James Andow (andow-j)

james.andow(at)manchester.ac.uk
jamesandow(at)gmail.com

My contributions to Philosophie.ch

If Philosophers Aren't Using Intuitions as Evidence, What Are They Doing?

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Bibliography

Andow, James. 2015a. “Expecting Moral Philosophers to be Reliable.” Dialectica 69(2): 205–220.

Andow, James. 2015b. “How Distinctive is Philosophers’ Intuition Talk?” Metaphilosophy 46(4–5): 515–538, doi:10.1111/meta.12151.

Andow, James. 2015c. “A Semantic Solution to the Problem with Aesthetic Testimony.” Acta Analytica 30(2): 211–218.

Andow, James. 2015d. “How ‘Intuition’ Exploded.” Metaphilosophy 46(2): 189–212, doi:10.1111/meta.12127.

Andow, James. 2016a. “Intuitions.” Analysis 76(2): 232–246.

Andow, James. 2016b. “Zebras, Intransigence & Semantic Apocalypse: Problems for Dispositional Metasemantics.” Philosophia 44(1): 53–62.

Andow, James. 2016c. “Abduction by Philosophers: Reorienting Philosophical Methodology.” Metaphilosophy 47(3): 353–370, doi:10.1111/meta.12191.

Andow, James. 2017a. “Intuition-Talk: Virus or Virtue?” Philosophia 45(2): 523–531.

Andow, James. 2017b. “Do Non-Philosophers Think Epistemic Consequentialism is Counterintuitive?” Synthese 194(7): 2631–2643.

Andow, James. 2017c. “A Partial Defence of Descriptive Evidentialism about Intuitions: A Reply to Molyneux (2014).” Metaphilosophy 48(1–2): 183–195, doi:10.1111/meta.12225.

Andow, James. 2021. “If Philosophers Aren’t Using Intuitions as Evidence, What Are They Doing?” Dialectica 75(2), doi:10.48106/dial.v75.i2.02.

Andow, James. 2023. “Intuitions about Cases as Evidence (for How We should Think).” Inquiry 66(6): 1036–1068, doi:10.1080/0020174X.2020.1767199.

Roberts, Pendaran, Andow, James and Schmidtke, Kelly. 2014. “Colour Relationalism and the Real Deliverances of Introspection.” Erkenntnis 79(5): 1173–1189.

Further References