José L. Zalabardo, pp. 1–13. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199691524.001.0001.
    Zalabardo, José L. 2012d. “Reference, Simplicity, and Necessary Existence in the Tractatus.” in Wittgenstein’s Early Philosophy, edited by José L. Zalabardo, pp. 119–150. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199691524.001.0001.
    Zalabardo, José L. 2012e. “Wright on Moore.” in Mind, Meaning, and Knowledge.Themes from the Philosophy of Crispin Wright, volume 1, edited by Annalisa Coliva, pp. 304–322. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199278053.001.0001.
    Zalabardo, José L. 2012f. Concepciones de lo real: realismo y antirealismo en semántica y metafı́sica. Oviedo: KRK Ediciones.
    Zalabardo, José L. 2012g. “Semantic Normativity and Naturalism.” in The Continuum Companion to the Philosophy of Language, edited by Manuel Garcı́a-Carpintero and Max Kölbel, pp. 203–227. London: Bloomsbury Academic. Second edition: Garcı́a-Carpintero and Kölbel (2014).
    Zalabardo, José L. 2014. “Inference and Scepticism.” in Scepticism and Perceptual Justification, edited by Dylan Dodd and Elia Zardini, pp. 108–127. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199658343.001.0001.
    Zalabardo, José L. 2015a. Representation and Reality in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198743941.001.0001.
    Zalabardo, José L. 2015b. “Wittgenstein’s Nonsense Objection to Russell’s Theory of Judgement.” in Wittgenstein and Perception, edited by Michael Campbell and Michael O’Sullivan, pp. 126–151. London: Routledge.
    Zalabardo, José L. 2015c. “Epistemic Disjunctivism and the Evidential Problem [on Pritchard (2012)].” Analysis 75(4): 615–627.
    Zalabardo, José L. 2016a. “Reflective Knowledge and the Nature of Truth.” Disputatio 8(43): 147–171, doi:10.2478/disp-2016-0009.
    Zalabardo, José L. 2016b. “Empiricist Pragmatism.” in Philosophical Issues 26: Knowledge and Mind, edited by Christoph Kelp and Jack C. Lyons, pp. 441–461. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell, doi:10.1111/phis.12071.
    Zalabardo, José L. 2017. “Davidson, Russell, and Wittgenstein on the Problem of Predication.” in Wittgenstein and Davidson on Language, Thought, and Action, edited by Claudine Verheggen, pp. 226–249. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, doi:10.1017/9781316145364.
    Zalabardo, José L. 2018. “Actualism and Modal Semantics.” Acta Analytica 33(1): 35–49.
    Zalabardo, José L. 2019a. “The Primacy of Practice.” in Expressivisms, Knowledge and Truth, edited by Marı́a José Frápolli, pp. 181–199. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement n. 86. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    Zalabardo, José L. 2019b. “Belief, Desire and the Prediction of Behaviour.” in Philosophical Issues 29: Epistemology, edited by Lisa Miracchi, pp. 295–310. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley; Sons, Inc., doi:10.1111/phis.12155.
    Zalabardo, José L. 2023. Pragmatist Semantics: A Use-Based Approach to Linguistic Representation. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780192874757.001.0001.

Further References